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

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Religion and Education

Spring 1988

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

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Preface to the Issue "Religion and Education"

WHILE IN THEIR GENESIS, PLANNING, AND EXECUTION a number of *Dædalus* issues reflect the importance of what may charitably be described as editorial accident, this one, entitled "Religion and Education," uniquely qualifies for that distinction. Indeed, it may be one of the happier accidents in almost thirty years of *Dædalus* publication. The issue in its present form was not planned; much of what appears in the pages that follow is a very slightly edited version of remarks made by a company of thirteen who met for two days to consider what a *Dædalus* issue that treated these subjects might most reasonably dwell on. Such planning procedures, frequently used by *Dædalus*, generally provide the principal themes that authors are then invited to address in writing more formal essays.

The planning committee invitations, which Father Timothy Healy, president of Georgetown University, and I sent last spring, explained to a number who had not participated in such *Dædalus* procedures before what we hoped to accomplish in this new issue. It may be useful to reproduce segments of that original letter; we wrote:

In 1989, Georgetown University will be celebrating its bicentennial; the American Academy of Arts and Sciences is just a trifle older, having been founded in 1780. Its journal, *Dædalus*, is by comparison a mere stripling, having begun to appear, as a quarterly, only in 1958. Each issue of the journal is devoted to a single subject, and over the years there are two that have

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preoccupied us continually. Religion and/or education have figured prominently in well over a dozen *Dædalus* volumes; we believe that the time may be propitious for us to join the two in a special issue.

The term *religion* is so broad as to encompass many subjects; joining it to *education* does not serve to make it any less cosmic. As with any special *Dædalus* issue, our first purpose must be to bring together a small number of men and women who can help us decide what questions we ought to pursue, whom we ought to try to involve as authors, and how we ought to proceed.

Neither of us has taken any firm decision on what the issue should concentrate on or how it ought to be organized. Those are matters for the planning committee to decide. However, both of us feel that it may be useful for you to know some of the suggestions that have been made to us in the last few months.

While almost everyone has agreed that the issue should dwell principally on religion and education in America, several have suggested that we pay particular attention to the education that the various clergies in the United States are now receiving. Others have urged us to look at the constraints on teaching religion that exist in American civil society. Are there new questions that need to be asked about church-state relations, prayer in school, abortion, and the like? Is the constitutional and political debate now occurring on the proper role of religion, and not only in the education of children and adolescents, one that we need to interpret in new ways? What does this debate tell us about our supposedly "secular" society?

A number of those with whom we have spoken have commented on the ways in which religion is being asked increasingly to address certain of the more bewildering moral issues of our time. What are the principal moral issues that religion is addressing and with what effect? What can we say about the role of religious institutions in educating the public on these issues?

Is it correct to say that religion has some particular purchase on the teaching of morality and on the teaching of ethics more generally? One Watergate "victim" chose to explain his lapse by acknowledging that he had had only one course in ethics. Is it moral instruction that is lacking in our society today?

Neither of us wishes to impose any fixed agenda on the planning committee. Indeed, it will be the task of the planning committee to determine what to do and how to do it. We cannot tell you how much we would appreciate your participating in our Georgetown-*Dædalus* effort. We see enormous possibilities for this volume; we need your help.

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As with all such invitations, particularly for a conference scheduled to take place in the summer, a number whom we had hoped to involve were already committed on the dates chosen, were planning to be abroad, or could not accommodate the dates in already crowded schedules. Even with two last-minute withdrawals for reasons of health, we were left with a most remarkable company, the preponderant number (though not all) being able to attend all the planning committee sessions.

We started with a dinner, followed by an evening of talk that was not recorded. It seemed churlish to insist on recording apparatus being introduced on what was intended to be a purely social occasion, but we regretted our decision later. From that first evening, a number of comments were made that gave promise of a kind of discussion that neither of the conveners had wholly anticipated. Much of the talk was personal; some of it can best be described as a dwelling on the way we live and think now; abstract issues were sometimes raised, but also many very concrete and practical proposals were made for the kinds of themes that ought to figure in the issue we were planning.

For the whole time that we were together, we were, in effect, fulfilling our tasks as a *Dædalus* planning committee. None of us imagined that our talk in the two days following the dinner, recorded for the editor's benefit, to make easier his task of issuing invitations to others to write, would serve other purposes as well. We knew that we were enjoying the discussion; we hoped that it might be useful; that seemed sufficient reason for pursuing it.

Only after the transcript was prepared, when a number of participants and others in the *Dædalus* editorial offices had had the opportunity to read it, did another possibility occur to us. The recorded discussion, while random and seemingly chaotic at times, had raised issues of such a compelling nature that several of us felt the wish to share this material, to give it a more permanent form. No one had imagined that the planning conference transcript by itself could substitute for the larger program we had planned, but we wondered whether there might not be great utility in publishing it. It might incite interest and discussion that could at a later date become a *Dædalus* issue entitled "Religion and Education, Further Reflections."

The conference participants accepted this proposal and agreed to make only the most minor changes in their original remarks. Our

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purpose was to retain, to the extent that we could, the spontaneity and candor of the Georgetown discussions. All participants were invited also to add, if they wished, what one chose to call suppressed thoughts, and a number have in fact done so. Also, the transcipt, sent to the few who were unable to attend that Washington, D.C. meeting, served as the basis for a request that they consider writing brief and informal comments. Four very generously reacted with certain "random thoughts" of their own. I feel a deep gratitude to the conference participants who agreed to allow their conversation to be reproduced in this form and indeed to all who have contributed informal comments.

As chairman of the conference, I acted principally as traffic director, rarely intruding with substantive comments of my own. Still, reading the transcript and excited by my recollections of what was said in both the conference room and outside, I cannot resist adding just a few "suppressed thoughts" of my own.

There were many occasions during the conference when John Locke's words, as rendered in his 1690 "Epistle Dedicatory" for *Some Thoughts Concerning Education,* had considerable resonance. Locke wrote:

> I my self have been consulted of late by so many, who profess themselves at a Loss how to breed their Children, and the early Corruption of Youth is now become so general a Complaint, that he cannot be thought wholly impertinent, who brings the Consideration of this Matter on the Stage, and offers something, if it be but to excite others, or afford Matter of Correction.[1]

Today, as so often in the past, when the education of children seems to pose such insuperable problems and when the "corruption of youth" is so much complained of, there is an overwhelming need to reflect on how the young appear, what insufficiencies adults choose to object to when they consider their religious lives. It would be easy to demonstrate that the young have scant knowledge of Scripture, the Old Testament or the New, that their familiarity with the Bible is today greatly diminished from a time when many knew more.

Still, this perception has to be squared with the impression that on many college campuses voluntary student participation in religious services has rarely been more regular or more sensitive to religious rites and rituals. Yet, at the same time, there appears to be a

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diminished regard for other kinds of ritual. Why is there not a corresponding respect for civil ceremonies? As one reads on in this *Dædalus* issue, one wonders whether the evidence of a decline in book knowledge—if it exists in certain groups and religious communities—exists in all. Can one rightly complain of a universal deterioration in religious learning? How does all this relate to the larger question of whether there is still a "canon" in American cultural life—books, ideas, and experiences possessed by all or recommended for all? Could such a canon ever exist in a society so religiously divided, rightly fearing the stirring up of religious passions and eager to avoid certain kinds of controversy?

It is a commonplace to say that we have seen massive religious changes in recent decades. Neither Protestantism, Catholicism, nor Judaism as they exist in the United States today replicates what were thought to be the distinguishing characteristics of each only a very few decades ago. Yet it is difficult to know whether in the new spirit of religious compromise, with its supposed toleration, independent of what some see as a decline in ecumenicism, there are very many American academics who would subscribe to Cardinal Newman's view that "religious doctrine is knowledge, in as full a sense as Newton's doctrine is knowledge." Nor would they be any more willing to subscribe to Newman's statement that "university teaching without theology is simply unphilosophical. Theology has at least as good a right to claim a place there as astronomy."[2]

Despite the proliferation of religious studies courses, of departments that bear that name, a suspicion of religion has not wholly waned in American academic life. Militant atheism may be out of fashion; so also may the confident belief in the ineluctable triumph of secularism, but a residue of suspicion of religion and religious belief remains. While many Americans might be willing to settle for a version of Locke's idea that education exists to teach "Virtue, Wisdom, Breeding, and Learning," and that these "sometimes stand for the same thing, or really include one another,"[3] the idea that virtue depends on the "true notion of God, as of the independent Supreme Being, Author and Maker of all Things, from whom we receive all our Good, who loves us, and gives us all Things," however innocent-sounding, would certainly be divisive.[4] It is not what many who are concerned about virtue would wish to accept as a credible definition.

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We are left, then, with three perhaps unconnected observations. First, given the American constitutional requirement that church and state be separated, public elementary and secondary schools, quite independently of whatever happens in the struggle to introduce prayer in school, will always eschew religion as a major component of their curriculum. So long as they do, religion will be the teaching responsibility of parents, who will decide what kinds of religious instruction their children ought to have. In a society said to be increasingly homogeneous, where the mass media are expected to provide at least a passing acquaintance with all the principal defining elements of the nation's life, some attention to religion is to be expected. While an argument can be made that there is today a familiarity with American religion that on many levels did not exist in the pretelevision age, much of it appears to be superficial. If it is superficial, children and adults will continue to be locked into the religious communities they are principally associated with, having little knowledge of what is going on in religious communities outside. Many, including the most ardently religious, see no loss in this situation. Indeed, their overwhelming concern may be a fear of contamination of the young who stray from the fixed beliefs of an earlier generation. However, in the presence of a marked deterioration of what can only be called the civil religion of the society, which is more than just a code term for patriotism, a serious problem is created. Religious ghettos have always existed; they continue to exist today, with what loss, if any, to the nation and the individual, one cannot be certain. The problem of civil morality as distinct from religious morality remains.

Second, as the country becomes more diverse religiously, with followers of Islam, Hinduism, Confucianism, and other major world religions increasing in the United States, not to speak of the Orthodox, both Greek and Russian, the old assumption that an American is either Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jew is both inaccurate and inhibitive of the kinds of reflection that ought to be occurring in this country today. If, for example, one is serious in asking a question like, What does it mean to be Chinese in the United States today? and perhaps in contrasting Chinese experience at this time with that of an earlier period, the religious beliefs and experience of the Chinese population may be relevant. It may matter greatly whether certain families are Christian or Confucian, how their religious life defines

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their capacity, indeed their willingness, to adopt certain American values and practices, and how the Chinese, like other Asians with their own religions, may be redefining or modifying what was once thought to be American culture.

Or take a very different example. If some see significance in blacks in Atlanta, for example, appearing to enjoy an educational opportunity not available to blacks in New York, it may be necessary to look not only at the quality of the two school systems, the incidence of divorce, separation, illegitimacy, and the like—all immensely important—but also at the nature of the religious life of the two communities, with its significance for children, parents, teachers, and school administrators. The black churches of America, long a subject of interest to scholars, are certainly vastly changed today from what they were when Gunnar Myrdal described them.[5] To estimate how they have changed in a perspective that takes account of the new powers that exist, which asks whether the smaller, more independent, still largely segregated black churches are losing parishioners as the "mainline" churches of America are—and how this change is affecting education—is to ask very fundamental questions.

Third, there is the need to acknowledge the immense importance of religion in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa and the effect this must have on how Americans perceive the world. There is also the need to acknowledge how the world perceives the United States. This involves much more than a willingness to become informed about the rest of the world, to study Islam, Taoism, Hinduism, cargo cults, Christianity, and Judaism abroad in a way that is still too uncommon.

A much larger issue, in my mind, is involved. Until the United States accepts the fact that its institutions and values are being scrutinized abroad as never before, and not simply because of disaffection with events in Washington, D.C., or more substantial fears about an economy that appears increasingly precarious, we will not understand the nature of the new intellectual dialogue that is occurring in the world today. Ernest Gellner, intending to be provocative, wrote in a recent issue of *The American Scholar:*

> The American Declaration of Independence is one of the most comic and preposterous documents ever penned. Yet Thomas Jefferson was not, in any technical or ordinary sense, a fool. This, however, did not prevent him and

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his fellows from affirming something totally absurd—namely, that views which, for 99 percent of mankind, would have been unintelligible, or at best blasphemous, heretical, and subversive, were actually *self-evident*.

What is the explanation of such egregious folly on the part of otherwise perfectly intelligent, sober, responsible, and competent men? The explanation is simple. They took their own rather unusual culture so much for granted that they mistook it for the human condition in general. An individualist world in which men are free to choose their own aims, and select their means by reference to efficiency, seemed to them an obvious world, and one in which all men live as of right. What other world could there be?[6]

These words deserve to be taken seriously. Even today, with all the shocks that have been administered to American self-confidence recently, there is a tendency for many to believe that American values are (or ought to be) universal. The idea that one of our most sacred civil religion texts would be regarded as "blasphemous, heretical, and subversive" in certain parts of the world today and that it would certainly have been so regarded in the eighteenth century is worth reflecting on. So also is the idea that Americans are in the habit of mistaking their "unusual culture" for "the human condition in general." While there is an obvious advantage in knowing the religions of the world and in understanding how they influence behavior and belief, there is an even greater need to understand why religion, whatever its role in contemporary American life, exercises extraordinary influence abroad. If we live in a world where religion may seem a negligible force in a number of very powerful states, it is a force of the greatest significance in others. In our tendency to be reductionist, to imagine that the world revolves around one or two poles—the Soviet or the American—it is important to remember that there are many others.

I must express our sincere gratitude to Father Healy for helping to make this issue of *Dædalus* possible. We are all in his debt for his agreeing to the idea of launching such an inquiry in the first instance and for his generous counsel and hospitality. We hope that this *Dædalus* issue will herald a very happy bicentennial celebration for Georgetown.

S.R.G.

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ENDNOTES

[1]John Locke, "Some Thoughts Concerning Education," in *The Educational Writings of John Locke* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 111–12.
[2]John Henry Cardinal Newman, *The Idea of a University* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1925), 42.
[3]Locke, 240.
[4]Locke, 241.
[5]Gunnar Myrdal, *The American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Row, 1942).
[6]Ernest Gellner, "The Stakes in Anthropology," *The American Scholar* 57 (1) (1988):22–23.

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

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Religion and Education

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James Gustafson
Timothy Healy, S.J.
Robert Kiely
George Lindbeck
Robert Lynn
Frank Manuel
John Padberg, S.J.
Theodore Sizer

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: Last evening, in a more informal setting, where we were free of the obligation to speak "for the record," we talked very generally about education and religion. It was a wonderful way for each of us to come to know the other, to sense what some of the preoccupations of the group are. Since most of us are in one way or another associated with universities, it would have been reasonable to expect that much of the discussion would dwell on our university experience, how religion figures in the academic curriculum, how it expresses itself in the daily lives of both students and faculty. That subject was certainly broached, but there was no disposition to concentrate only on such matters.

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Rather, implicit in all our discussion was the idea that whether we are reflecting on the varieties of religious experience, the nature of religious symbolism, or the importance of religious ritual, we are in fact asking a more fundamental question, which has to do with the role of religion in American society today.

While it would be a mistake to pretend that America's schools and universities provide the perfect window for surveying that vastly complex terrain, they may reveal much that would not be learned by the study of certain other American institutions. To believe, for example, as certain publicists do, that the young in this country today are basically irreligious, that their scant knowledge of Scripture and Bible history is proof of that fact is to live with a very simple idea of what the term *religion* implies, how religious belief is expressed, and what religious experience can be. It is to close one's eyes also to any number of contemporary phenomena, including the very obvious one that millions of American students, undergraduate and graduate, regularly and voluntarily attend religious services and participate in extracurricular activities that can only be called religious. In these circumstances, it is impossible to imagine that secularism is the rampant ideology of our day, that God is indeed dead for them.

To look at religion and education in the largest frame is to look at the culture of a society, in this case our own. I think it would be illuminating and helpful for us to consider contemporary education in cultural-historical terms. Even though we may have to change our notions of ingroup and outgroup and abandon certain canons that once enjoyed undisputed authority, together with a number of interpretations that were commonly held, all these things need to be seen in cultural perspective. Our language has changed. So have our mores. So have our expectations. This is not to say that there are no continuities. Indeed, our need may be precisely to give attention to both continuity and change.

DENISE CARMODY: The question I have is, Do we want to discuss what the relationship between religion and education is or what it should be?

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: How do you feel about that?

DENISE CARMODY: I would think that we would need to do both. To say even tentatively what should be, we would need to say what is.

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MICHAEL FISHBANE: I would add to that the need for historical depth in our analyses, for an account of how things have been. I think it is vital that we accompany our prescriptions of how things may go with some historical perspective. It may help to arrange the issues in history-of-religion categories, to focus on classical textual or cultural tensions as we envision new harmonies or shared cultures. To see the issues in a broad perspective, to retrieve them from the past as a way of illuminating the present and the future, serves, I think, two purposes. It gives cultural depth to our analysis and in a sense rebuilds culture at the same time. In this way we do not simply make proposals. We embed or indirectly suggest such changes in the course of our historical research.

There are other benefits too. For one, we resist the danger of skimpy, contemporary analyses. For another, we enable people who are really at the forefront of contemporary education to see what they are doing in cultural-historical terms. After all, our cultural task is grave and far-reaching and, I think, may require fundamental changes in ingroup-outgroup relations and in the notion of cultural-literary canons and their reinterpretation. But once matters are seen in a cultural perspective, attitudes may change and resistance may lessen. Our very language has changed, and if we see this change in historical terms, we may be better able to readjust or assess just what we want to do.

TIMOTHY HEALY: I can give you an example of that. If you run a university, particularly if it has any religious base at all, you are continually under fire about the morals of students. It is perfectly clear that student morals in the minds of millions of people have radically declined since the 1950s—"they have all gone to hell in a hand basket." If you read the sixteenth-century commentaries, you will find that exactly the same thing was being said. Go all the way back to the Codex Gratianus, which carries a gloss on the canon that a bishop must suppress houses of prostitution in his diocese. The gloss is "except if the bishop is unfortunate enough to have a university in his diocese." The explanation given is *Scholares sine meretricibus vivere nequeunt*—"Students cannot live without whores." Not they won't, but they CAN'T. That's put down in blunt Latin, so it seems to me that somewhere in the sixteenth century, Oxford had the same dreadful reputation that Georgetown has in the

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minds of certain conservative Catholics. And others, by the way—they are by no means all Catholics.

Putting the thing in historical context reminds you that certain things about being twenty do not change much over the centuries. Today we provide a little greater facility in that the medieval university was all male, but that seems to me to be about the only change that's happened. All sorts of historical contexts are deeply deceiving, particularly the close ones. The 1950s, I think, in Catholic higher education are a sort of blot on the landscape that one has to get over and frankly, I think, an aberration. For most people my age, it's regarded as the golden age, and I don't think for a multiplicity of reasons that it ought to be so regarded. It's helpful to go back beyond this century and get some sense of what was happening in the nineteenth century and even earlier.

THEODORE SIZER: I thought about the topic coming down. So much depends on the lens we use to look at the issue and who does the looking. As far as high schools are concerned, as that is what I've been looking at, the most interesting thing about the place of religion is how small it is. For adolescents in both public and private schools, which of all age groups is probably more taken by ritual than any other, the religious threads that interest us around this table are quite irrelevant. That is interesting. That needs to be said. In my listening to colleagues in religious studies, I get no sense of the extraordinary limitation of the impact on the public of the ideas with which they are engaged, particularly the young public. We spend a lot of time looking at the aberrant, the fundamentalist schools, the Jewish day school movement, the ups and downs and ins and outs of the vast Catholic diocesan or nondiocesan systems. And that is certainly the edge. The great mass of schools and communities do not address the kinds of issues that concern us.

I don't know if religion being culturally less significant than we would like is necessarily a bad thing. I think we should ask anthropologists—people who have watched growing up in America and who have asked questions about the rituals of growing up over time—to what extent some of those rituals are religious by some definition and what the changes in those rituals imply for the culture.

ROBERT KIELY: May I comment on that? I think that is very important, and it might be an interesting way of connecting with

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higher education and secondary school education. Two of my children have gone to the Cambridge public high school. I went to the graduation this past spring. About six hundred graduated from the senior class, and the principal announced that there were seventy national groups represented in the school. Now, Cambridge Rindge and Latin may not be characteristic of every small-town high school, but this diversity is getting more and more common in large-city secondary schools, and religion plays absolutely no role in the school, just as you've said.

It seems to me that there is a very important and a very American reason for that. This is a school that was troubled with all kinds of tensions for many years, and I think that there has been a tacit agreement that the areas of differences and sensitivities will be muted deliberately. When I think about what religious attitudes we might have in common, at least in the American context, one thing most Americans seem to share is a strong belief in religious tolerance. One must not impose one's own attitudes toward religion, whether one is a believer or not, on others. This is fundamental to our sense of keeping the civic peace in this country. Whether one associates with an established religion or not, we all have rather strong views about what religion is or is not. And what one gets on public occasions therefore is either the bland Memorial Day service or the reading of T. S. Eliot's "Wasteland" in which the teacher does not free himself to say what he really thinks about it. We've all been to occasions like that, where we bite our tongues for fear of giving offense or imposing our own beliefs on others. I don't think our discussion should be like that. On the other hand, I suppose the opposite would be a series of strongly individualistic, "Here I stand" positions, which is also part of the American picture. From secondary school onward, we are all accustomed to bland neutrality or divisive individualism.

THEODORE SIZER: What did you observe at Cambridge Rindge and Latin School—deliberate tolerance or tolerance driven by indifference?

ROBERT KIELY: I think some of both. I would say that in the policy of the school, in the courses offered, there was a restraint, a wish not to get students into course work or into extracurricular activities that were going to bring them into conflict on this matter. I assume that was deliberate.

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GEORGE LINDBECK: There is an interesting secular parallel in the past decade's arguments over the thick and thin theories of the good. You have a whole group of secular thinkers who are trying to devise a notion of what we require for civic peace, which really more or less excludes discussion of ultimate ends and purposes—of the good—so all you can do in the public arena is set down procedural rules, and then people are free to develop their own communities. But you are not allowed to let those communities compete for having *the* solution for everyone, and it seems to me that constraint leads to a kind of neurotic fear of even discussing certain kinds of issues. Ultimate questions concerning human welfare and human destiny are not considered appropriate for public discourse, and that seems to me a crazy sort of situation.

Religion in the eyes of many is a way of looking at the world that has something called *the* answer to things. I think anybody who proposes to have *the* answer is looked upon as a danger to the civil good. One can pick up these parallel trends developing. I don't think the feeling is indifference. I think it is a genuine nervousness that you can't do this. It's going to be offensive to others. It's going to be dangerous to others.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: To go back to Ted Sizer's comments, to what extent do Steve and others think it is necessary to look at the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of education about religion in traditional religious institutions? When one gets to high school or undergraduate or even graduate level and finds that amount of ignorance, one can't just look at the secondary school system. One has to ask what happened in the religious communities out of which these people come that they should be so ignorant at this age. That might be another side of it.

JOHN PADBERG: To pick up on that, I think we have got to make clear how very unusual this country's higher-education system is. It's the first and only place where on other than an early, midadolescent level, religion is studied seriously. It can be studied seriously in a university. Somebody in a European system finishes secondary school, goes on to a university, and immediately specializes in medicine, political science, literature, or some other subject. You can, at least in a fair number of places in this country, on a relatively serious, young-adult level, study religion or theology.

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MICHAEL FISHBANE: The overall reluctance to teach certain aspects of religion because of a fear of confronting the sensibilities of our students should also, I think, be recognized for some of its educational implications. Certainly, one of the basic tensions between religious and general education is the notion of the hierarchy of texts. Unreflective tolerance often claims that all religious texts should be seen or studied in the same way. This claim can lead to a dangerous leveling of the subject matter—not because uniform methodologies are bad in some sense but because the historical religions themselves have a vital sense of textual hierarchy. Historically, the Western religions have a clear sense of canon and a fundamental belief that certain materials should be taught in specific, traditional ways in order to inculcate certain beliefs, virtues, and behaviors. Our modern and postmodern will to dehierarchization, on the other hand—whether because of fear of confrontation or some notion of commonality—often simply cultivates the most bland sense of tolerance.

As a topic for consideration, then, we might want to pick up on the question of whether the goal of education is to treat all texts alike and to present cultures and religions as equivalent, without significant differences of value. I think we can profitably take up the challenge—indeed, even see what the challenge is—of cultures or subcultures in America that have hierarchies of texts and values that come into conflict with the general American ethos of nonconfrontation, or of the American will to dehierarchize the sources of instruction and virtue. If we want to use religious texts to foster discussion on the nature of the person or value in our educational system, we must find respectful ways of bringing these materials into vigorous—and not bland—conversation.

ROBERT LYNN: I want to ask Ted Sizer to expand his comments about the historical aspect of this situation. Is it a new development or something that has been with us for some time?

THEODORE SIZER: I think it's a relatively new development, meaning a development since the Second World War. Many of the so-called public school systems were powerfully either very Catholic or very Protestant. Most in the nineteenth century were very Protestant, insofar as there were "systems." But in the Cambridge public schools, which our kids went to some years ago, at the elementary level, you couldn't tell some of the old-line elementary school

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teachers from their equivalents in the parochial schools. There was no questioning certain things.

One sees a kind of sloppiness today. It may be inattention. It may be trying to avoid controversy. It may be just the feeling that there are other priorities that seem to engulf the kids, engulf the teachers, in schools, even in the church-related schools. In visiting Catholic schools, I am constantly surprised by how many of the required theology classes are really kind of touchy-feely psychology gatherings—"How do you feel about it?"—and struck by how little pressure there is to develop a sharply edged Catholicism.

I hope we don't lose the religious character of our church-related universities. When I as an outsider have asked people running church-related schools why they aren't more powerfully Catholic or whatever, they have replied, "We're not evangelical." So something has changed as mass secondary education has spread across this country since the 1960s. There has been very little "edge" to the religious sense in most schools, including church-related schools.

JOHN PADBERG: That's where history comes in, important in all sorts of ways for the Catholic schools. After Vatican II the reaction to the way in which religion was taught in those schools, especially the primary and secondary schools, with the Baltimore catechism and straight, clear, precise, definite, one-track answers all the way through twelve years, was absolutely immense. We're getting away from the reaction only now.

Most of the Catholic schools from the middle of the nineteenth century on were teaching a very intellectualized, highly statement-oriented version of Catholicism. The Baltimore catechism begins with "Who made me?" "God made me." "Why did God make me?" "God made me to know, love, and serve Him, and thereby gain heaven." "How do I know, love, and serve God?" And you went through a hundred pages of questions and answers like that, all very clear, neat, ordered, precise, determined.

Once Vatican II came along and began to open the door to the thought that there were other answers, and not only one set of them to some of these questions, the structure that had been so tightly put together and by which supposedly the faith could be explained had a couple of pins pulled out of it and collapsed. Part of the reaction to

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that was everything everywhere or anything anywhere—the touchy-feely, the psychologizing of religion. If we don't take account of that development in Catholic schools, we will see a very small part of the picture.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Another break occurred at about that same time. I went to a Jesuit high school in New York, called Regis. It is anomalous. It is the only funded school the Jesuits have—there is no tuition. I graduated in 1940, and a lot of the kids didn't go on to college. Then, of course, there was the great unpleasantness between the Third Reich and this republic, which upset my generation. Still, if you went to college at that time, it was taken for granted that you would go to a Catholic college. A principal would not give you a recommendation for a non-Catholic college. Immediately after the Second Vatican Council, the high schools really did open up, and I noticed this year that the leading college choice at Regis is NYU, with nine kids choosing it. Next come Williams and Georgetown, with eight each, and then there's a list of about fifty schools, most of them praetorian because the kids generally work hard. The good Catholic high schools are now sedulously recruited by major state colleges in California, by the Ivy League in the Northeast, by the Poison Ivy in the mid-Atlantic area, with absolutely no reference to their being Catholic. You can't tell from the college choices of kids in this particular high school anything except that they must be bright.

JOHN PADBERG: The forty-seven Jesuit high schools around the country are descended upon by droves of recruiters from everywhere. They would never have gotten in the door before Vatican II.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: This is a classic example of what happens when the kind of theology that Catholicism is assimilates. How do you maintain a kind of integrity in your own faith and religion, meanwhile trying to have it accepted in the larger society and wanting to show yourself acceptable and open? Part of it is to be open. You have to find a way to digest everything that is going on in the culture and put it together. Of course, it doesn't add up to a very coherent package.

ROBERT KIELY: Being open—I'm thinking about Michael's comment on dehierarchizing texts—is often being open to something other than a book. Where value courses exist in secondary schools—

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even in schools with Catholic or Protestant backgrounds, probably not Jewish though—the ethics and religious studies courses often have no books at all. You're expected to read the newspaper or think from experience. This approach is based on the notion of a religious sensibility or an ethical sensibility that comes from within. It is not supposed to be text-oriented.

TIMOTHY HEALY: There was a very strong front-loading of Scholastic terminology in that old "proposition presentation" of the faith. It was strictly in Scholastic terms, and while they were not broken down and I don't think as youngsters we understood them, matters such as substance and accident, form and matter were dealt with in catechisms intended for quite young children. Certainly, substance and accident was taught us, at—I don't know—what age?

JOHN PADBERG: Seven.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Seven, when we made our First Communion. Then, the categories of substance and accident, explaining the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, were spelled out in purely Scholastic terms. We were familiar with those and comfortable with them. I got less comfortable with them as I learned what they meant.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Am I correct in understanding that in the Catholic schools there has been a shift away from objective argument and that no rhetoric has replaced it in the wake of the radical subjectivization of all discussions of religion? Are you limited to talking about how you feel about religious faith and religious experience, or has a new rhetoric emerged? Certainly, the need to find a new language of education is a challenge facing Jewish parochial schools.

TIMOTHY HEALY: There are curious patterns, Michael, which I am just not capable of analyzing for you. I can give you one out of our experience at Georgetown. I have never seen a time when the liturgy, the formal liturgy, I mean the Mass, has drawn more profound attention and participation than I have in the past five or six years. It is extraordinary in what numbers and with what frequency students reach toward this one unifying act. It's a very beautiful ritual, a very rich ritual. It is now, by the way, also an intelligible ritual to other than the priest because we are saying it in English. That is clearly part of the rhetoric that has evolved.

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MICHAEL FISHBANE: It has parallels in contemporary Jewish life, and I wonder whether we might want to explore it, given the relative absence from the modern world of coherent arguments for faith. For many moderns, ritual behavior has become an alternate mode of religious rhetoric. In contrast with earlier times, when traditional ritual either complemented or deepened the received religious structures, ritual frequently functions today as an alternate structure. Alongside this phenomenon there is also the increase of ritual formalism in certain Jewish circles, which aims at a critique of modernity—or at least seeks to deepen forms of antimodernism. In these instances, the form itself becomes a countercultural statement, an ideological proclamation that silences discourse and the search for new religious discussion.

TIMOTHY HEALY: There's a parallel Catholic experience. The Mass is very important, but the sacrament of penance has practically ceased to exist on university campuses, so much so that some of us are worried. Years ago you could have in a university chapel on a Catholic campus a couple of priests all afternoon and through the early evening hearing confessions, and they would be busy. You could stick the curé d'ars there now as a confessor and have no trade at all unless you began doing marvelous things, in which case the kids would go to "watch this guy levitate." But that may well be a reflection of the revolution with the young in their privatization of all sexual morality. That kids fool around—to use the metaphor the Irish invented for it—is as old as the university itself. That they feel no problem with this is quite a modern phenomenon. The medievals knew what was naughty.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: At the Catholic parochial schools, don't they teach sexual behavior within a religious context?

THEODORE SIZER: There's rhetoric and there's reality, and the rhetoric is there, in my experience with a few parochial schools. But even that becomes a ritual.

I think your point about rituals is immensely important. The schools have rituals that are simply played out because that's the way you do things. For example, if you go to a public school graduation, despite the separation of church and state, the local clergy always offer a blessing. Ask a kid, "What was the name of the clergyman or clergywoman who gave the blessing?" and he'll answer, "I don't

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know." "What did she or he say?" "I don't know." "Was it OK?" "Sure." There's a kind of acceptance of the form without any concern for the substance. I think the same thing applies to the kind of expected adult teaching, almost parental knee-jerk "Thou shalt not. . ."

ROBERT LYNN: But, Ted, are you including the extracurriculum in your statement?

THEODORE SIZER: The extracurriculum is where most of the ritual takes place.

ROBERT LYNN: Ah, yes. But are you saying that you find very little by way of religious sentiment in the extracurriculum of high school students, and does your sample include the Southeast and the Southwest?

THEODORE SIZER: I find remarkably little religious manifestation of the formal kind, which is represented by "capital *R*" Religious Studies as we pursue them at Phillips Academy in Andover. I find a very great "small *r*" religious emphasis in kids. It is almost as if there were in our time a thrashing-around for a new sort of Baltimore catechism, a new McGuffey. But maybe the formalistic texts are an outmoded way of doing this.

All you have to do is have a youngster die in a school—from suicide or racial violence or something like that—and watch what happens. *That's* the extracurriculum. Much of it is profoundly religious. The solemn reappraisal of what is really important in life that followed that murder at Cambridge Rindge and Latin School a few years back is revealing. Yes, I think there is much religious energy among adolescents. It is just a different sort of energy than that which occupies a good deal of the time of those of us who study the matter.

ROBERT LYNN: In addition to that, I was after something else. It is often overlooked or minimized by people who find the whole development distasteful—that is, among high school students the manifestation of religious movements that are carried out by the students themselves. You go to the Southeast or the Southwest, and you see the proliferation and development of such movements as Young Life, Youth for Christ, and Fellowship of Christian Atheletes. None of those have been critically examined, placed in a historical context. We haven't understood how those have replaced

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earlier developments out of the 1880s and 1890s that have largely disappeared.

THEODORE SIZER: I spent some Wednesday nights in West Texas during school time and found that you don't hold any meetings on that night, because that's church night. I was taken around to different churches. It was all very secular, *very* secular. It was a social thing. And so I think we do need to look carefully at things like the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, which at the school level is fascinating. My instinct, however, is to believe that it's not very deep.

ROBERT LYNN: That is what we must find out. The Fellowship of Christian Athletes embodies a wonderful expression of the alchemy of sports and religion, a mixture that is so characteristic of our society. What does that mixture mean? And how does it explain the way in which people are honored or dishonored? These questions have been almost entirely neglected by historians of American religion because for a variety of understandable reasons, they find the movement distasteful. Yet such mass movements are powerful in some places. At least we have to examine them and find out what's going on there.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Another aspect worth reflecting on is generosity. Let's go back just to the colleges. Out of the twenty to thirty thousand graduates of Jesuit colleges every year, there are some six hundred kids giving one or two years' service to something called the Jesuit Volunteer Corps. On this campus of five thousand undergraduates, there are solidly a thousand who spend many hours a week tutoring or working for the elderly. Most of the inspiration for that is putatively religious. Still, there is absolutely no sectarian distinction—the student who led the Community Action Coalition two years ago was Jewish. The young take this kind of religious manifestation very seriously. The six hundred in the national grouping are called bluntly the Jesuit Volunteer Corps, and religious community is part of their experience. It is worked at very seriously, and the kids go along with it. Its abstract theological content I can't judge.

JOHN PADBERG: It varies from section to section. Some of the theological content they get in the course of being part of this Jesuit Volunteer Corps is very serious. They live in community. How much a month are they given?

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TIMOTHY HEALY: Thirty dollars, something like that. They serve a whole year. In foreign service they are required to serve two years, which involves language learning. Essentially, the program leans on a kind of religiously oriented community of students and their directors in Belize, Nepal, and somewhere in Micronesia. There are about four international groups.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Aspects of this discussion strike me as extremely important for teaching the humanities. The study of spontaneous religious behaviors, of newly generated rituals, would certainly help the educator, who often faces a painful generation gap. The kids come to us, and we immediately feel like adversaries toward them. They often appear to know little about the historical cultures we teach and to care even less. We tend to see them as culturally deformed because they don't know who Achilles was and to see ourselves as advocates for texts whose value is hardly self-evident to them. Because of this situation, we lose perspective and do not recognize their spontaneous religious power or appreciate their cultural concerns. Without having the academy capitulate to the raw needs of the kids coming in, I think it would be helpful for educators to know more about these spontaneous energies—energies that are, perhaps, intimations of a new religious age and preformations of new cultural concerns.

ROBERT KIELY: It would be interesting also to see whether there might be some connection between the spontaneous interest and the return to a certain formalism. I would certainly corroborate what Tim Healy said about the attendance at religious services. I think it goes across the religious categories. My sense is that although there is always the danger of empty form, at best these rituals are not only occasions of worship but also of learning and a kind of bonding.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: I am interested in a number of Michael Fishbane's comments. One has to do with a hierarchy of texts. When we talk about these new religious movements and all this spontaneity, we are talking about a religiosity without any significant historical consciousness of the roots through texts, through ritual, through community from which these sorts of things have come. And there is always the problem of the extent to which one can sustain even these general religious and moral impulses without some kind of communal identity and some kind of historical identity.

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One thing we might want to look at on the university level and down to the high school level—I think this is what Michael is getting at—is this: Are students exposed to any comprehensive and thorough study of the classic religious documents in Western culture? At the University of Chicago I have participated in a Great Books–inspired undergraduate program called Texts and Fundamentals. It has been very interesting to work through large sections of Calvin's *Institutes,* Luther's 1535 commentary on Galatians, and St. Thomas on virtue and law, for example, with undergraduates who have never read religious books. When I did Calvin last winter, I had eight students—one Jewish, three Catholic, the others kind of nominal nothing or something. I asked how many had ever read a religious book. One student said that she had read the Book of Job in a course on Western civilization. I asked how many had read the Bible, and I got a kind of unsureness. What interests me in doing this with undergraduates at Chicago is the extent to which they can be very bright and exceedingly perceptive, not only about the sort of existential or human-condition issues that come out of those texts but also about ideas. It takes a lot of backing and filling for an instructor to set these things in a historical context that those people don't have.

A great number of what pass for Western civilization courses—and I think this is what Michael is saying—simply skirt the religious traditions. They concentrate on the *Iliad,* the *Odyssey,* and the *Republic* and then treat Hobbes, Machiavelli, and so forth.

I think we could do a much better job of reading classical texts and setting them in historical context, not only as a way of overcoming these deficiencies we have been talking about but also as a way of showing that religion is not just ritual or experience. Religion is ideas. Religion is not just voluntary help. There are communities and historical factors that need to be reflected on. I would like to see such things considered. Even if for religious texts you look back to the so-called great books of the Hutchins era, you will find St. Thomas Aquinas, one chapter of Calvin's *Institutes,* and that is all.

THEODORE SIZER: This discussion underscores a distinction I think we should keep in mind—the difference between talking about religion in *higher* education and talking about religion and education themselves. It is well to remember that, depending upon how you count it, between a fifth and a quarter of all school-age children in

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this country come from households living below the poverty line. And if you count all institutions of higher education, only one out of every two Americans ever goes on. Religion and education is a profoundly different issue in a high school in New York City than it is at Brown University or Georgetown. Maybe it shouldn't be, but I think we have to be clear about what drives large numbers of poor youngsters. The school population will be a third minority by the mid-1990s—mostly black and Hispanic. What does that mean for religion in America? That is a different question from what it will mean for elite universities.

GEORGE LINDBECK: Ever since the Second Vatican Council, I have taught a course for Yale undergraduates on contemporary Roman Catholic developments. I happened to be a Protestant observer at the Second Vatican Council, so it was logical for me to take on this course, and I have just kept on. So I have had a twenty-year experience of dealing mostly with Roman Catholics because it is mostly Roman Catholics who take this course. The transformation in those twenty years has been immense. Admittedly, these are mostly Catholics from prosperous suburban parishes. They are not a representative sample of Catholic students from the country at large. But everything that has been said so far about student developments fits these undergraduates. They know little about Catholic doctrine in contrast to twenty years ago, but they are interested in finding out about it. They are also ritually interested. Many are socially concerned and have philanthropic interests.

My role ends up being that of a catechist. I have to tell them the most elementary things about Catholic doctrine in a way that was wholly unnecessary twenty years ago. So this talk we had a little while ago about the unique American situation, where one can study religion on the higher-education level, is a bit misleading. Some of this growth of the study of religion—and that was to some extent supported by what Jim Gustafson said—is a matter of belated catechesis.

Now, the students in undergraduate religion courses at Yale who identify themselves with particular religious traditions have generally in my experience been Catholic or Jewish. There is also, however, a high proportion of students, if you take the undergraduate courses as a whole, who are simply interested in the phenomenon of religion.

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They don't admit to a personally meaningful identification with any particular communal tradition. Their study of religion is often a matter of trying to develop their own philosophy of life. It does not involve raising the question of becoming part of a communal religious tradition.

For this group of students the function of these college religion courses seems to me psychologically, sociologically, and educationally very individualistic. I find myself reminded of a case that has become rather famous, cited in *Habits of the Heart,* the book by Robert Bellah—the example of Sheilaism. Sheila Larson invented her own religion and called it Sheilaism. An awful lot of American religiosity on the college level seems to me to be of this character.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Part of the tension that we feel is that we come to the text as interpreters, and we place great cultural value on that fact. Part of our purpose is therefore to fill in historical background and to put students into filiation with earlier tradition—in short, to make them interpreters. In many ways what astonishes and frightens us—and it is part of the power of youth—is that they are so very different. We see ourselves as interpreters, and they see themselves as open to new revelations. I use the term very broadly, of course, but my point is that these students don't always want to come back to prior moments of religious illumination through the texts that sponsored them. At best, they may come to these texts as fragments of wisdom—which they arrange at will and without historical perspective into some new configuration.

That, in a sense, is one problem we face as teachers. We represent the cultural tradition and want to initiate our students into it. We want to make them responsible cultural members, and some of us may see them as culturally shallow. Still, they seem to be functioning very well.

Can we presume that because they don't think their way through earlier stages of civilization, they are necessarily philistine or incapable of serious ethical reflection? We may tend to think so and perhaps have thoroughly deluded ourselves into thinking that virtue needs some training. Still, many of our students don't see this need for antiquated learning. They see the corpus as utterly outmoded. My experience suggests that they take bits and pieces of it and apply it in individual ways. They have their own religious sentiments, and they bond with kids who have similar feelings.

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ROBERT KIELY: Well, that is interesting, at least in terms of some aspects of the gospel because the basic gospel message doesn't particularly require learning or knowledge of a long textual tradition. Not that Jesus himself didn't have it, but that is not what he stressed. He frequently praised the simplicity of children. It is curious, for if those students who are Christians who are behaving in a spontaneous way were to argue with us or to answer some of what we have been saying about texts, they might say, "Yes, we are closer to the gospel than you people who are the interpreters and the commentators."

GEORGE LINDBECK: This is a very unhistorical way of talking about the gospel. No other previous generation of Christians would ever have talked that way, with the exception of some left-wing Protestants. Christianity has always been textually based from the very first generation for which scripture was the Hebrew Bible, even if in Greek translation.

ROBERT KIELY: But there have been very different balances in terms of the importance of the text and the impulse of the inner light.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: One of the topics that we haven't discussed yet and that seems to me extremely valuable for the issues we are considering is the matter of authority and its various loci—texts, traditions, and teachers. What in the culture serve as points of orientation in this making of new personalities?

JOHN PADBERG: Certainly, some of the people entering Roman Catholic seminaries now, having come out of that generation where there was little or no formal content in religion courses, are much more conservative than they would have been say ten or fifteen years ago. They want doctrine taught. As one young Jesuit said rather vigorously, "Look, I want to hear exactly what the Church has said over the centuries. All I got when I was in grade school was, 'Now put together Noah's ark out of these pieces of paper,' or 'Tell me where Joan of Arc wandered during her campaigns in France.' That is all I got. I got stories. I got things to make or things to do, to excite my imagination. Now tell me what the Church has said."

DENISE CARMODY: In the state schools where I have taught—Penn State, Wichita State, now University of Tulsa, historically Presbyterian—a preponderance of students in a Catholicism course that I teach have been Roman Catholic. I find in both the state schools and

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across middle America the same lack of historical knowledge, or any knowledge, really, of their Catholic heritage. The thing that frightens me, though, is that while they cling to a certain amount of ritual and bonding, they interpret their Catholicism in terms of their very conservative backgrounds. They are bigoted. They say that theirs is the true Catholic tradition, and it becomes a tug of war to try to enlighten them about what the whole Catholic tradition is because, except in the area of sex, where you will find them very liberal, they have taken in all the conventional conservative ideas and then baptized those, declaring them Catholic.

Unless we return to a historical study of text and recover a real knowledge of what the history of the Church has been, we are not just going to have very superficial understanding, not only touchy-feely, but new and more intense forms of bigotry. That is a very strong word, I realize.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: From a historical point of view, I think we should not forget that most of the monotheistic religions were enormously bigoted and intolerant in their classical forms. We tend to think that if we put forward the whole historical spectrum, it will somehow justify religious pluralism or tolerance. Nothing could be further from the truth, and there is no need to cite historical examples. Contemporary Orthodox religious practice in Israel proves the point quite well. Many spokesmen for certain groups claim that they alone represent authentic Judaism and that they alone are privileged interpreters of the tradition.

It does not help to say that this is a distorted argument. Claims and counterclaims of authenticity fill the historical literature. As historians we may want to rebut this or that claim, and as moderns we may reject such assertions for purely ethical reasons. But the fact is that all the wonderful diversities we find in religions or in any single religion were neither simultaneous nor synchronous. The historical religions have tended to advocate exclusive claims and to exclude others. I think we should not forget that.

DENISE CARMODY: Yes, but if they are exposed to the whole, they are less likely to justify their own bigotries.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: Could you be a little more specific on what those bigotries are? They don't exist in the sexual domain. What are they?

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DENISE CARMODY: These students tend to be absolute about where salvation lies, about the relationship and the place of Jews. As for sexual mores, they have very conservative notions about homosexuality, but for their own lives, they write off any notion of the Church having authority on matters like abortion, birth control, or divorce. They tend to be extremely capitalistic and to see communism as the new devil and therefore anything that is anticapitalist as automatically communist. I am drawing these in very broad brushstrokes, but they don't come across quite like that. Still, under the veneer of sophistication that is undeniably there, what distresses me is that these are Catholic youngsters telling me that this is what they have been taught. When I really begin to probe them, they believe they have picked this up in sermons, but they can never nail it down.

I have become increasingly dubious over the years that they have been taught this. It is what they think they have been hearing. The virtual extinction of any kind of teaching of the old tradition in the last twenty years, at least in the regular parochial schools, has perhaps led to this impression. I don't want to make it the only reason, but outside the Jesuit schools, I don't see in the average parochial high school anywhere near the level of education in theology or religious studies that existed a few decades ago. Most have lay teachers. Frequently the children are taught out of a knowledge of social studies, or if their teachers have attended some sort of institute of theology, their knowledge of the tradition is rather shaky. I think that you must consider also the effects of Vatican II. It precipated a great exodus from the ranks of the clergy and the religious. The idea that most of the teachers in Catholic schools should be members of a religious order went out. Teachers with a pre–Vatican II education were usually fairly thorough, at least in understanding the historical context.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: What do you see as your task as an educator today? Is it to undermine certain forms of bigotry? To present an alternate Catholicism? To inject a notion of choice? Is that your value as an educator in this case?

DENISE CARMODY: That is what I ask myself at the beginning of each semester, and at the end I am not sure. On the notion of social justice, I am concerned that students be exposed to the teaching of the Church in the encyclicals, for instance, and that they have some

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knowledge of the diversity of Catholic opinion. I mean not to proselytize for liberal Catholicism but to show the depth of the intellectual tradition. I think that if students can get back to some notion of the respect that this tradition once engendered, it may create in them a critical intelligence that will view religion again as countercultural, as at least always questioning why this is so.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: In effect, you are trying to educate students toward a kind of common culture that we would like to have, a culture that is tolerant, diverse, preoccupied with social issues. It is therefore an important issue in religion and education to reflect on how we should approach the fund of historical texts of Judaism and Christianity and just what we should tease out of them in order to create new cultural strains.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: It seems to me that this going back to the texts has its accomplishments, or at least its aspirations. But I find that for many intellectuals in the university in which I teach, the justification for being interested in religion is largely a functional one—namely, that traditional religions are culturally conservative forces and therefore buttresses against the *anomie* and relativism of modern culture. It is interesting that some ex-Catholics believe everything went wrong at Vatican II. At least before Vatican II, Catholicism was a culturally conservative force. Some Jewish colleagues think that Reformed Judaism is nothing, though they probably never go to temple or synagogue, and that what we really need is some sort of Conservative Judaism, if not Orthodox Judaism itself, because that at least functions as a culturally conservative force. You could probably go worldwide and see similar developments in revivals of Islam and conservative Hinduism. I don't think there is any way in which such persons could deal with a major issue.

Is the justification for teaching religion now going to be a functional one with reference to its utility for students and for the larger culture? Or are we going to insist that genuine issues of the adequacy of religious truth claims be considered?

MICHAEL FISHBANE: I think we have to view this issue with Tim's earlier point in mind. We have to focus hard on the differences in education offered by seminaries, church-related schools, and secular universities. What we do to our historical tradition in the secular university for the sake of a certain kind of common culture may be

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quite different from the kind of education that we would prefer. We create different kinds of religious teachers or teachers of religion in these different settings. I think we have to face that truth directly.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: Isn't there another side of that coin, which is that many secular people now look to papal teachings to support reform efforts in Latin America? If you want to change the world, religion can be very functional. Still, that is a different crowd, for the most part made up of those who understand the revolutionary implications of religious teachings for nonreligious, political purposes.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Religion is functional with reference to what you want it to be. *Functional* is a relational term. It doesn't mean anything unless you know what it is functioning in relation to.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: If you leave aside the sexual issues, Roman Catholic social teachings are seen as rather liberal these days rather than conservative.

TIMOTHY HEALY: I want to raise a question from inside the academy, from the point of view of higher education. We have talked a great deal about abstracting the students, pulling students away from both the narrative content of the tradition and from the community of that tradition. Is our teaching of the humanities aimed at that? Is this an inevitable result of majoring in psychology, English, comparative literature, or modern languages, possibly even history? I am very worried about the total denial of both community and tradition. Consider English literary criticism at the moment. The great theme of modern poetry, and this is why it all tends to be lyric, is "me against the universe." There are nastier ways of putting that.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: What do you do at a place like Georgetown? Do you focus on theory, for example, or talk about the ellipses of meaning and the. . .

TIMOTHY HEALY: And the irrelevance of historical background?

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Where, then, do you find your foothold?

TIMOTHY HEALY: Mike, the problem with the Catholic universities is that they are not asking these questions. Our English department wants to be as much like Harvard's as possible. If there were another model, if Oxford were still where it was thirty years ago, then we

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might be imitating that instead. This is the problem, I think, within the religious colleges. They ask structural questions, juridical questions, and they don't ask educational questions. I don't mean to sound pompous. They don't ask what impact Catholic tradition, let us say here, and Catholic history, for example, have on the way one approaches history itself.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: But what is the alternative? Is there a kind of Catholic model?

TIMOTHY HEALY: No, secular excellence is the model. There is not a Catholic model. If there is, after years of reading, I have not run into it. If you pick Harvard as the norm for a great university—you know, Harvard's great usefulness to the republic is precisely that she does sit there and do this—then the English department at Harvard becomes the norm for the English department at Georgetown, I think to the impoverishment of both. By the way, for all his statements about not having a religious bump, this is a subject that Derek Bok, Harvard's president, has raised. How is it different at Georgetown? And the answer is, I am not sure it is different at all.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: You would want to hire Harvard graduates too rather than the graduates of lesser-known universities, wouldn't you?

TIMOTHY HEALY: Yes, exactly.

ROBERT KIELY: Practically speaking, it seems to me that even if your students did begin to ask those philosophical or theological questions, your faculty would be so scattered in its way of dealing with them that even if one could define a Catholic model, there would be no guarantee in a Catholic university today that you would find it articulated by the majority of the faculty.

THEODORE SIZER: What if you started at Georgetown a Catholic college like an honors college? Honors colleges were once popular. You couldn't do it all at once, but what if you said, "All right, there is a group of faculty members that are going to come together, and the registrar is going to shut up and let us do what we want, and we will take some small group of volunteer students, and we will march to a different drummer"?

TIMOTHY HEALY: It is a fun idea. The only difficulty is that those colleges were founded on a combination of a sort of classicism and

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fascism. Unfortunately, what they had was a sharp accent on classical learning—and I mean literally classical learning, Latin and Greek—joined to a political fascism, and that was quite repulsive.

JOHN PADBERG: Well, such special colleges weren't founded within universities. The only one that is within a university is St. Ignatius Institute in San Francisco. The one in St. Louis and others are independent colleges.

THEODORE SIZER: And when were they started up?

JOHN PADBERG: During the last ten or twelve years.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Right after the Vatican Council. They are anti–Vatican Council reactions essentially. Philosophy is reduced absolutely to the Scholastic synthesis. Beyond that, nothing has happened. A marvelous state of mind!

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Well, at a more simple level, what would be the Catholic answer to the question, To what extent are so-called secular texts part of the great tradition that you see yourself fostering in a larger Catholic sense?

TIMOTHY HEALY: Michael, I come out of English, and no great text is unreligious—quite seriously. It is a basic preoccupation of Shakespeare, human conduct from kings to paupers. It's the guts of Chaucer and Dryden, both of whom were Catholic. It really runs right through Dickens. I am in a world that cannot be totally secular, at least as far as I see, unless you are going to limit yourself to a small cluster of modern poets, and that's just too dull.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: But you were saying something more. The notion that we are cultivating the religious imagination in our students is one thing. The notion that this is a *preparatio* for something else is part of your task as a Catholic.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Yes, you have caught me in a contradiction, because if I want serious religious reflection from students, one of the texts that I have been tempted to use, and have used with freshmen, is Anthony Hecht, who happens to be here at Georgetown. All three of his volumes raise in both Jewish and Catholic terms a fascinating set of religious questions, and yet I think if you called Tony a religious poet, he'd go right through the overhead. He isn't, and yet there is deep inquiry into questions that come out of both traditions. Here, by

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the way, *Judeo-Christian* really means something, because this is a man very learned in Roman Catholicism. He is a Jew, and he is very well versed in his own tradition, and the two together make a kind of poetic matrix out of which all sorts of questions can arise. Maybe the only contribution that Georgetown can make is to be certain that there are enough of the faculty sensitive to these issues to be willing to raise them.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: I don't see a great problem if the presupposition is that there are different religious choices. If the cultivation of the religious imagination is a primary educational value at Georgetown, there would be no problem. Choice would be encouraged at every level, and some students would become Catholics and others would not. However, to the degree that you would want to channel that imagination, a deep contradiction between humanistic and religious education would result.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Let me give you an odd one. We have on the Georgetown staff three rabbis.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Who teach Judaic studies?

TIMOTHY HEALY: They also teach, but they are principally there as chaplains. Their main job seems to be to take middlewestern kids who have no Jewish roots whatsoever and put them in contact with Talmudic thought, with the great texts. Curiously enough, they come very close to turning out as many seminary students as do the Roman Catholic clerics. There are two or three kids every year who leave Georgetown to go to rabbinical school, most of whom came in as thoroughly secularized young Jews. So something is alive in the tradition because the atmosphere of the place allows that to happen and doesn't discourage it. Now, the advantage the rabbis have is that they are starting from an acknowledged tabula rasa.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: The kids are also in a minority context.

TIMOTHY HEALY: That's right. The kid comes in saying, "I am Jewish but I know nothing about it." And then Harold White and his two colleagues begin to build on this.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Somewhere along the line this group needs to decide on some definitions of the term *religion,* because we are treating many things—religion in terms of general orientation toward

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life, openness to all sorts of possibilities, the formation of some coherent life outlook. We are also concerned about particular historic religious traditions and how they are confronted. That has been an issue in religious studies. It has been an issue in certain Christian theology for a long time. I think we at least have to be clear. Are we talking about a more general religious imagination? Then we are talking about one set of problems. When we are talking about religion in terms of enculturation and exposure to historical themes, we are talking about religion in a different way. It makes a difference in how one relates religion and education. Which of these two foci do we have in mind?

MICHAEL FISHBANE: May I ask a naive question? As a Jew, I would be curious to know how Christians still see the relationship between Christianity and culture. You tend to split the matter, I think. But is there still a notion abroad, whether in schools like Georgetown or more generally, that the old Catholic ideal or some modern Protestant version of Christianity and culture have validity?

ROBERT KIELY: Very personally, as a Roman Catholic—and I don't mean to be incorporating any of my friends here—I think this is also a fairly ancient Catholic dilemma. On one hand, I feel the need for an institutional, cultural, historical entity, the Church. Yet when I hear of the defensiveness of the Catholic university or the proposal of a Catholic college within a Catholic university, I worry about it. I wish it were there, but I wouldn't want to be in it as a Catholic. I want the tradition. I want the establishment. I want the institution. But I think that, religiously speaking, for me, Christianity, certainly Catholic Christianity, is at its purest when those institutions are down and suffering, when they are not in the ascendancy. I think that, in parenthetical reference to certain forms of neofascism, we sense that historically. It seems to me that the best Christianity is the Christianity that is marginalized, perhaps even persecuted, that is not understood—the Christianity that is always being looked for or groped for, remembered, lost, and remembered again, that serves as a question aimed at another kind of establishment, the kind of establishment that I belong to, at Harvard.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: You see it as an adversary.

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ROBERT KIELY: Yes. To be even more specific, in literary criticism, a bad word in most poststructuralists' literary theory, as you all must know, is *transcendence*. Where *transcendence* is found in language or in theory, it must be questioned and, if possible, eliminated. Well, the problem with that word that I have as a questioning Catholic outside a Catholic teaching institution is that it is a term in reference to religion that has little to do with my experience of religion, as one whose religion is historical and sacramental and incarnational. Transcendence sounds like neo-Platonism, and that is partly what they mean, but it also seems like an imprecise abstraction for something that, for me, has a much more complicated and concrete association.

That kind of contradiction seems to me a healthy thing for a religious person, whether Catholic or whatever, to be struggling with, in the institutions that are secular or established, outside the established churches. You asked a question about the Catholic model. My Catholic model would be a recollection of a tradition, a reverence for a tradition, an experience of sacrament and incarnation that is always brought to bear on the established language and the practices and behavior of the nonreligious or watered-down forms of religion in the democratic institutions that most of us work in.

FRANK MANUEL: As I listen to this, I want to liken some of the things I hear to Edward Gibbon's description of Roman religion. He said in one passage—I am paraphrasing it—that the mass of the people, the Romans, thought all religions were equally true, the magistrates thought all religions were equally useful, and the philosophers thought all religions were equally false. Now, it would be hard to find anyone around this table who would very carefully say that all religions are equally false. I hear words like *healthy* and *useful*. These things have different meanings to each one of us. But in a way, we are showing that Gibbon was totally wrong, almost irrelevant, in that description of the Roman religion, because the Roman Empire was giving birth to a great persecuted religion at that time.

The generalizations are very difficult. I hear your anecdotal experiences, and they seem so extraordinarily diverse that I don't see how they can even be encompassed in a single issue.

I wonder whether the most straightforward approach would be to describe the welter of religious experience that exists at this moment

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and that some of you are giving testimony to, particularly the personal aspect. I am not afraid of the feeling tone that you are trying to get at when you talk about some of the students you deal with. In America I think you have somewhere that you can start out with. You can start out with the late nineteenth-century spiritual crisis that traditionally is supposed to have occurred among adolescents, that is described by William James and the whole group that were making such investigations. What has happened to that religious crisis among the young? Maybe it has been transformed. Maybe it is still there. Maybe it is hidden. It is taking on a vast variety of forms. To me, that would be the authentic description of this religious moment.

What to do about it, the second point you raised, would be one on which each one of us would have a very different view. Some of us would see this as ending up in some Enlightenment commonality as the ideal. Others would want that commonality with the retention of Catholic colleges and Jewish institutions, usually of a fundamentalist order, so that they would preserve their purity—sometimes embalmed, sometimes more or less living, sometimes quite vital if persecuted. We might include that. But I think the possibility of arriving at general formulae here—it sounds Gibbonian to me—disturbs me, because the word *variety* is the thing that I sense in all of the experiences that you are describing. Some of them, if you lay them out, are going to be extraordinarily startling. I am mindful of your descriptions. I could give some of my own.

We haven't talked about Jewish experience in preparation for the rabbinate in a place like Yeshiva University. I have spent hours in recent weeks with two students I sent there. These young people spent a whole year studying two texts in two parts of two tractates of the Talmud. And then the heart of the curriculum is going to be the standard compendium on religious observance.

That kind of Judaism is almost unheard of among most who know Conservative Judaism or Reformed Judaism, which has all the appurtenances for me of a good Unitarian church in Boston. I'm sure that if we begin to dig, maybe the issue is to reveal this variety, this chaotic variety. I would prefer this to the cover-all kind of religious phrase—"God bless you" at the end of a presidential speech.

VOICE: God, wherever she is, bless you!

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TIMOTHY HEALY: Frank, I've been waiting for years for that man at the end of a speech to say, *"Benedictus benedicat."*

VOICE: He was not a musical star.

FRANK MANUEL: There is one other point I want to make. *Avoidance* is the word I have heard when you have talked about religion in secondary education. In some respects, avoiding may be the best thing we can do, because if we really gave the full blast of the religious traditions in all their complexity, we would be at each other's throats again, so it's selection that we inevitably are going to have to resort to. I would, if we could, invent a rhetoric that would say we are taking out of religious tradition that which is—maybe the word *useful* is bad—but that which we today want as a people to keep alive. We need not be afraid of the fact that it is going to be selective. Religions are constantly erasing and writing in, and erasing and writing in. Why not say that? I think that is possibly as communicable as some of the nonsense formulae that we are throwing around.

Variety is the useful word for experience. Maybe there is somebody who could reread some of those late nineteenth-century works as a sort of landmark for American religion when we first began to rationalize it. A lot of it sounds nonsensical, but at least that is a point of departure by which you can judge what in the world you now see going on with such complexity, changing every few years.

JOHN PADBERG: Rather than religion and education, perhaps our concern should be education and the varieties of religious experience. Are there not going to be different ways in which one conceives of education in terms of how one conceives of religious experience?

GEORGE LINDBECK: That gets back to the question that I think you were asking, the relation of religion and culture. Is there such a thing as religious experience as a universal? It has Tillichian resonances to me, the notion of the experience of the transcendent or the sacred being manifested in various ways in different cultures and religions and all religions dealing with the same fundamental human problems but in different ways. One of the questions that can be raised is whether that is ultimately a cannibalistic way of thinking about religion. I find myself with a bit more of a textual orientation, being much more comfortable talking about religious issues, meaning by

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that where religious communities and people have their group and individual identities formed by religious traditions. I'm not sure how that relates to what you were saying, Frank. I think it may be supportive of it, even though I am raising a question regarding the use of the term *religious experience.*

FRANK MANUEL: The term is obviously taken from the late nineteenth century. I don't know whether anybody would have used it very commonly before. Would they? It doesn't resonate in my memory.

GEORGE LINDBECK: Yes, it was common among Protestants as a concept, even if not a term, from Schleiermacher on. And then, of course, in William James and in various studies of conversion experiences that were done by various psychologists of the late nineteenth century, it became dominant. This emphasis on religious experience seems to me intensely Protestant, characteristic of liberal and evangelical Protestantism. It was until recently largely irrelevant to the traditional forms of two-thirds of the religions in this country at the present time. Protestantism is becoming a minority rather than a dominant tradition, but its stress on religious experience has become well-nigh universal.

TIMOTHY HEALY: George, there's a sharp Catholic parallel, and again, forgive me for putting it in terms of my trade. What is the position of a university built out of the Catholic tradition when there is no longer an immigrant population to serve and protect against the prejudice of the surrounding society, when it is no longer meaningful to say, as the dean of the Fordham Law School said to me one time, "There is no major Wall Street firm without a Fordham partner"? It was clear that the function of a law school in a Catholic university was to break down prejudice, which, by the way was then very real. It's staggering when you realize how close this is to us.

One of our trustees tells this story about himself. He went to Georgetown as an undergraduate, went on to Columbia Law School, then took a job with Dewey, Ballantine. After five years he was called in and told that his work was excellent, that he was obviously destined for a distinguished career in the law but that the firm of Dewey, Ballantine would not be comfortable with an Irish Catholic partner.

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This was after World War II in the early 1950s. He went and joined a young Jewish lawyer named Joe Flom, and they are now the firm of Skadden, Arps, which could swing Dewey, Ballantine both for clout and for size.

I now preside over a Catholic institution that is only 60 percent Catholic in its undergraduate population and nowhere near that percentage in any of its professional schools. It would never occur to me that it was significant that *x* number of law firms had Georgetown University partners. That sort of prejudice, in my view, is not significant at the moment.

Indeed, I find more of it today in the Catholic population. Look at the celebration of Antonin Scalia as the first Italian on the Supreme Court, in utter ignorance and forgetting of Benjamin Cardozo, who was every bit as Italian but happened to be Jewish. The Italo-Americans are still saying the first Italian on the Supreme Court is Antonin Scalia. He's not. This isn't a disputable fact except in their minds. If he be a pagan or a Roman Catholic, that is fine, but he cannot be a Jew and be the first Italian on the Court. It was in that world that the Catholic higher and secondary education enterprise grew—largely, I think, to get the dominant liberal progressive Protestantism out of the education of the young. Remove that national history, and you are left with a major question about what this institution means.

I agree with Frank. I think we are going to end up in tremendous variety. And I don't think there is a single colleague of mine in Jesuit higher education who does not have some of the feeling that Bob has, that I had for seven years at the City University of New York. Then I felt that I was doing a great deal more in this curious posture as a Jesuit vice-chancellor of a major public university than I would have been doing at Fordham or at Georgetown. For the Catholic community that was a more significant service, a more exposed service. That I didn't get my salary was probably the most outstanding thing about me. That I was ordained meant nothing. I did weddings and bar mitzvahs, as a lot of the faculty did who happened to have rabbinical ordination. But in the 1980s there is a brand new question posed to an operation that is not worried about survival.

THEODORE SIZER: You've made it, so you're in trouble?

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TIMOTHY HEALY: Yes. I put the question in the form of *Veritas*, the shortening of the original Harvard motto. Is there an angle of teaching and learning, is there a different experience, as Frank says, and if there is, are we valorizing it, or can we? But there really is a question of the meaning of the institution. I am an old enough Catholic to say that after two hundred years one cannot ignore the question. As George Will says, you can be a high-church Unitarian, but why bother? We could be the high-church version of the secular institution but with a kind of a Unitarian base, where there is no distinction. If that's the question, it seems to me a very real one. Hence, I like Frank's formula. I think there is a different experience created in these institutions. I don't think they do it well enough, I don't think they do it consistently enough, and I think they are far too much dominated by a kind of a secular wisdom in the recruiting of faculty and indeed in teaching within the institution. I don't think the model is Mother Harvard in anything except the rigor of scholarship.

ROBERT LYNN: What's your outsider's view of—let's say—Protestant colleges such as Oral Roberts or Wheaton College, Illinois, or places of that sort, which still are maintaining a very distinctive religious identity? You've virtually offered a sociological explanation. As Ted says, you have enjoyed success, and so you now have a problem. Then why are these other places flourishing? Is there a similar sociological explanation for all of these institutions?

TIMOTHY HEALY: I'm not knowledgeable enough to answer.

ROBERT LYNN: Why is it that a university that has restrictions on faculty recruitment and so forth seems to flourish and have considerable success as an educational institution? There are Bob Jones, and Oral Roberts, and places like Wheaton. Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan, would be a marvelous place to study as an institution that has enjoyed a coherent ethnic identity but that now has a theological identity. If some of you learned the difference between accident and substance at the age of seven, they learned the difference between supralapsarianism and prelapsarianism. They can define that difference. Perhaps that's why they produce some good philosophers. It seems to me that there's a whole range of successful institutions. If we offer a sociological explanation for one, then I think we are bound to offer a sociological explanation for the others.

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TIMOTHY HEALY: I'm not comfortable talking about a sociological explanation either, because within the Roman Catholic community, corresponding to Frank's "the varieties of religious experience," there is the condemnation of Americanism. Rome feared that somehow the democratic realities of America would sap the vigor of the Church. It wasn't really a very good heresy. There are all sorts of historians who are able to talk about it better than I can. I mean it wasn't a patch on Luther, who put theses up and argued in propositional terms. There were no propositions connected with Americanism. In fact, most Americans denied that it existed. But it did shove the thinking of an institution like Catholic University into a permanently conservative mode. Americanism was contemporaneous with the founding of Catholic University. It did not affect places like Georgetown and Notre Dame to that extent.

ROBERT LYNN: What is there about your success at Georgetown that's led to your problem?

TIMOTHY HEALY: As long as we were coherent to ourselves, we had the clearly defined purpose of launching an immigrant population into whatever was defined as the mainstream, and that meant mainly medicine, law, accounting. It did not mean the State Department, the higher levels of the federal bureaucracy, or a nonlocal elective office. Very curiously, those were conceded as the majority's purlieu and were not really much fought about.

JOHN PADBERG: But "launching an immigrant population," though indeed that was part of what was going on, was not the rhetoric being used. The rhetoric was "protecting the faith of the immigrant."

TIMOTHY HEALY: That's right. Both were simultaneous. There is now not in any selective college a problem of dealing mainly with immigrants, except that 10 percent of our kids are black, and they are the most immigrant of immigrants and by the way, largely non-Catholic.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: What was the intent in founding Brandeis?

MICHAEL FISHBANE: I should speak after Frank, since he was one of the founding fathers, present at the creation. At Brandeis the issue was not so much preserving the faith as coping with quota systems and insuring quality education for all. The Jewish community was

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eager to take up this challenge and to contribute to American culture by doing so. The founding president of the university, Abraham Sachar, once referred to this challenge and task with the expression "a host at last." What I think he meant is that the American Jewish community had come of age and was prepared to become a host for American education and culture, much as the Protestant communities had done earlier. And so there was nothing specifically Jewish in the religious sense about the founding of Brandeis. The hope was rather that Jewish ideals about education and society would contribute a new matrix for the postwar rebirth of American culture.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: I bet no Protestant or Catholic college ever self-consciously had that as its intent.

TIMOTHY HEALY: No. I'm not sure they shouldn't, but I don't think you could say that to be "a host at last" was in the thinking of the Catholic colleges. John, correct me if I am wrong.

JOHN PADBERG: No, I don't think so. Most of them, though, were founded at a point at which there was no possibility of their being a host. Brandeis responded at the point at which it was a possibility.

TIMOTHY HEALY: And I think Georgetown is in something of the same position. Our support, by the way, is still largely Catholic, which lays a heavy burden on the president. What I loved about the City University of New York is that it was clean lined. If we educated the children of the poor, we did the job that we were founded to do, and we did it as best we knew how, but there was never a deep ideological division amongst us. There were all sorts of tactical divisions. We were the fightingest staff in America, but there was never any of the deep questioning that I find here at Georgetown, and that I find in myself, despite the years of secular service and totally secular preparation. Dear Mother Oxford is hardly an Anglican institution, though my supervisor there was a devout Anglican, which was fun. The structure and norms of the university were those of Harvard or Berkeley.

I feel that the Catholic colleges are in a very funny posture right now. I have never really talked to Evelyn Handler, president of Brandeis, to see if she finds Brandeis in somewhat the same quandary.

FRANK MANUEL: Yes. She tried at one point to erase *emet* in Hebrew from the center of the school symbol. Let me assure you that

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my memory is very clear about the beginning. There wasn't a single religious Jew I knew of in the founding of Brandeis, even by remote translation or use of that term, with the exception perhaps of that strange novelist, Ludwig Lewisohn, who used to eat croissants on Passover with his doctor's dispensation. This was a purely East European Jewish foundation in its orientation and original funding, and it was sensitive to certain areas and disputes. I would say that with time, and especially the political growth of Israel, there were new emphases.

The word *politics* hasn't come into our discussion yet. In fact, I would say that Kennedy's election, as much as Vatican II, has had the effect of transforming the expectations of young Catholics. It suddenly made everything possible, whereas it wasn't before.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Do you remember, Frank, right afterwards? They were identifying candidates, and they'd say "Roman Catholic" as though it were a plus, and most Catholics objected to this violently. The magazine *America* did, saying that this is ridicuous. It's neither a plus nor a minus. After Kennedy, one could say that with a straight face. Before Kennedy, you could not as a Roman Catholic. It was clearly a minus and a steady minus. Now, at this point I think the Catholic population couldn't care less, and if either party nominated a Catholic I doubt very much that that fact itself would draw any significant amount of Catholic votes out of the other party.

FRANK MANUEL: But it won't nominate an atheist. In other words, you are still in the Montesquieu position of the necessity of having a religion. You've got to have some visible god. This is quite clear-cut, so that the political dimensions of this are very, very specific, and they are unique in a certain sense to this country, since in France there isn't a political test. Here we still have a political test.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Wouldn't it be true that the political test has become more severe in recent times?

TIMOTHY HEALY: Yes.

FRANK MANUEL: Yes. Washington and Franklin, my gods!

ROBERT LYNN: Or even Lincoln, for he had no religious affiliation.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Frank, the journalist Jimmy Breslin was once accused of no longer being a Catholic, and his answer, I thought, was very perceptive and very much in the Catholic tradition. He said, "I

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am a bad Catholic. It is a recognized status within the Church, and indeed has been held by some dignified people, and it is by no means a denial of membership."

JOHN PADBERG: On the history—and I have to be quite parochial about this—as far as I know, the Jesuits were the first group within Roman Catholicism who took on as institutional endeavor the work of education in an institution that they themselves founded and directed. There were of course Dominicans and Franciscans, others—Benedictines—at particular universities, colleges, places like that, within their own monasteries. But until Ignatius Loyola came along, especially with the fourth part of the Jesuit constitutions, you didn't have any one religious group within Roman Catholicism that, to take the motto of the first and greatest of the Jesuit schools, *religioni et bonis artibus*—religion and the liberal arts—took seriously at one and the same time the worship of God—that's what they meant by religion here—and human culture in itself. Within the terms in which Ignatius talked about it, *bonis artibus* meant art, literature, philosophy, science. I don't know where that eventually gets us, but it was a very different kind of a thing for a religious order within Roman Catholicism to be seriously dedicated to, and willing to put resources into, education and at the same time to say that this was a way—not only a means but an end in itself—to help souls. *Soul* doesn't mean simply some evanescent or immaterial thing. It means human beings as human beings, and for Ignatius and the early Jesuits, human beings in their destiny toward God. But that there was an institutional commitment to both at the same time, has been—if you happen to think it was a good thing they did—one of the glories of the Jesuits.

But it has also been one of their problems, right from the beginning. On the one hand, they have consistently been accused of being simply instrumentalists—only using education for some other ulterior purpose. And on the other hand, there are a lot of conservative Catholics who have accused Jesuits of being, at the best, crypto-secularists, who have simply not taken God seriously, who have been far too devoted to everything from astromony to political science. And that's one of the things that every Jesuit I know of who has ever been involved in higher education has had to deal with personally and internally.

TIMOTHY HEALY: That's right. We are called hyphenated Jesuits.

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JOHN PADBERG: I think most of us have had the experience of dealing with this problem personally. It's the institutions now and not just those that are Jesuit, although we can take them as an example, that are going to have to deal with it.

TIMOTHY HEALY: In American terms, it is very subtly different from Harvard's beautiful paragraph, which haunts me, that starts off, "Having built our houses and laid out our fields and established public order, we must now turn to the education of the clergy, lest when the ministers now amongst us rest in the dust, ignorance follow in their place." It's a marvelous statement, not only because it's such exquisite English but because it has a harder-edged purpose than John Carroll's prospectus in 1785, which says "for the increase of the faith and the cultivation of the arts and sciences." This is the old Jesuit statement that has been splitting up Jesuits for four hundred years and is now very seriously an institutional question.

THEODORE SIZER: But isn't the interesting history of these kinds of institutions recently the fact that they have not grown. Private education, higher or secondary or primary, is most interesting in the last thirty years in its relative and absolute decline. That's the story.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Ted, we don't grow, because Georgetown has enough bodies on its ninety-one acres. I mean literally there is not room to grow.

THEODORE SIZER: There are many schools and colleges that have been founded since the Second World War, and the percentage of those that were driven by religious persuasion is very small. You see that at the elementary and secondary level dramatically. Now, what does that say?

One danger is that we will engage in institutional histories, overlooking or underemphasizing the fact that those very institutions are a shrinking percentage of the academy and of the system of mass education writ large and therefore will not grapple with the question, Why is that so?

ROBERT LYNN: If you looked at the *Chronicle of Higher Education* a couple of weeks ago where it totaled up the number of students in postsecondary education and compared that figure with the one from the 1950s, you are absolutely correct. And the preponderance of experience represented around this table would draw us toward those

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institutions reflected in that shrinking minority. I am interested not only in the accredited institutions—someday we must talk about accreditation and the graduate school, and the way in which that has affected variety and diversity in higher education—but also in the other educational forms that shape and influence American students and yet are not a part of the degree-granting apparatus. There is a whole set of institutions out there that escapes the attention of a group like this because our experiences put us so much into the life of the school. So that comment should go right alongside your observation that the private-school sector is shrinking dramatically over a fifty-year period.

I am interested in what happens, for instance, either to dropouts or to people who are high school graduates. Where do they go? What do they do? Here we have to consider the diverse array of vocational schools, the different kinds of programs that are sponsored by voluntary associations, churches, and the like. For example, what is it that gets to kids who are in the inner city who have been socially promoted for years and have simply dropped out? What sort of schooling experience is available to them? Often it is through certain kinds of parish-based programs for those people. There's a network of evanescent institutions we represent that escapes the school mentality.

THEODORE SIZER: Steve, let me put on the table a couple of pieces of research. Both are highly controversial. I recall one that was done about ten years ago by Don Erickson, who was at Chicago then, on nonpublic and public schools. Most of his research was done in British Columbia, where there is a significant number of nonpublic schools that have some state aid. As good sociologists do, controlling for social class and all that, and looking very carefully at the tests given to youngsters, he found that when he controlled for class, a particular group of schools in his quite large sample appeared to serve their students exceptionally well, and those were schools that were "persecuted." Schools at the edge—private schools just about to collapse—tended to have a kind of energy that had in some interesting way an effect on the academic performance of the students. I was reminded of that in Jim's description of the virtual necessity of persecution for a sense of purpose. I find Erickson's work particularly interesting because it is counterintuitive.

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The second is much better known and much more recent—James Coleman's recent book on public and private schools, the research he's been doing in the "High School and Beyond" survey, again done at the University of Chicago. Jim has found that, even with all the sloppiness and sponginess that we have described, particularly in Catholic schools, there is, in his judgment, a good deal of evidence of higher performance—performance defined in pretty narrow, academic terms—of kids, again controlled for social class, in those schools. And he has some very interesting hunches about what he calls social capital, a very significant part of which is religion as we have defined it implicitly some of the time here. Jim argues that the focus in some of the parochial high schools, with all their problems, appears to effectively serve kids, even in their general academic performance. Give me a school that has a heart, give me a school that has a focus, Jim implies, and I'll show you a school the kids of which perform very well according to traditional, academic, secular criteria.

ROBERT KIELY: The inclusion of religious attitudes and groups that are not particularly represented by those of us here is terribly important—black churches and various forms of fundamentalism. I would be very curious to hear someone talk about the Mormons, the Christian Scientists, the indigenous American religions. What interests me about them is where they are now, what their influence is. What one often hears about these groups from the liberal university perspective is that what they believe may be extreme or different or strange, but they're so American—their values, their behavior. They are theologically marginal but mainstream in their American behavior and attitudes.

Another group I'm interested in is the southwestern Hispanics—partially Catholic, perhaps largely Catholic, but also evangelistic Protestant—who have worked out something that seems to be neither quite Latin American nor Western European but, again, something that is becoming an indigenous American religious expression. If one did something with the Mormons and the Christian Scientists, it would be going back to nineteenth-century America, but with the Hispanics, with the kinds of religious attitudes that one finds in certain regions of this country today, there is an opportunity to say more about contemporary religious experience.

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ROBERT LYNN: The comment about the Mormons is to the point. Richard Bushman, whose work in colonial studies is well known, is also himself a Mormon. Recently he did a study of a Mormon congregation, a Mormon stake. I found it absorbing because it helped me understand the power and dynamism of the Mormon movement. I use the word *movement* advisedly. It has deep educational power. When you go to the literature and look for explanations of that, you see that the literature is largely focused upon the disputes about the founders, the first generation. But the contemporary spread of Mormonism, not only across this country but in the world, is and can be considered an educational movement. It is very instructive. Lawrence Cremin, when he came to treat utopian communities, was daring in his choice of the Mormons as an illustration of the most successful educational utopian movement we have had. That is the sort of thing we miss and so I appreciate your picking that out.

GEORGE LINDBECK: While we are talking about subjects for inquiry, the so-called new religions would provide a category of para-educational institutions. The ashrams and Zen centers, which are proliferating all over the place, are in some instances educationally quite serious—something to keep in mind.

Another thing has struck me. We have used the word *Enlightenment* in various contexts a number of times, with the implication that the Enlightenment progressive consensus, which constituted a kind of intellectual framework for much of higher education in this country for a long time, is collapsing, and that is one of the things that makes secularism an increasingly vague term. It no longer has a definite Enlightenment content. Enlightenment as a religion, not simply as secularism, is another factor. If we are going to talk about the vacuum that is developing in the center of American educational life, it would presumably be associated with this collapse of Enlightenment faith, a faith that was shared in part by the mainstream religious traditions. One reason that mainstream Protestantism is in difficulty is that the Enlightenment part of its commitments and convictions—that is, its confidence in reason, science, and progress—has disintegrated.

STANLEY CAVELL: I would like to add to the idea of studying the new religions the various parareligions. Grant that the religious impulse is present and not always identifiable, including, of course, not to the one in whom it is present. What happens to those who have

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found no place to invest it? Now, suppose this absence is what drives their own reading. I don't know what drives people to read anymore. Nor do I know whether universities could regard this hunger for reading, or love of reading, as a part of what constitutes their own success, to the extent that universities are institutions in which the hunger for reading is to be recognized and encouraged and satisfied. You mention Zen. There are very beautiful Zen books, and I suppose most of the people who read them don't go to ashrams and Zen centers. They read them for a certain parareligious experience. What else might they, do they, read for this reason?

That leads to the question of where there is a religious argument going on in this culture. If there isn't a public argument of some kind, recognizable and shared, it is not very likely that the universities will, so to speak, pick it up. We might, of course, have academic squabbles about these matters—that's our birthright. But it seems to me the last time philosophy was, as such, involved in a public religious conversation or argument was at the rise of logical positivism, in which you just had to say a couple of rude and hasty things in order to have other people say rude and hasty things back, like "Religious statements are meaningless," followed by "Oh no, they are not. They are very meaningful." Well, as a level of public discourse, that is pretty thin gruel. And that went on for years, decades. To whose profit?

Is it that secularism is itself now so passionless that nobody has to declare belief in reason anymore? We are members of universities. I am supposed to believe in reason. I may believe in other things too, but I am supposed to have some sort of commitment to that. Is it not worth my saying so? And is this because my behavior shows that I have retained my faith in reason or that I have lost this faith? Might I be in a false position in the university because of these questions? Recall Marx's remark in the early 1840s that the critique of religion was over in Europe. Is it over because no one cares about it? Is it not over because Nietzsche showed somebody that it is not over? What is Nietzsche but somebody driving himself mad over the religious issue? And my favorite unknown writer on culture is Emerson, who at the moment Marx said that the critique of religion was over, took something of an opposite view of religion and started philosophy in this culture. I don't know other philosophers of my generation who think that, but perhaps they do not acknowledge all the places in which to look for philosophy.

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A word—I guess an ironic word—about something that Bob was saying concerning the onslaught of the recent French writing over the past couple of decades against—call it transcendence. American philosophy is on the whole ignorant or contemptuous of the French material that has taken over certain advanced literary studies. Jacques Derrida is the last living major figure of his generation, and it is as though he were for certain American students the only writer in France. He is the beneficiary of the fame of his generation and perhaps of the one preceding it. Though the emperor of literary studies, he hardly exists in philosophy. Neither his adulation nor his denigration is to our credit as a culture but manifests merely that our culture is incapable of conversing with itself. Anyway, I don't hear where our conversation is going.

The irony I allude to is that this shows more deeply than ever how uncontrollable the split in the traditions of philosophy is, in the philosophical spirit as it has existed since the death of Kant. The idea that certain kinds of advanced literary critical theory has overcome this split between English-speaking and German-speaking philosophy seems to me preposterous. The split is as deep as it ever was. It may be that analytical philosophy will now become, or is becoming, somewhat fashionable in Paris. So what? That is just going to mean that they are going to have a few splits in Paris too—they do now. It does not mean that anything is healed.

But the fact is that in analytical philosophy the question of transcendence is not even addressed. It seems a known quantity—namely, that it does not exist. All you can do is to psychologize it. But in the French tradition that has inherited the German tradition, they see that philosophical stakes remain in play. That is something to have a battle about, which means that the German tradition is still involved in a critique of religion and the American pragmatist-positivist tradition, supposing that that critique, so to speak, is over, does not recognize what it was for, preparation for the philosophical criticism of culture. So in avoiding this onslaught and keeping oneself ignorant of the philosophical work of the continent of Europe, one has withheld oneself from a major discourse.

In deploring this ignorance, including of course my own, I speak as one who has suffered in various ways from this onslaught. It has done as much harm as good—and it has done much good—to at least two generations of students now, amplified by the fact that their teachers

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cannot participate in conversation with them. This is a mark of a revolution. That combative rhetoric is one in which one subtext seems to me a quarrel with religion.

By the way, I think somebody should write about the desperate arguments now used popularly for and against religion. Do you all think the attack on secular humanism is just to be taken humorously? Listen to what those people say! It is about any attempt to have a reasonable discourse about these matters. Millions of our fellow citizens are involved in all this.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: After living in New York, I have become much more sympathetic to complaints about the media. There is a widespread, monolithic form of secular humanism among many who work in the media. It comes out in the way news is handled, the way cultural attitudes are advanced. It is there.

STANLEY CAVELL: Can we commission an exchange about this?

GEORGE LINDBECK: It is not just that these are nutty people who use these mindless arguments. They are actually talking about something.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: Because they see something going on in the culture that is very disturbing.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: I think there is religious argument going on. It is just that we do not read each other's books. There is plenty of religious argument going on in theological journals, in terms of justification of religious beliefs or the use of hermeneutical theory as an alternative way of understanding religious meaning in texts and history. George Lindbeck's recent book on religious doctrine is a case in point. It is wrong to say that there is not religious argument going on. It is just that a lot of people, because of other interests or because they do not respect the people who are writing religious arguments, don't know about it.

STANLEY CAVELL: Certainly I did not say there was *not* one. When I asked where it was and how one identified it, I wanted to exempt for the moment the idea that it is taken care of by academic arguments. It seems to me that if the religious arguments of this culture are going on in the pages of certain academic journals, in isolation from popular arguments, then that is probably an important fact and should be treated as the academicization of religious quarrel, the way everything else is academicized. Of course, this is not just bad.

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JAMES GUSTAFSON: I think you are right on that. In types of literature I have observed the absence of the essay as a form of religious discourse. I go back to Emerson on that—the marvelous essays that were learned and insightful but devoid of all academic baggage to justify them. One of the things that has happened in intellectual life in American religion is precisely the academicization of it. The journals have become more and more technically oriented. So, one asks, where in American public life does one publish an insightful religious essay? Occasionally *Dædalus* comes out with a number on religion. That is one place in which you could do it. But the professionalization of religious studies in America has marginalized such writing. And how do people win brownie points for religious studies? You do not win them by doing insightful religious essays à la Emerson or à la James or even à la the Niebuhrs. That does not count. You need an apparatus that is simply not in the essay format. That is a serious problem.

Is that because the larger intellectual public as well as the larger public has become uninterested in or indifferent to religious questions? Or is it that the religious questions are now being addressed in different ways? The journal *Parabola* is very interesting, a kind of combination of all sorts of things, but I do not know many people who read it except for myself once in a while.

FRANK MANUEL: We have been talking about one of the ways to kill a subject—to academicize it. But in America we have another very important group, and it is a very obvious one—the lawyers. Their interest is to legalize the question. If you legalize the question, you kill it.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: Do we really kill it?

FRANK MANUEL: We kill it in terms of the public questions that my friend Stanley Cavell was addressing here on one level. I think there is still a lot more to be said about the culture-and-religion issue and what is behind the whole thing at this time.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: But what happens to religion when it becomes academicized? You do not mean that academicizing literally kills it. That is just a little professorial self-torture. It may be in this culture that that is the only way to preserve it. Maybe the academy is the

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catacombs. So we have our arguments, and maybe the culture will wake up one day and listen to the arguments that have been going on.

TIMOTHY HEALY: That is a powerful idea. We have taken the whole abortion debate out of political discourse and are treating it through the courts. I suspect that if the issue went back into political discourse, twenty years from now the nation would come roughly to where we are right now in the state of the law, but it would not be the unholy brawl that it is now—legalized, the whole argument taken out of any kind of rational discourse that nonlawyers can engage in.

I think the nation would come around to where the court was, but we have certainly removed this from rational public discourse, and thus we are barraged with highly irrational public discourse, and not even discourse at all but action, which is very frightening because this is essentially a religious quarrel. Maybe I have too Catholic a view of it, but it seems to me that this is what is involved here.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: Because it is a religious quarrel is precisely why some people say you cannot talk about it in public. We can have a legal discourse, or we can deal with it in our private religious preserves. But we cannot have a common moral discussion. That gets us in trouble, and one side might win on that level, and then we would really be in difficulty.

TIMOTHY HEALY: What bothers me is that we cannot have even a political discourse.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: If we use the language of rights, we can. That is the way to have a political discourse.

TIMOTHY HEALY: That has been put on the back burner, and it seems to me that one of the great catharses of the republic is that we do have it out in politics. We scream and yell and carry on and ultimately settle out of fatigue, out of respect for a political decision, but we are not allowed to do that now. It has been, as Frank said, legalized.

ROBERT KIELY: What is curious, it seems to me, about that with regard to debates involving the Roman Church is that even within the Church, what I would regard as religious arguments are being couched in political and legalistic terms. It is almost as though Catholics of various sorts think that is safer or maybe that a theological vocabulary is no longer available to enough people. One

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answer I would give to Stanley's question about where fundamental religious argument is taking place is in the Roman Catholic Church. While some people would say, "Oh, it is really just political—it is just a matter of Rome versus us or a dispute over where the authority is," I doubt that. Using terms like *redemption,* the *concept of God,* the *Trinity,* or the *spirit* may not be the way people are arguing issues. That is not the contemporary lingo, but that is really what it is all about.

TIMOTHY HEALY: There is another debate going on, Stanley, on authority and freedom, which is largely American and Latin American and which strikes me as probably five times more important than all the theology God ever invented. What I have been seeing more and more is a social democratic force pushing its way back into the Catholic Church, making up for the loss of England and the Reformation and of everything that derives from England, which includes the whole vocabulary of democracy. This time it is not one continent but two. The argument is being perhaps more theologically waged in Spanish than in English, but ultimately it seems to me that the tie between the Roman Church on these two continents is forcing back on the feudally structured papacy an idea of democracy and due process derived from England that has taken very profound roots in Latin American Catholic thought.

And the Vatican is resisting with every tool it has. By the way, one of the points of that resistance is its leaning on universities. There is a very large dispute about the autonomy of an intellectual institution within the Church that is a long way from being resolved.

STANLEY CAVELL: I would like to respond to that. It is fascinating. I wish I knew more about it than the rumors I have heard. But it does not quite answer what I intended by my question, Where is the culture debating with itself over these issues? That is, noting the academicizing of the argument, I just ask how important that fact is. We do not know what the academy is anymore. Is there a comparable puzzle about the Church, inside the Church? Whom are we talking to as professors? It is certainly a different time from when you and I started talking from our chairs.

Similarly, I do not know what it means that this tremendously fateful debate is now going on, so to speak, within the Church. Certainly, nothing could be more powerful for an eventual public

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debate, but it has not reached that, as you put it, "yet." I am struck also by Bob saying no to whether he would want to participate in an all-religious school when he was talking about his commitment to Roman Catholicism and what it meant to him. When you characterized what religion meant here, you did not characterize it as an intellectual debate that was setting you on fire. This debate is fateful for the Church and therefore for millions of people—politically as well as religiously.

But is this the place where you are exercising your mind constantly, where you feel as a teacher it is important for you to confess your faith and say that its debate is what is on your mind? Now, we can presumably escape doing this with our students. Do we feel that we should? Emerson said that if you do not start speaking from the heart, you will not know how to teach anybody anything. But we do not feel that to stake out where it is we stand on nonacademic issues is part of academic decorum or freedom. The most observant Jews I know who are philosophers are mathematicians or philosophers of science. I have envied them this combination, especially its enabling them to keep the institutions of their speech clearly separate if they wish.

THEODORE SIZER: Tim, let me ask you a question. You have studiously avoided the other institution about which you know a great deal—prisons. I do not know if you still go to Attica and check in.

TIMOTHY HEALY: He is treating a very personal history. I came once straight from Attica to Andover, and Ted, very wisely, walked me like a tired horse around that lovely campus until I came back to some rational sense of control over my own life. Attica was honestly a shattering experience. I had been there three days. And I came to visit Ted and to visit my nephew, who was a student at Andover, and I still remember the therapy of that afternoon.

THEODORE SIZER: I still remember what was going through your mind. What does *that* world say to the issue of this gathering? What does that world say to the questions of religion and education that we are raising?

TIMOTHY HEALY: All I can say to that, Ted, is I always regard it as one of the major religious failures of both liberal Protestantism and

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Roman Catholicism, and indeed of Judaism in my slight understanding of it, that we have now a national consensus that no one is redeemable in this prison world. Once you are in prison, you are there to be punished, you are there as a punishment, and it is the national, criminological consensus in the United States that really nothing we do for you there is more than keeping you busy so that you do not explode and that no rehabilitation is possible. This really is said bluntly, and it scandalizes me as a believing Christian to hear other Christians say this because it flies straight in the face of Saint Paul.

The grace of God is not bound. But for those bound in prisons, we as a nation say it is. I do not know what that has to do with education. I spent a year trying to put a two-year college into the prison system and failed, totally failed, in the legislature. It was in that process that I leaned on Ted's shoulder that memorable afternoon in Massachusetts. But it is not a religious argument, Stanley. I can only wish it were.

STANLEY CAVELL: You find the denial of religion as part of this argument to be a national consensus?

TIMOTHY HEALY: That is right. That is the consensus of criminology, that nothing we do in that context can be rehabilitative.

THEODORE SIZER: Is that not a theme about religion in America? The way the society treats its peripheral folks, the very old, the very young, the very criminal—what that says is very powerful.

TIMOTHY HEALY: It is to me scandalous that after the long history of the penitentiary, the Quaker beginnings, then the very serious liberal Protestant follow-through on this—to isolate, to instruct, to reorient, and to readapt to society—none of this ancient baggage of criminology is current in the thinking now. It is bluntly stated that rehabilitation is a chimera. If you are in jail, you are there, and you are being held out of society.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: I think you are quite right, but I certainly hear one rationale. It is that we have to get accepted the idea that people are responsible for their behavior. There is good and bad in this world, and punishment for its own sake is just. It is a kind of conservative argument, which legitimates precisely this rejection, saying that there was a liberal, evangelical kind of Christianity behind

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all of this but that we have to get back to punishing wrongdoing and not having starry ideals about transforming bad behavior. I think this is probably harmful, but nonetheless it is there.

TIMOTHY HEALY: The screws and the big screws, the superintendents of "correctional facilities"—we no longer call them prisons—sharply distinguish the really bad cases, for whom all you can do is hold them out of society. That is your service to society, that you get them off the street. People like this have always been a clear minority of the population. Certainly there are some very bad kids, but when you are talking about below-twenty-year-olds, there is something in me that I do not think is liberal at all, that says no, I just can't give up on a twenty-year-old. I may be a hundred years out of date.

Attica was the perfect example of the utterly hostile detention center, hostile to anyone who came from the outside. By the way, I did not go in a Roman collar. I was "Dr. Healy from Albany." And, since I was not working that closely with these people, I felt no need to identify myself as a priest. At CUNY, I always did. Anybody who worked with me knew I was a priest and a Jesuit, including the kids I taught, but at the prison I was just an official from Albany. And I was not doing a Roman Catholic thing. I was working for the state university on special assignment for about eight months. The hostility was really frightening. Just the fact that I had a doctorate put me into a category of—you know, it is like walking into marine barracks and saying you are a communist. That was the feeling I had. And, by the way, this was an induced feeling, because I am normally not that paranoid. The sheer hostility of people opening a door and not looking at you, sliding this great steel thing and gesturing you in, not greeting you, not looking at you, not saying "good morning" when you say "good morning." Three days of this reduced me to the state where Ted practically put me on the couch.

There has been some religious argument about the very strong position the bishops have taken on capital punishment, in opposition. The effect of the bishops' statement can be seen if you take the Catholics—I presume that they are going to vote exactly like the rest of the people—about 80 to 85 percent of whom say they want capital punishment. That one is not a religious argument, at least as I read it.

THEODORE SIZER: You use the word *hostility*. There is a lot of anger.

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TIMOTHY HEALY: Yes, a lot of anger in kids. The trashing phenomenon frightens me profoundly, and it happens in all universities. The men's room will just be demolished the fifth week of term for no reason except that some people get drunk and work out hostilities, real anger, on sinks and toilets. I would rather they do that than attack people, but—

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Is all that changed, or is it just that the anger takes a different form?

TIMOTHY HEALY: It may be, Jim. I am perhaps doing what I have railed against—looking at the 1950s as normative.

THEODORE SIZER: There are those who would say the threat of annihilation, nuclear apocalypse, has changed the generations. The "apocalypse" may create a kind of fatalism that takes practical form in this trashing and short-range kind of behavior.

I do not know whether to buy that argument or not, but there are serious folks who have interviewed lots of kids and there are therapists who make this argument. Deeply behind the younger generation now is the sense of fatalism, which certainly is not characteristic of an earlier age.

TIMOTHY HEALY: I have found that kids, at least the kids I know here at Georgetown, are rather like Californians. You know that California is going to slide into the ocean someday, but nobody out there ever talks about it seriously. The menaces are just as real, but if as an Easterner you go out to California and mention that you would just as soon the fault did not go off that week, I have never found that a conversational topic among Californians.

ROBERT LYNN: That does not explain the destructiveness of the young.

THEODORE SIZER: I find the fact that serious scholars profess this "fatalism" possibility interesting. It is not trivial, even though I do not find their arguments so far fully convincing.

TIMOTHY HEALY: I defer to those who are teaching full schedules. I teach one freshman course, which is hardly a full load, but how about kids you have in class today? Is this a preoccupation?

GEORGE LINDBECK: Not that I hear, but then I am not sure that one would hear it even if it were part of their concern.

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MICHAEL FISHBANE: I, strangely enough, hear this concern from kids in grammar school. My son is almost twelve and goes to a Jewish day school. His friends talk about the threats to modern life all the time. He is frightened to death about AIDS, and his classmates talk about it regularly. He is frightened about nuclear weapons. He reads about them. The kids talk about them. They are petrified.

STANLEY CAVELL: But are we not afraid also?

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Yes.

STANLEY CAVELL: I assume that if we are afraid of it, our children are afraid of it.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: And in some ways, to return to the context that we are dealing with, when I speak with my son about such concerns, traditional religious answers are mostly irrelevant. He looks around him and sees death and suffering and fear. For him, these are primary categories of experience, and he is trying to find appropriate terms for dealing with them. Old religious symbols and rationalizations do not have the immediacy or concreteness he needs.

ROBERT LYNN: And yet he is in a cohort that is the healthiest group of kids in the history of the human race, with the longest life expectancy and the least chance of coming down with any fatal illness.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: As I said, he sees religious issues as largely irrelevant to this. When he goes for a medical checkup, for example, he starts talking to the doctor about infectious diseases. The issues are on his mind and those of his friends.

STANLEY CAVELL: But people who are against secular humanists have a wonderful story to tell about all this, and that does not seem to me to be an irrelevant feature of what they are speaking to or speaking for. I must confess to a taste for late-night cable television and its evangelism. I cannot stay away from it.

Take the description of the rapture. The minister says that some who are really going to believe this are just going to rise up and watch the ending battle of the world. And then he asks, "Isn't that incredible?" And we are invited to respond nonrhetorically, gleefully, to our incredible good fortune, scarcely able to wait for it to happen. Now, do people who are sure they know better than this talk about this? To whom?

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I am one of those Jews who is cold to Reformed Judaism and yet mostly does not in any case attend any severer synagogue. So I feel I am in a foolish, uncreative position about these matters. I talk about some of these feelings of conflict and their history in my life with my eleven-year-old son, yet I want him, clearly enough to pressure him, to study Hebrew and have a bar mitzvah. But if I think a religious identity is valuable for him, do I want our more enlightened churches to talk to our children about the end of the world? I want them to talk to governments about it. And I know that television cartoons talk to our children about this because so many are about the end of the world.

DENISE CARMODY: My colleague at Tulsa, Grace Mojtabai, who is Jewish and divorced from a Muslim, lived in Iran for quite a few years and has lived in Amarillo, Texas, now for four years. She teaches half the year and is a novelist. She wrote a book in which she recorded interviews with the various fundamentalist ministers in Amarillo and around there. *Blessed Assurance: Living with the Bomb in Amarillo, Texas* tells about the place where the nuclear device is put together. Her question always was, What do you make of this? It was not so much their jobs, though that is what led her there in the beginning, with the bishop saying that Catholics should consider resigning or looking for other work because it was immoral to work at such a facility.

What she really became interested in, and somewhat horrified by, was the whole notion of rapture, taught in church after church after church. She recorded these ceremonies and then spoke with ministers and church leaders. It is very evident that while they still take out life insurance, they definitely believe that the whole nuclear disaster is part of God's plan and not a bad thing, because they will be taken off.

At Tulsa University we ran a discussion about it, and there was some registering of horror that this could be believed, but I came away with the feeling that the people who were not there would have been far more sympathetic. What I can pick up from secretaries and others who are at a lower middle-class level is a very deep conviction that we are in God's hands, that this world is so corrupt now that the end should be very soon and likely will be. When you say that if we fear AIDS, then our children will pick up this fear, I wonder if the students do not also pick up this kind of resignation, almost a

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fatalism really, which their religion has not taught them but at least allowed them to "catch."

ROBERT KIELY: What I have been hearing in the last couple of years that surprises me is students' saying how old they feel and how fast time seems to be going. It is the sort of thing I expect older people to say. It is also interesting that in literary history, at least in relatively recent literary history, this is what the Victorians were always saying. Tennyson, Browning, and Arnold, as soon as they turned twenty-seven, began to feel old. Now it seems to be around nineteen or so that it comes on.

DENISE CARMODY: They frequently say, "When I was young. . . "

ROBERT KIELY: Yes, and thinking about Michael's twelve-year-old, I wonder what his words mean. There are various ways, obviously, of responding to fear, the fear of the end and the fear of death. One is in religious terms. Some think religion has nothing to offer. Others would argue that a main function of religion is contemplation of the end. In any case, religion deals with death.

DENISE CARMODY: I wonder if that's the reason for the great interest in the death-and-dying courses, at least in the state universities. They are still packing them in.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: That would be an interesting subtopic to look at—the experimental efforts in teaching in departments of religious studies to readdress these questions. James Carse at New York University has had hundreds of students sitting in his death-and-dying course and then was on TV in the mornings at some early hour. We're talking about religion in the universities, the things that grew out of the 1960s in an effort to nourish some kind of vague general religious response to reach realities. What's happened to those courses now? Are they still attractive? And then the interjection of all sorts of aesthetic, moral, and religious overtones in courses on nuclear war studies. I participated in a conference—actually the American Academy of Arts and Sciences sponsored it in the Midwest—on teaching courses on arms control. William Ringler, from Madison, put on a multimedia show to evoke a sense of nuclear apocalypse. You'd have to have been a terribly hard-hearted person not to go out of there shaking. Symbols were manipulated not in

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order to evoke an explicitly religious intent, but the apocalyptic symbolism he used was very powerful.

One can control the responses of students in the interests of a moral perspective by a certain kind of teaching, and a lot of that kind of teaching goes on in religious studies courses. One can control responses in a way that falsifies the reality of the world of which we are part by presenting only one alternative and one perspective on a choice. I have worried for a long time about the way in which religious studies has become its own evangelical enterprise on the part of certain people with reference to death and dying, nuclear war issues, and things of that sort.

GEORGE LINDBECK: That I think needs to be underlined as a possible topic for some kind of study, the way in which religious studies, taught in secular institutions, ends up providing some sort of cosmic legitimation and support for all sorts of liberal causes. By and large, I approve of these causes, but I recently had a conversation with a group of my daughter's age. They are just now our side of twenty-five. It was on this matter of fear of atomic holocaust. Almost all of them had been petrified at Michael's son's age. All of them said they had found it necessary to get over that stage and were relatively indifferent to the issues now. They were interested in other aspects of politics, but nuclear warfare had seemed so insoluble a problem that it had gone onto the back burner.

THEODORE SIZER: Were any of them about to have or contemplating having children?

GEORGE LINDBECK: They looked at their friends who were a few years older and noticed how they were having children and were beginning to wonder whether they wouldn't make the same decision when they got to be thirty.

THEODORE SIZER: My experience is the same. Our kids are a little older, but when they asked, "Shall we bring the next generation into being?" on the nuclear issue, they became twelve-year-olds again.

GEORGE LINDBECK: That's interesting. My impression is that some young women were sure they didn't want children when they were in their late teens, but now that certainty is beginning to crumble. Zero population growth and the nuclear threat no longer seem sufficient reasons for remaining childless.

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DANIEL CALLAHAN: What has struck me for some time is that the private moral life is basically not discussed at all. How often in religious studies departments do people really talk about how you want to live your personal life, and what is private morality, and the whole sexual ethic? Many don't consider that part of ethics. That's been removed. It's been delegitimized, delisted.

GEORGE LINDBECK: I get the sense that where liberal, socially concerned religion has often failed is in taking seriously the private realm. It tries to serve personal needs, but that's not quite the same as learning how to construct a coherent sense of your own direction in life, devising a private morality to guide you in the way you behave toward other people, those you live with.

ROBERT LYNN: I don't think we ought to limit the inquiry just to religious studies. As long as we're talking about other forms of religion and education, we really ought to take a critical look at theological schools, where we would see much of the same tendency toward a convenient distinction between public and private and where the sensibility Jim has described as belonging to religious studies is also powerful. I would say, Tim, that it's not a stranger to some Catholic institutions.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Oh, no.

ROBERT LYNN: So that what you ought to look for there is the deeper unity, and that is the course of American liberalism as it has affected both those in religious studies and also those in the theological schools. Don't leave out theological schools. There are some very interesting arguments going on within that sphere.

GEORGE LINDBECK: There's a parallel between this and what Denise was talking about on the conservative side. If we take seriously what you were saying, then it would seem we get a kind of politicization of religion, both conservative and liberal, in which personal morals and public stands are sharply distinguished.

ROBERT LYNN: The evidence that James Davison Hunter has come up with in his study of new Evangelicals would indicate that the same sort of private-public distinction in sexual morality is in vogue, even in the bastions of evangelical fervor.

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DANIEL CALLAHAN: It would be a mistake, though, to wholly equate personal morality with sexual morality.

(Pause in conversation)

FRANK MANUEL: This is a question. I have no answer to it. I have a memory of a number of decades ago that there were religious gurus around in the intellectual world. Tillich was one. Niebuhr and Heschel were others. Are there equivalent figures today? I don't have the feeling that they exist.

JOHN PADBERG: Within Roman Catholicism, certainly, a theological guru of the first order is Karl Rahner, and he still is.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Bob Lynn and I have a thesis about this. To some extent the national visibility of some of those people was due to Henry R. Luce, who gave them space and put their pictures on the cover of *Time* magazine. He gave those people a visibility outside the religious community that probably equally competent people in their time never got and that certain people don't get at the present time.

ROBERT LYNN: It really was more an accident of the 1950s than we currently understand. If you take it historically and go back to the 1920s, as I have in my own work, there are any number of able theologians who were not household names. Today there are some very serious people who in different circles—including some within this room—are taken as sources of wisdom and understanding. Luce did more for neoorthodoxy than has yet been recounted by any historian.

GEORGE LINDBECK: I think your question is different though. It's not public exposure. It's a question of whether among religiously concerned and intelligent people there were individuals who had the guru status. Heschel had that status and I think that Neibuhr did too on the Protestant side, and it was irrelevant whether Luce publicized them.

ROBERT LYNN: But, George, if you look at the hundred years of this progressive era, I think you will find those ten to fifteen years an exception. What I see in you and Jim and others is the same pattern that I could point to in the 1920s.

GEORGE LINDBECK: I'll concede that.

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MICHAEL FISHBANE: Earlier we were talking about texts and their transmission. What I think Frank was emphasizing is that we don't appear to have human models.

FRANK MANUEL: That's what I was suggesting.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Since Frank mentioned Heschel, let me remind you that he once said that the goal of religious education was not to create text readers but text persons. This kind of textualization of the self is a particularly Jewish spiritual ideal. We don't have such models in the contemporary Jewish community. The aura of authenticity is lacking, particularly of an authentic recreation of the self through texts. Franz Rosenzweig represents such a model. And though he died over fifty years ago, his achievement is still a powerful memory for many modern Jews.

DENISE CARMODY: But isn't that partly because we don't have the docility either—or maybe it's the faith, or whatever it is—that's a necessary component to have the guru? We don't want to follow.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: What I am referring to has little to do with imitation. Neither Heschel nor Rosenzweig were gurus to be imitated. Rather, they presented a living configuration of modern possibilities. Their followers are not relieved of responsibility. Each and all still have to find their own way. Each one must become his own interpreter. Heschel and Rosenzweig and Buber too were models of what it means to be a teacher, I think, for they were teachers who pointed out ways and possibilities. They were not people who cultivated imitators.

DENISE CARMODY: Right, I wasn't thinking so much of imitation but more that so much of our academic training is critical rather than sympathetic. So much of it is argumentative that I don't know that we create an atmosphere that will allow us to follow, not in slavish imitation but even to listen receptively enough to hear wisdom. Usually, as soon as we are listening to someone, we're countering with an argument. It's a matter of style.

GEORGE LINDBECK: The phenomenon is important. It may be necessary to locate it in historically specific circumstances. As has already been suggested, all the people we have mentioned were people who were deeply imbued with a tradition but who nevertheless were providing an opportunity for people who were traditionally

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trained themselves to see how one could be in the tradition and yet at the same time modern.

DENISE CARMODY: Yes.

GEORGE LINDBECK: I think on the Roman Catholic side, in the Second Vatican Council, of the enormous importance of people like Yves Congar, for example. Or to cite another example, I remember one Catholic bishop of rigid traditionalist outlook who, after he'd heard a Catholic biblical scholar hold forth on the desirability of radical transformation of the way in which Scripture is dealt with, said, "He was all wrong in terms of my training, but he's such a holy man."

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: I think we come back to this whole theme of text because the Neibuhrs, Tillichs, and Bubers were all essentially commentators on text. The holy men and the holy women are the new gurus of our time. The name that hasn't been uttered yet and that is extraordinarily important today is Mother Theresa.

THEODORE SIZER: You will also remember that Martin Luther King's text was on television. His message was the multiple image.

JOHN PADBERG: When you are talking about models and initiating them, there's a phrase being used now very much among French Jesuits about the essentials of what Jesuits have been trying to do for centuries—*la pédagogie de desir*, the pedagogy of desire, bringing people to desire that which would make them free to make intelligent, appropriate choices out of their own tradition, out of their own religious background. That's what the teaching ought to be about and what the professors ought to be about. It's a common term now showing up in French religious educational literature.

TIMOTHY HEALY: It is interesting that everybody in the Roman Catholic tradition we have mentioned, and I'm thinking of everybody I can think of as real gurus, is pre–Vatican Council or Vatican Council itself. Yves Congar, Augustin Bea, John Courtney Murray, Henry de Lubac, Karl Rahner—all of them feed into the Vatican Council. And after that, I cannot think of a major figure that would fit the real guru category. Mother Theresa, but that's a different kind of phenomenon.

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MICHAEL FISHBANE: All this helps crystallize parts of our earlier conversation—that one thing our students don't have is models of personhood. Certainly just this is one of the things we try to cultivate through our teaching of the great books.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: We also live in a culture that loves to hook into people and pull them down rather than build them up. Mother Teresa is seen by many as a kind of sexist, as an antifeminist. We don't just glorify her. People look closely and ask, "Is she really a heroine?" I don't think that kind of thing happened with the Heschel people.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: I felt this morning that we were talking, on the whole, of religion in America. It is perfectly proper that this be the subject. Perhaps, however, we ought to look at another possibility. Again, we may choose in fifteen minutes to decide that it is a possibility that ought not to be pursued, but the option of dealing with religion not only as an American experience but also as a phenomenon in the world at large ought to be considered. There is great interest in what is happening everywhere in fundamentalism, whether it is indeed a universal phenomenon, what is happening in Islam, in Hinduism, in Confucianism. I cannot tell you how much interest there was in the Spring 1987 issue of *Dædalus* that involved Tu Wei-ming writing about Confucianism and Chinese intellectuals.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: I am inclined to see things in a broad framework, not so much that I am afraid that focus just on America would be parochial but that I am aware these religious questions have a cross-cultural and a historical dimension. Let me give an example from something that I mentioned earlier about textual hierarchies. I think it would be quite helpful to see the American dimensions of this problem in the broadest terms. As we all know, some modern states tend to control their social groups by exercising a monopoly on interpretation. The canons of accessibility to the culture are very much restricted by certain groups who lay claim to privileged power to interpret the foundation documents of the groups. It would be intriguing, I think, to view some of the things going on in America from this history-of-religions perspective. Or if we shift from competing claims for the true hermeneutic to the field of religious polemics, a similar benefit accrues. If we looked at certain constitutional issues, such as the abortion controversy or the creationism

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debate, from the perspective of the history of religions, I think that our understanding of the American situation would deepen.

I don't think we need to lose our focus on America, but much will be gained if we see the American case in a cross-cultural and a historical setting.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: Could I suggest a comparable case study? I recently talked with someone from Spain—mainly in the context of medical ethics. He described how, since the death of Franco, the country has quickly developed a strong body of secular thought competing with the religious, and now the whole culture is changing. This change happened earlier in Italy and France but over a longer period. With Spain it's been fast.

GEORGE LINDBECK: One kind of comparative study could deal with what difference it makes when religion is an integral part of the public-school curriculum, as it is in Scandinavia, Germany, England, and Canada. It is ironic that the United States is in many ways the most religious of all the advanced industrial Western societies and yet we are the ones who have excluded religion from formal instruction in schools most completely. Understanding that phenonemon could be of crucial importance.

Your mention of Tu Wei-ming's work brings to mind his acting as a consultant to the government in Singapore, where religious instruction in the schools has been addressed at a high government level. Also there is something comparable in Thailand, where there is now a program of developing instruction in world religions in the secondary schools. The political reason for this is the problem of dealing with the small Muslim minority in the south and the feeling on the part of the government that it needs to instruct the Buddhist majority to disabuse them of their prejudice toward Muslims. The government is doing this, however, by introducing instruction on all the major world religions—Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Islam, as well as Buddhism—into the secondary schools. It seems to be following more than anything else the Birmingham model that has been introduced in England for instruction in world religions in the state schools.

In Singapore at the level of the government ministry—the equivalent of our cabinet—there was a discussion of the problem, and somebody commented that among the major world religions there

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was no Jew present, whereupon a Chinese Christian said, "But that's not true—I'm a Jew. Christianity is a Jewish religion."

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Once when I was in Japan, I tried to explain to some Buddhist that I was a Jew, and the conversation was going nowhere for a long period of time, so I simply said that Judaism is an early form of Christianity.

ROBERT KIELY: It would be useful to consider how an American Jew or Christian or whatever kind of American describes herself or himself away from home. I am thinking about our eight months in mainland China, where religion had been forbidden—Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, everything—and then during the year we were there it was declared permissible again, although it was still not being taught in the schools. The textual substitute was Chairman Mao's Red Book, with its little repeatable phrases. A form of sainthood was given to a character named Lei Feng, who was a martyr who died for the revolutionary cause at the age of nineteen or twenty. His posters were everywhere. All kinds of legends grew around him—about how he helped old people, the suffering, children. He had become a kind of Saint Francis figure in a secular society. But this religious association would come into focus only if one thought about it through an American sensibility away from home territory.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: Depending on the initial phrase one uses, the angle from which one approaches religious experience differs. Can you comment, Frank, on what difference it would make if we were to substitute *communal religious traditions* for *varieties of religious experience* and whether you would approve?

FRANK MANUEL: *Communal religious traditions* would emphasize the specific organized, institutional, and cultural, whereas *varieties of religious experience* would tend to—I am thinking in purely Jamesian terms and I don't know whether *experience* is the right word—emphasize what it's doing to individuals as part of these groups. If you look at the world, I would say that *religious experience* emphasizes the polarization that I see. *Communal religious traditions* would emphasize a certain cohesiveness that still exists. The names do matter. I don't propose *religious experience* as a solution. I think the *experience* is broad in the sense that it's more flexible than the *communal*, which would emphasize to me the organized forms.

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ROBERT KIELY: I keep wondering how we can be sure to work in the experience of spirituality in religion, so that the description of religion is not merely an external, institutional, sociological phenomenon. We need to talk about the interior life as it is understood, talked about, thought about.

ROBERT LYNN: If we do venture in that direction, then I would want at least to contemplate the question of how Americans understood that in past generations. I can tell you about one strand of the American experience. In large reaches of American Protestantism the argument over the relation of piety and knowledge goes clear back to the latter part of the eighteenth century. You can see it in the founding documents of institutions of higher education. So, rather than restrict ourselves to the contemporary interpretation of spirituality, we should also attend to that century-and-a-half old problem of the relation of piety and knowledge. And then, when did it no longer become a problem? I have some suggestions about that. Ironically enough, the issue has now come back into certain institutions whose leaders are unaware that their forebears ever struggled with it.

STANLEY CAVELL: What did the Catholic founders of American Catholic universities and institutions of higher education think of when they used, as John put it, the rhetoric of defending the immigrants' old faith? What were they defending it against? The pressures of the modern world? Or against alternative kinds of education? Was it a haven?

JOHN PADBERG: Well, certainly starting with the primary schools, it was protecting from what they regarded as a militantly Protestant public school. When the secondary schools came along, I think probably that same kind of thing occurred. For higher education, I suspect they picked up the rhetoric from the primary and secondary schools partly without seeing some of its implications. But they regarded most of the non-Catholic higher educational institutions as basically Protestant also, because at least when a good number of the Catholic places that used that rhetoric were founded, there were very few state schools. It would have been a choice between the Catholic ones and the either quite ostensibly or implicitly Protestant, non-Catholic ones.

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STANLEY CAVELL: May I take it a step further? Is it no longer a problem now, the fact that a kid from a religious background who has not been forced to think about these things loses his or her faith after the first whiff of Enlightenment talk, say when assigned Hume's *Dialogues on Natural Religion* in the introduction-to-philosophy course? Do you think that is an issue?

TIMOTHY HEALY: No, I don't. There are two questions. What does the faith mean? The point of departure is mostly in the 1840s and 1850s for the big Catholic universities. There was a problem then. The Roman Catholic Church had seen in the Deep South an assimilation that was total. Several of the reigning hierarchs early on encouraged mixed marriage as a way of spreading the faith, forgetting quite conveniently that it was only a way of spreading the faith if there was an extant church to draw upon. Since there was no extant church in the South, thousands of Murphys and O'Reillys and O'Briens, almost all Irish, ended up as Baptists and Methodists because that was the only church available. There was a recoil from that. It was initially a fear of assimilation, an assimilation into Protestantism more than into secularism or atheism. I don't think atheism was a very popular cast of mind until well into the nineteenth century, long after most of the major Catholic universities had been founded.

This is very tentative. I have never asked myself the question what clearly they had in mind. I am more preoccupied with the fact that they also had in mind that they were going to do the secular thing and do it well. That's where the division within the Catholic community itself occurred. I think they would have found a general Catholic agreement that it's a bad idea for kids to assimilate in such a way that they become Protestant. I don't think anyone thought of assimilation into nothing. So preserving the faith meant less teaching it than putting it in a context where it would not be challenged. I am talking myself into some clarity.

And by the way, most of this is before the Morrill Act of 1862 was implemented, so that the state school doesn't loom large. What does loom large is Oberlin, and Harvard, and William and Mary, and the Protestant establishment schools, which were seen as the Protestant establishment.

JOHN PADBERG: But Tim, take the founding of Catholic University.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: What year would that be?

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TIMOTHY HEALY: 1897.

JOHN PADBERG: The primary theme of their work was not one of cultural defensiveness. It was rather one of reclaiming the long-term university tradition.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Yes, but with Catholic U., you're in a very different world. First of all, it was founded as a graduate school. And by the way, one of the pieces of history that isn't known, and I hope we get it out in our history for the Georgetown bicentennial, is that there was a huge effort made through Rome to get the law school and the medical school from Georgetown transferred to Catholic U., and Georgetown was to become, to quote the exact documents, "a Holy Cross." That was defeated by the revolt of the Georgetown medical and legal faculties. Catholic University was founded strictly as a graduate school. And I suspect some were working on the lucubrations of people like Father Drum, claiming that Catholicism is not a creed, it's a culture. That would be the mood and atmosphere in that founding, but by then you are almost into the twentieth century.

GEORGE LINDBECK: To speak to Stan's question about the relationship between defense against modernity or defense against Protestantism, in my own non-Catholic reading of the nineteenth-century materials, I am struck by the degree to which the Roman Catholic polemics and apologetics assimilated Protestantism and atheism. You get it in the First Vatican Council in speech after speech, where the Reformation is seen as the source of Voltaire. And one archbishop was shouted down when he suggested that there were multitudes of Protestants who "truly loved" Jesus. Actually, he couldn't continue his speech.

FRANK MANUEL: Fortunately, Voltaire would have agreed.

GEORGE LINDBECK: As recently as 1950 in Toronto, Canada, one of the tentative beginnings of ecumenical discussion between Protestant and Catholic clergy dealt with Christology. I know about this from personal experience. When a Presbyterian minister explained that his faith as a Reformation Protestant was the Nicene Creed, a Catholic priest started crying because he was so moved to discover that some Protestants believed in the divinity of Jesus.

TIMOTHY HEALY: It's very hard when you look back. I'm working on the 1840s, when a bunch of Jesuits trekked up from Kentucky to

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the Bronx and began Fordham University. There were elements in there that were not very logical. One was prestige. If you had an educational system, you had to have a college. That was the normal top, still a familiar enough phenomenon on the academic landscape where the good departments want to give only a doctorate. The doctorate wasn't the issue in 1840, but the bachelor's degree, by and large, was. And I think there was a yearning to say, "We too have the complete system."

There's no question about primary and secondary education. That was clearly to get rid of what was seen as formal Protestant instruction in the public schools. The irony of the conservative Catholics nowadays, screaming about getting prayer back into the schools, is that they founded the parochial school system to get prayer out of the schools. The Catholics were saying, "Make it completely secular. Cut out everything. Don't let us in, but don't let THEM in either." "Them" by and large was not secular humanism—it was organized Protestantism.

FRANK MANUEL: And for Baptists in New England, it meant keeping out the Congregationalists.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Or the Unitarians.

FRANK MANUEL: Remember that when the American Academy of Arts and Sciences was founded in 1780, it was very specific that theology not be discussed under any circumstances. This is carrying on the tradition of the Royal Society, made explicit in the Newtonian epoch. I don't know when the first Catholic was appointed to the American Academy, or whether one knew, but theology is now definitely "in." I don't know when theology was allowed as a class at the American Academy. It must have been—

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: In the twenties, I believe.

FRANK MANUEL: This is a very late phenomenon, but the whole point was there is another tradition—and I imagine in 1789, when Georgetown was founded, there was a tradition of having a completely neutral arts and sciences that wouldn't be touched by any religious form. They probably did obeisance to the Creator. This just complicates the history.

STANLEY CAVELL: The old Humanist Manifesto is cut out of that cloth. John Dewey, after all, signed it. So when I hear denunciations

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of secular humanism and I discover they really are talking about that document, I ask myself, Are they talking about me?

CHORUS OF VOICES: They are.

STANLEY CAVELL: I guess they are. And yet I am not going to sign a document of that sort. Theology does not exist for me as that kind of intellectual threat. Dewey is not for me that kind of intellectual hero. Something else has happened, so I am going to ask, Can one still identify in academic circles fervent atheists, people who find atheism an important position to take, as if we were still struggling to get the Enlightenment to happen? What new forms does this struggle take? And then, how many of us are there for whom education is a substitute for religion, for whom the reading of great secular scriptures occupies the role that we can no longer quite lend to Scripture itself? Then Scripture itself becomes a special case of substitution.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Let me add one more strand to the Catholic history. Religious orders are like British regiments. Yours has a band. I want mine to have a band. And the religious orders, I think, proliferated small colleges because it was the natural complement to the Brothers of the Tabernacle Door Swinging Open that they have their college because the Fathers of the Tabernacle Door Nailed Shut had their college. And of the two hundred and eighty that survived, a goodly number were founded out of familial pride, and not just by sisters, by the way. Many of the small ones were women's colleges, and that was reserved for the nuns.

The other fight goes very, very deep in the academy of higher education, the fight about the fascination with learning as manifested by the Scholastics, who were as a body largely despised in the Benedictine tradition, which regarded university learning as a corrupting process and a very dangerous instrument. The early Benedictine writers talking about the early university—now we're back in the tenth and eleventh century—were sharply opposed to the university clerks and found their preoccupation with learning reprehensible and, in fact, the whole architecture of Scholasticism faintly blasphemous. It fascinates me to find something that I am fending off in the 1980s that has its root back in the schools of Victor and Abelard. The modern version of that would be secular humanism—in other words, the substitution of the work of man and the mind of man for the work of God. Very strong opposition there.

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FRANK MANUEL: I want to recall the intellectual and the historical background. From the very beginning, from Saint Jerome down—Eugene Rice at Columbia has written an extraordinary book on what happened to Jerome—there was a constantly changing attitude and tradition and feeling about Jerome, both pictorially and in works. What do you do with Latin culture? You are really raising the question again, and there is a long history in every church, about what you do with what at a given time. Is the secular culture breeding Horace? Are you allowed to quote him?

JOHN PADBERG: Were you a disciple of Cicero or of Jesus?

FRANK MANUEL: Yes, that terrible horror. Jerome is depicted in many paintings being flagellated for having chosen Cicero. It would be very hard to do a real history of that. It would vary from century to century. So is this not an eternal battle?

And in the Judaic-Hebraic tradition, there has been that same constant question—do you admit the philosophers or not? Maimonides is thought of as an exemplar of normative Judaism, but after all there was a violent movement against the acceptance of Maimonides. This is really a universal war, of which the American story is a little incident. There are no specific events, I think, that would be anything but little variations in a long story.

TIMOTHY HEALY: The only event in the American Catholic story is the Know-Nothing period of about twelve years, which I think did beget a much more defensive mood. A defense, not of ideology, Stanley, but more of entity. The Church was under sharp attack. And there were very few as brave as the old archbishop who said to Mayor Fernando Wood that he wanted this nonsense stopped. Wood said to him, "Are you afraid for your churches?" And the old man looked him dead in the eye and said, "No, your honor, it is yours I am afraid for." That was quite an eccentric reaction to a real sense of closure, that twelve years in the Catholic community in the Northeast. In the Middle West it was different.

JOHN PADBERG: There was some of it out there. It destroyed the original medical school at St. Louis University.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: I have just been working through the papal social encyclical tradition from the eighteenth century through the contemporary period. I do not think you can read the encyclicals of the nineteenth century without reading almost every one of them in

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terms of the impact of the French Revolution. We are talking about a story that has a long past.

ROBERT LYNN: That story affected the Protestants as much as the Catholics. It was Timothy Dwight at Yale College who used the French Revolution and the specter of Voltaire and all those other people to launch his revival system and really the continued development of the college. It was right at the center of his understanding. Andover Theological Seminary was justified on that same basis.

GEORGE LINDBECK: I would like to ask John a question. In the secular French education of the nineteenth century, would those who went through the secular side, the anticlerical system, have any exposure to Christian teachings? What would they know about Christian texts?

The reason I am asking the question is that there is a decisive difference between whether the philosophers can be admitted and whether Scripture should be excluded from the educational system. The characteristic of the most recent phase of the American educational systems is that the Scriptures are excluded from any kind of study, which has not been true in Germany, Scandinavia, or England. It may have been true in France.

JOHN PADBERG: Well, for primary and secondary education, it would depend on the period. To begin with, from the Restoration up to 1830. From 1830 up to 1852, the Falloux law. From 1852 to 1880, when things were open again under the Falloux law. From 1880 on, when they were closed. There would be at least those four periods. As for what would be admissible in primary schools, they, even by some of the anticlericals, were left in the hands of the religious orders because that was the place where young citizens could learn religion and therefore learn to be submissive to their betters and accept their fate and so on. But for the real leaders of French society, the secondary schools were the places where any religion was to be excluded, if at all possible, because you had to form true French citizens, who had allegiance to the Revolution and its values.

FRANK MANUEL: But you admitted the religious learning, historicizing it. The effort is put into the history of the origins of Christianity, with its clear anticlerical overtones.

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JOHN PADBERG: So the educated anticlerical would at least know the *Vie de Jésus,* by Ernest Renan.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: It would be one of the classics of his republican tradition.

JOHN PADBERG: That would be more than the educated American knows nowadays.

FRANK MANUEL: Yes. We do not have the technique of being able to historicize the Bible, because we do not have any Bible to historicize. I once tried lecturing at a university in Melbourne, Australia, on science and religion in the seventeenth century. What do you do when you have to mention a biblical text? There is nothing, no resonance at all, because it never was there. Now we are pretty much coming around to that position, I think. The French nineteenth century still had a way in, but we have no way in, I think. I believe I am giving a reasonable account of the cultural situation at the moment.

JOHN PADBERG: Even when one was bitterly opposed, he at least talked knowledgeably about what this superstition was that he was opposed to.

FRANK MANUEL: I could take a paradoxical position and maintain that the ordinary literate Frenchman never read the Old Testament before Voltaire.

TIMOTHY HEALY: And then they read it only in the extracts.

FRANK MANUEL: Seriously, you do not have any Bible in France. The Germanic tradition had Luther's Bible. The English had the old King James version. There is no such document in French culture. There are many Bibles. For the Hugenots, there was a Bible. But for the others, no. This is why when I talk about religious experience, I want to insist that it is so varied in Western culture.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: What we are now talking about I have never read. It is a different kind of intellectual history, of America's universities, of America's schools. You are not just documenting the movement that led someone from being a Congregationalist to becoming a Unitarian. It is not that individuals suddenly become more secular. The original religious inspiration was transformed, but transformed by what? What do we know about the early colleges, so

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tied to Protestant belief? Denominational universities had already become numerous by the middle of the nineteenth century. What were they progressing toward? How are we to explain their present secularism? Nobody would think to study the history of Oxford without recalling the moment when a don could marry and remain a don. What is analogous to that in this country?

ROBERT KIELY: A footnote to that and a fascinating one, I think, in terms of the development of the originally Protestant colleges, which have mostly become secularized, is to look at how and when they readmitted religious studies into the curriculum. I am thinking of Harvard, for example. Harvard began as a seminary, and around 1870 the subject of religious studies was eliminated from the undergraduate curriculum and was out of it for probably at least a hundred years. It was only fifteen years ago that religious studies was readmitted to that curriculum. It was readmitted partly with the assumption that religion was no longer dangerous, that it was noncontroversial, that it was not a threat.

Certainly, in the Harvard that I came into in the 1950s and as far as I know, during President Conant's period, there was no religion major. It happened during the presidency of Derek Bok. President Nathan Pusey was, of course, very interested in religion. Perhaps because of that there was still a fear on the part of various faculty members that if a religious studies major were introduced at that time, it might be threatening. They were asking, "What is going on here? Is there an agenda that the administration has in mind?" As long as religion might seem intellectually or politically touchy or dangerous, there was a resistance to it, even as a subject of study.

ROBERT LYNN: I would like to caution, though, about reading the present back into the past. Very quickly, the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century curriculum at either Harvard or Yale would not have anything called religious studies. We know a good deal about the senior course, most often taught by the president, on moral philosophy. The rest of the structure did not really allow substantial attention to religion. I have been reading about Yale in particular. Religion came in the extracurriculum. It especially came in and through student life as well as through the sermons in the required chapel.

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JOHN PADBERG: That is exactly the case of the French Jesuit schools in the nineteenth century. If they had two periods a week of anything like formal religious instruction, that was a great deal. But the crown of everything was the last year of the seven-year course, which was philosophy and was taught by the senior and most prestigious professor. It was to bring together everything that the students had learned before into a synthesis, which would deepen, supposedly, their faith and also enable them to ward off the attacks of—and I quote—"a blind rationalism." Or if you want a paraphrase from one of the strangest textbooks used at the time, "The professors shall endeavor, progressing from the first principals of natural reason known to every human being, to move therefrom finally to the crown of all of this wisdom, the divinity of Jesus Christ and the foundation of the Catholic faith." Progressing from the first principals of natural reason!

TIMOTHY HEALY: By the way, Bob, philosophy played a similar role at Catholic colleges. Philosophy was the great carrier, like the Protestant tradition of having the president teaching in his institution. The senior year at Georgetown, Fordham, and Boston College included what was probably a six-credit course or the equivalent each term—one on natural theology, one on ethics. The professor of ethics became the character on campus because everybody took the course. Now, these colleges were small. They had three or four hundred kids total, so the entire senior class would take the ethics course from one man, and the natural theology course from the other. Twenty-four credits in philosophy were required, no matter what your major was, and philosophy was the carrier of religion. This was pure Scholasticism, and the Catholic genius ran all through it, so you did not need a course in religion. That would have been a waste of time. Besides, you could get that in sermons. By the time we were finished with your head philosophically, you had the whole Scholastic synthesis in your head and all its terminology, and that was all that was required to nail you forever to the faith.

And it worked too. The alumni of Georgetown grouse regularly about the lack of philosophy. The fact is that philosophy is a very popular major here, but it is obviously not totally Scholastic, and it does not culminate in those two great courses, both taught by Jesuits. That went on until the Second World War. I once dug out of the

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Fordham archives a whole batch of letters from 1903 and 1904, with the alumni complaining furiously that the college had gone to the dogs because those two courses were no longer taught *in Latin*. Let us not only get the liturgical accent. Let's get the liturgical language in there. Until the turn of the century, they were taught in Latin.

ROBERT LYNN: At Yale, Harvard, and Princeton, courses in moral philosophy up through the nineteenth century were really religious instruction. In this connection, we need to think of one of the truly great presidents of Brown—Francis Wayland. His work was important not only at Brown. It was copied at countless schools across the Midwest. There have been studies of the experience of particular universities. For instance, Ralph Gabriel, the great American studies scholar, did a lovely volume on religion and learning at Yale. It was very gentle. But we do not have any larger view of both the Protestant and the Catholic experience.

Of course, the great moment of change, the one constantly noted, occurs from 1870 to 1890, which Lawrence Veysey has charted so well in his book *Emergence of the American University*. We have not had anybody look at what happened to religion, in either the so-called Protestant colleges—I would say Protestant only by ethos, and that was blanching out rapidly—or the Catholic universities. We need to take a look at what happened to Catholic higher education since about 1890 to 1910 and then compare that with the experience of other schools in the whole era of transformation.

TIMOTHY HEALY: My sense of it, Bob, is that apart from the professional schools, there is about a thirty- to forty-year gap. My memories go back to the 1940s. The talk I picked up from my elders was that graduate work, for instance, at Fordham began in the late 1920s and 1930s, that it was principally the work of Robert Gannon, who gathered to himself about fifteen first-class scholars. There were a couple of Europeans. The rest were drawn principally from Harvard and Yale. The point is he was just thirty years too late. Thirty years before that, fifteen serious scholars could make a graduate school, by and large. By the time he started it, you needed fifty-five. You needed five in each of ten departments, and this was totally beyond his grasp. It was probably also beyond Fordham's financial capacity. But it was very interesting that there was a time

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when graduate departments could be built around two very strong people, with others doing interesting things.

JOHN PADBERG: It is worth looking at William Fitzgerald's *Governance of Jesuit Colleges* to see how there were some halfhearted attempts at deciding which places would have graduate schools and in what fields. There was a total unreality of understanding what resources in personnel were needed.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Somewhere about 1910 one of the Jesuit provincials sent a notice out to the entire Eastern seaboard. His instructions were that "in the future, when Jesuits appear on public platforms, they will take care to have the initials D.D. printed after their names." Period. New paragraph. "We will determine at some later date from which institutions these titles are to be derived." Unbelievable! We are not talking about 1780 here.

FRANK MANUEL: Well, that is why I want to give a warning about the history that is playing a very important role in this. The difficulties will always be the great gap between formal orders that appear in government circulars, particularly in administrators' orders, and what has actually happened. One thing appears on paper, and the real thing has no relationship to it. English universities would be a case in point. So, also, the American eighteenth-century colleges.

JOHN PADBERG: The place in which some of the Jesuit institutions are rich in the description of the real, when there was not that clear distinction between the school and the community, was the daily diary that the minister of the house or the prefect of studies kept. The minister was the Jesuit in charge of everything from the boilers to shoestrings. You would find maybe in the minutes of the corporation what supposedly had been decided day by day. You would find in the daily diary of the minister the realities of what happened in the institution. In some ways that is by far the most realistic set of materials you could find.

TIMOTHY HEALY: We peeled off a good colonial historian six years ago to start working on Georgetown, and he for the first time will have all the numbers and statistics and demographics of when the place changed from a high school, a French *collège,* to an American college, that kind of information. He will tell the story that has never been told. The lovely eighteenth-century building here was built by

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slaves. The architect was a slave builder. He had no last name. The rule, as I have found out since I have gotten here, was that the Jesuits would buy slaves and own them, or communities could, but could not sell them. In 1853, the rector-president—the two jobs went together, the head of the community and the head of the university—sold Georgetown's slaves. He was immediately, within about two months, fired.

JOHN PADBERG: The idea of breaking up a family, first of all, and then also of endangering the faith of slaves, if they were sold to someone other than a Catholic, was anathema.

TIMOTHY HEALY: All of those stories are now coming out, so Georgetown will probably have, about a year from now, a far better history of what the faculty was, what the student numbers were, where they came from, what level they were working at, through the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, than most other places I know.

ROBERT LYNN: I know a group of historians beginning the searches of archives of congregational histories and building up out of that a sense of what the lived experience was.

GEORGE LINDBECK: Do you know about the conference on religion and American intellectual life that was held at the Smithsonian the spring of 1986? There was a number of historians at that who were doing archival work and giving some preliminary reports in areas related to our interests. Bruce Kuklick's work, in particular, on the transformation of American philosophy shows how it replaced religion in the older universities, with James and Dewey, for example, being the new clerics.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Am I just being historically ignorant? Is not the first element in the Enlightenment faith the separation of church and state? The year 1785 saw the first full meeting of the American Roman Catholic clergy, about twenty-five of them, drawn mostly from Maryland and Pennsylvania, a couple down from New York and New Jersey, none in New England, and if there were any in Virginia, I have forgotten. They sent a report to Rome. It was written by John Carroll, the bishop of Baltimore and founder of Georgetown, who was by birth the one certified gentleman in the crowd and consequently their presiding officer. The statement "that since the

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revolution has been achieved, the good effects of the separation of church and state are beginning to be felt" makes good sense to us, and we would take it for granted and congratulate Carroll for understanding what it meant for the future of Catholicism. It was the most absolute heresy when it arrived in Rome. This is like saying to them that the good effects, the beneficial effects, of abortion are beginning to be felt. That was exactly the way that must have landed, like a lead brick on a Roman desk some place. Carroll was no fool. He must have known. Also, I think he was staking out a new piece of turf and saying, "Fellows, you are going to have to adapt to it. It will not adapt to you."

In 1950 I was taught what was called the *thesis classica.* I must admit that the Belgian who taught it to us apologized for it, but it was the formal position of the Church, John Courtney Murray about that time having been told to shut up. It said that in a monarchy the Catholic king was to suppress public Protestant worship but that in a democracy, Catholics, alas, had to wait until they were 51 percent of the population, at which point by vote they would perform the same useful service of suppressing the public manifestations of a non-Catholic religion. The private manifestations were another question, never really addressed. But the public manifestations were addressed. Almost two hundred years later, that thesis was still being presented to theological students in seminaries as the official position of the Church, which John Carroll had very effectively denied in 1785. This is the Enlightenment article of faith that by and large the separation of church and state is a good idea, which clearly was accepted right through the history of Catholicism in the United States.

FRANK MANUEL: Well, it was the opportunity for freedom.

GEORGE LINDBECK: Do you really think that the Vatican was so stupid that they did not realize that the separation of church and state was not all bad in the United States?

JOHN PADBERG: They would recognize, yes, that it was an advantage in the United States and that it would continue to be an advantage and that there probably would not be a 51 percent majority. As a matter of fact, in the place in which there was more than a 51 percent majority—Belgium, for example, where the constitution had been established in 1830—there was no move on the

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part of any cleric there, or anybody in Rome, to push the archbishop into calling a referendum for that. But practice is one thing. You can do almost anything as long as you maintain the official doctrine.

TIMOTHY HEALY: That is right. That was the official belief. I studied that thesis in Belgium in 1950.

GEORGE LINDBECK: I attended a conference in 1956 in New York in which the Paul Blanshard attack on religion was still a matter of hot dispute, in which 40 percent of the attendance was Catholic, and they were being attacked by the majority on this matter right down the line. The American Civil Liberties Union was heavily represented. Believe me, the large proportion of American non-Catholics believed that that thesis was the official Roman position.

TIMOTHY HEALY: It was. Blanshard was quite right on that one.

FRANK MANUEL: Leonard Levy, the historian of constitutional law, has in terms of the religious clauses said the last word. You will get varying views if you take Enlightenment historians. There is a broad gamut of positions on the Enlightenment in America and its religious or nonreligious character, and there is no unified, official viewpoint. You have a number of historians who could summarize or take a position on what, historically, is a proper definition of the term *Enlightenment.* I think here the issue becomes contemporary, as in the Supreme Court decision in the Pawtucket case on whether you are allowed to put up a crèche or not.

JOHN PADBERG: But there is also the question of what are the unexamined assumptions about the Enlightenment that informed much of American higher education, and if those assumptions are no longer accepted or operative or vital, what does that do to American higher education?

GEORGE LINDBECK: An intellectual historian at the conference at the Smithsonian that I mentioned earlier attempted to characterize the difference between the 1950s and the present. He said it seems prefectly commonplace in such gatherings to say that the epistemological status of quarks and of Homeric Gods is exactly the same and that what has changed is the social conditions under which things are accepted as true or not.

In the 1950s that would have been shocking in any similar academic group. I think that has something to do with the disappear-

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ance of the aggressive atheism that you mentioned earlier. When I started out at Yale, I certainly knew aggressive atheists on the faculty. I don't know any now.

Richard Rorty, for example, doesn't bother the way Brand Blanshard did to argue against religion. I was a teaching assistant of Brand Blanshard's, who was Paul's brother. They were sons of a Presbyterian minister and argued aggressively against religion. But now the comparable attitude as represented by Rorty, who once took a course of mine and is the grandson of the distinguished theologian Walter Rauschenbush, is, in effect, "Religion does not interest me. It wouldn't occur to me to argue against the existence of God. It just doesn't interest me." That's the switch.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: How did that come about? I mean, what happened within the academy to produce that? It must involve attitudes toward the Enlightenment in some sense or other, but what was the sociology of that whole development?

GEORGE LINDBECK: It has something to do with that change from positivism, which tended to dominate in the 1950s and which has disappeared rather quickly, but also something to do with the changes in philosophy of science, most often referred to under the name of T. S. Kuhn, I suppose. A whole set of factors is involved.

STANLEY CAVELL: We need some sort of account of the rise and fall of positivism, not just in American philosophy but in American social science as well. The philosophy that psychologists and sociologists would have been exposed to in graduate school was positivism. Anyway, that was the thing in philosophy that stayed with them, captured their intellectual superegos. What they knew was that you had to be scientific, and they were given a very mechanical picture of science and its verifiability. Surely that is the background against which Kuhn's work had such an extraordinary impact. There was a highly motivated intellectual house of cards, and if you commanded the authority to say that and to show better and concretely how natural science works as a historical phenomenon, you stood to have a crashing, reactive influence. But nothing could have predicted the scope of Kuhn's success.

At this moment, with the decline in analytical philosophy, or with the disheartenment over analytical philosophy, my colleague Burton

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Dreben and his students are starting to learn how to write about the history of analytical philosophy. That would have been a paradoxical thing to do twenty years ago, since analytical philosophy was set against the idea that there is any history and, above all, that it had a history. It took itself, as it were, to have essentially no past, as if it were immortal. But now there are smart people starting to think about it. I wonder if one nudged them a little bit whether one of them would think about the way in which their turn to history is in some functional relation with something happening to a religious, or at least more broadly historical, sensibility. They certainly have nothing now to say against religion.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: In *The Rise of American Philosophy,* Kuklick argues that the professionalization of philosophy in the early twentieth century tended to drive out larger questions, of which religion was one. The ground had been prepared prior to positivism, and positivism killed things off once and for all.

FRANK MANUEL: What has happened to the idea of progress since the end of the latter part of the nineteenth century? You could take any time and its effect on others. Again, the whole Niebuhr phenomenon—the attack on liberal Protestant theology. Isn't that one of the problems?

JOHN PADBERG: It could be.

FRANK MANUEL: Theology was liberal in the sense of commitment to the idea of progress. Even Tillich faced up to the attack on the idea of progress.

GEORGE LINDBECK: Tillich was a continuator of the nineteenth-century German tradition of challenging certain elements of the positivistic, rationalistic Enlightenment, but what we're talking about now seems to be a new phenomenon.

FRANK MANUEL: It may be. I don't read the contemporary stuff. The argument is to me as old as de Maistre. I seem to hear the same tones.

GEORGE LINDBECK: Stan, you'd be better able to comment on this than I am, but it's the dissolution of a kind of hardheaded empirical rationalism from within rather than an attack from outside.

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FRANK MANUEL: For me, de Maistre is an attack on science from within, before it got going. To attack science from within its own preconceptions is again an old tradition in Western society. The historians and philosophers of science are raising these questions. Aren't they the more radical in their criticism?

GEORGE LINDBECK: Yes. What I meant is that the type of criticism strikes me as very different from the sort of reservations about a positivism that you would get from a Tillich, which grew out of German idealism.

FRANK MANUEL: I would agree there's a difference. It is a subject nonetheless. I think there is a relationship between the present predicament and this phenomenon.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Another option would be to do a functional interpretation of secularism as its own kind of religion or as a functional equivalent of religion. The ways in which it provides justification, outlook, and so forth for all sorts of practices of education could be examined. There still are those militant secular people who had their own manifesto in the *New York Times* a couple of years ago that Sidney Hook and others signed. I thought it was a very virulent kind of antireligion document, particularly anti-Catholic. They are not gone completely. Maybe they're not intellectually important, but they are still around.

STANLEY CAVELL: But that strikes me as a marginal reaction now in the aftermath of the undisputed reign of analytical philosophy. Heidegger and Wittgenstein bear on this. Take them as two of the major names in twentieth-century philosophy. Both were haunted by religion. Both declared that they were not religious. The struggle of and against positivism in the last thirty or forty years certainly threatened religion. Yet it is Wittgenstein who says to one of his students, "See everything in the *Philosophical Investigations* as if it were written from a religious point of view." Now, it is true if you gave that advice still in most philosophy departments, you would draw a blank. And most people who study Wittgenstein just would have no use for the idea. And Heidegger obviously can't exist without an inner struggle with religion.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Let me ask a question of fact, to make it complete. The Catholic institutions have by and large held tight to

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continental philosophy, J. Richardson being one of the major commentators on Heidegger and Husserl. Is this true of the formally Protestant colleges, Jim?

JAMES GUSTAFSON: What do you mean by *formally*?

TIMOTHY HEALY: Would the Catholic intellectuals who have held against most of the positivist movement right since the beginning have found natural allies in the Protestant colleges? I don't mean the ex- ones. You cited Wheaton before.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: I think Wheaton has had a pretty analytic philosophy. I doubt if it ever propounded positivism. Calvin College has a kind of theological rationalism. I don't know how that fits into this spectrum. George, what do you think? They are certainly not Heideggerians. They're certainly not Wittgensteinians. What are they?

GEORGE LINDBECK: They are, some people would say, nonpositivists with the temperament of positivists!

STANLEY CAVELL: I would like to see something done about what sort of solace an embattled theology finds in secular philosophy. How important now, for example, is the Whiteheadian movement in Protestant theology?

JAMES GUSTAFSON: George and I probably have some disagreements about this. I think there are people who took to the later Wittgenstein and the language games and built a philosophical basis for a kind of confessional theology. It provided them a lot of solace, from my point of view. George would be kinder about that than I am. There certainly are other ways in which solace is provided. I show my own bias to some extent.

I see the interest in hermeneutical theories as another way in which people find a philosophical perspective that provides solace in the face of threats to theology in texts and various theories of interpretation. I am interested in the extent to which theologians who use hermeneutical philosophy can range everywhere from virtually biblical literalists to the most far-out kind of Eliadean general history-of-religions type of person. There are different ways that current philosophical movements can be borrowed, or used apologetically in one way or another, for theology.

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GEORGE LINDBECK: One could add to that the influence, obviously, of Marxism, particularly associated with liberation theology. Process is important. Process theology, borrowed from Alfred North Whitehead, via Charles Hartshorne chiefly. On the difference between Jim and myself that Jim referred to, I think of Wittgensteinian fideism, as it is sometimes called, as having a lot of nonfideistic substance to it when modified by somebody like William Christian. The later Wittgenstein is clearly of importance to a considerable number of theologians.

STANLEY CAVELL: And a feature of my question is whether philosophical solace genuinely relieves intellectual and spiritual distress. The question is not just whether you manage a certain religiosity out of some resort to philosophy but the other way around as well—whether you are actually thereby engaging professional philosophy in any of the forms in which it is now practiced. What the philosophical profession is has become a question for many of us. But if it is Whitehead, for example, who is the philosophical resort and if or since Whitehead is virtually without following in professional philosophy—except for the provision of that very solace—then in accepting solace from that particular philosophy, you have blocked off relations with the field of philosophy. I am wondering to what extent that happens and hence to what extent there are mock dialogues going on between philosophy and theology.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: It's a monologue between theologians and their favorite philosophers.

STANLEY CAVELL: Why not, if it is still the case that philosophy and religion live off one another? And sometimes die of one another. I have examined Ph.D. candidates in programs in the philosophy of religion some of whose teachers have seemed to me more religious about analytical philosophy than about religious conviction and sentiment. They can be quite shocking when they wish to press some graduate student for ever greater precision of argument in a region or a moment at which a philosopher might be much more intuitive. Well, everyone's trying to prove something.

I recently asked President Laney of Emory University what they are doing with all that theology down there. Do the philosophers participate in it? The answer was, "Not much." But there is at Emory

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an odd school, or interdisciplinary graduate program, not particularly professional in its conception of a degree.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: It's the Institute of Liberal Arts.

STANLEY CAVELL: Yes. Well, I was all for this program. I asked if its students care whether they are getting degrees that allow them to teach in other places, or not. If not, who are these people? Laney's idea was that a generation ago they would have been theology students. That meant to me that some of them are people who want to be around the university, who want to think, who want to live a life of thought and concern, and there are not many ways or places in which to do that. Then in this case—is it not?—education is becoming a sort of replacement for religion. So, if we are asking where one finds religion, if it's the thing that can't speak its name still in academic circles, maybe the name we use for it sometimes is still *philosophy*.

ROBERT KIELY: Continuing that, it would be interesting to follow through on what is called religion, not just by some philosophers but by people in various disciplines who seem to be disassociating themselves from it and yet use the term or use terms associated with religion. What connotations do they associate with it?

STANLEY CAVELL: How big a subject is Bible studies now, literary Bible studies?

ROBERT KIELY: There is considerable interest in it.

STANLEY CAVELL: I thought what Bob was going to say, in extending the shadow world between philosophy and religion, is that there is such a world also between literature and religion. I am convinced that I know a number of literary graduate students who read in general everything from some religious yearning, who want a secular text to yield what they can't accept in a religious text, want, say, *Paradise Lost* to be the thing or Shakespeare. I have urged the idea that in *Walden* Thoreau was consciously composing a scripture. But then he pervasively records and turns moments and images and phrases that are familiar from actual scriptures, Western and Eastern. This is a source of my wondering how widespread in literary circles interest is in actual scriptures.

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ROBERT KIELY: I meant that, but I also meant the negatives, with—and this is just another way of thinking about the Enlightenment discussion—let's say psychology majors, or chemistry majors, or biology majors, who use the term *religion* to indicate what they are *not* doing. What I am wondering is whether one could get at what their assumptions are about what this thing is that they are not up to, that they are not interested in.

GEORGE LINDBECK: Your use of the word *solace* I found interesting. I wonder, though, if one might also think of it as people in religion looking for a language with which to communicate with the rest of the world. Catholic Scholasticism picked up Aristotle for that purpose. But if the language you pick up philosophically in order to communicate or to find solace itself becomes problematic, then you're really in trouble. Once Scholasticism as a philosophical system became doubtful, where in the world were Roman Catholics to go to find some alternative? Well, they went to phenomenology, existentialism, and the like, which seems to be a lot more promising than going toward positivism, which was powerful at the time that Scholasticism was declining.

But all religious communities have the problem of learning how to talk to other communities, particularly if they are living in a pluralistic society. And then that forces you into having a double consciousness, double language, and switching back and forth all the time. That, it seems to me, would be interesting to explore in itself.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: I worry about the virulent move against any traces of the stereotype of positivism. Religious thinkers, in effect, can say, "We've now discovered that science isn't as hard as it used to be. Therefore it is legitimate to be a theologian." I worry a good bit about that.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: Last evening, we were talking about the extent to which a medium as important as television has affected religious life. How? By its religious programs? By all the other programs that are aired? By being the educational force in the lives of so many young people? Is that what we mean? Is that the sort of thing that we ought to address? Or ought we really to try for something like the kinds of things we've been talking about today? This whole theme of text seems to me terribly important.

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MICHAEL FISHBANE: I, for one, am glad that you came back to this issue. I was just musing about it before you called us to order again. In some ways it ties in with one of the final issues that we did open up, the notion of ersatz. We have the emergence of new religious structures, particularly when young people in the university or those who don't go to university are little connected with what most recently was termed the Logos. There are new rituals. There are new forms of religious imagination. There are new forms of celebration abroad. I think that it behooves us to penetrate these religious structures.

Earlier I referred to a comparative dimension for our studies. I think we might better understand the new spirit arising in America if we saw it in and through some of the structures of known religions. I am glad the matter has come up again. As I have mentioned, one of our challenges as teachers is that we are facing a crisis of text culture versus nontext culture. Some of the despair that is often voiced is the despair of trying to retrieve something that may not be easily retrievable. If we are going to educate another generation in terms of value and informed decision, it behooves us to know what are the genuine religious impulses at work in today's youth. What sustains a whole substructure of our society? Do we have the emergence of a new religious mind that isn't burdened by the past? This is an exhilarating matter but one that also frightens me. I am very interested in what all this means as a religious phenomenon. I am not simply inclined to label our students' freedom from the past as a philistine desire.

I would like to consider the issue of cultural canons and who controls them. A basic feature here revolves around the question, Who controls the interpretative process? In some ways people have access to a culture by what certain teachers define as the hierarchy of meanings and readings of its classical sources. Groups therefore become marginal and excluded from power because they are told that they don't have privileged access to the major texts. They then form alternative communities of interpretation.

The formation of religious communities as functions of interpreters and their interpretations has serious ethical import. Frank and I have mentioned the contemporary situation in Israel. A great cultural battle is now under way there, and part of it revolves around the

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question of who is privileged to interpret the culture. Who has the right to teach the foundational texts of the culture? Some people co-opt the rights of others in acts of hermeneutical righteousness. Others simply give up.

It would be interesting to see this larger matter from a cross-cultural perspective—in America, for example. What kind of claims of interpretation are put forth? Who have become the teachers? How and on what basis are some groups privileged and others not? And how can a common culture be established under these circumstances? We all know that here in America we have people making large-scale claims for their models of exegesis. The fact that the master document is not the Bible or not only the Bible should not deflect us from seeing the dynamic for what it is. In America we too have a kind of cultural crisis of interpretation. And because we do not have a common language to mediate that crisis, religion and education should be concerned with helping our culture develop a language that the culture can build on. The root problem is thus an ancient, historical one. But it has many modern reflexes. In America we have many texts, and as teachers we want to endorse many forms of interpretation. As in earlier times, tolerance plays a great role in mediating between the claims of interpreters.

STANLEY CAVELL: Speaking about a common language, or lack of it, I would like to see two or three pages from each of, say, a dozen people about a book that has either convinced them that there is something to religion or perhaps that there is nothing to it. We live in such a strange culture, where the adventitiousness of cultural discovery is almost common, quite as if that is expected, as if culture itself is adventitious.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: You talk about the adventitious nature of our culture. The point and its paradoxes deserve emphasis. What does it mean for a young person to go into a bookstore and to see paperback versions of the Bible next to the Tibetan Book of the Dead, and these placed next to novels and picture books? They are all there on a shelf for roughly the same price, and the bindings are similar. No sign says, "Only this is your master text. Only this document gives access to religious meaning." This is, to be sure, a rough and simple example. But it points out something vital about our culture—about the

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accessibility to meaning and about the cross-fertilization that can take place by chance. We no longer have privileged texts, with all else being commentaries on them. This is an enormous culture shift.

GEORGE LINDBECK: Do I detect a certain tension between the emphasis that you are putting on the word *text* and the use of the words *religious experience?* How does that relate to your question about the definition of religion? You said that there was a problem there, and I was wondering what specifically you had in mind.

ROBERT KIELY: One of the problems is the way the term *religion* is being used by us and the way it is used by others. Michael put it very well when he raised questions that have to do with texts—Where is the authority? What is the canon? Where in the hierarchy is a particular text or scripture? And what of the absence of texts?

If we are talking about education, not only are we dealing with young people at universities or in secondary school who do not have texts in hierarchical order, at least not in the same hierarchical order as one another or as earlier generations did, but many of whom have few, if any, common texts to react to. Yet what I think I hear Michael probing in his own children and others is that this does not necessarily mean that that generation is not expressing a religious need and perhaps also a religious sentiment.

GEORGE LINDBECK: We no longer have any canon, not even in literature. The result is that there is a cacophony of languages that people learn. They learn none of them well, and so there's a diminution of the level and depth at which communication can take place. The disappearance of a literary canon is not unassociated with the problem of the loss of the religious canon, because in the days when one had the kind of normal training in English literature that most of us had at our age, one automatically absorbed an enormous number of biblical references that are simply lost to our contemporaries who are forty years younger. I do not know that there have been any careful statistical studies, but every teacher of my age that I know of is convinced that average college freshmen know far less, are able to identify far fewer scriptural allusions in what they read, than they could a generation ago.

Actually, when you begin talking about texts, what I mean by *religious traditions* is very close to the same thing. In my mind *religious experience* connotes something entirely different. You can

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talk about religious experiences that have no clear relationship to any texts. In any number of different religious traditions, you can talk about mysticism, for example, or a sense of the sacred or a sense of awe. Religious needs also can be talked about in disassociation from texts, canons, traditions. But once one disassociates phenomenological and experiential talk about religion from traditions, canons, and texts, I no longer have the slightest idea of what it means.

I can illustrate the difficulty with my wife's problem in Thailand, where she did some teaching of religion, in English, in a university where all the instruction was in English. One difficulty was trying to communicate to Buddhist university students that the sacred is not identical to magic. The whole notion of the sacred was foreign. Well, all right, that is a trivial example, but one has to know something textually about Buddhism and about Western religions before one can start teaching in such an environment.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: There are latent textual forms. I mean there is no such thing as a nonmediated religious experience. Jews do not have mystical experiences of the Virgin Mary, and Catholics do not have mystical experiences of the Shechinah. People absorb cultural images and have experiences based upon them. The fact is that our younger people are having experiences based on mythologies or narratives outside our canonical ken—whether they be Star Wars or He-man or images picked up from television. This popular mythology contributes to the cultural imagination and helps dramatize popular astonishment and terror.

When we were talking earlier about AIDS, I mentioned the fear of it all. My son does not use traditional religious language, but his fears express real religious terror. Why? Because in a sense science and culture have provided a substitute myth for an orderly cosmos. And now this orderly cosmos of scientific rationalism cannot totally cover over these elements of raw mystery and terror. This dread, this fear of the unnatural, is expressed in new religious terms. We must attune ourselves to this phenomenon and learn to read the narrative of how our students interpret the infinite universe. As teachers, we must listen to their language of mystery, to their new mythology of religious wonder—filled as it is with images of black holes, quarks, and God knows what else.

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What I am saying, then, is that I do not think people come to experience like some tabula rasa. No. They are filled with images and narratives. We have to decode them if we want to understand what is going on in "the new religions," if we want to expand the nexus of religion and education.

GEORGE LINDBECK: We are very much on the same wavelength, and I can see that when you begin to talk about religious experience, mediated, formed, shaped, and expressed through narratives of this kind or the other, you are entirely avoiding the kind of problem that I find myself fearful of, which is a sort of free-floating notion of religious experience, which does not tie it down to any specificities, which leaves it unmediated, which leads to Sheilaism, and so on. Much of the widespread talk about religious experience strikes me as an unprofitable way of talking about religion, but if I am the only one who has this problem, then I think I will drop it, as long as one emphasizes what you were calling mediation.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: It may be an issue worth exploring.

ROBERT KIELY: I certainly think so. I also do not understand what it means to speak of an experience of God without mediation, but I think it would not be a bad thing to deal with the oddities of the mediation, even the mangling of texts. I think of the papers we have all gotten from students with comments like "when Eve danced enticingly before Adam in the Garden of Eden" or "that old Victorian saw, Am I My Brother's Keeper?" I do not think it would be a totally bad thing to attend to the jumbling of texts in some systematic way.

JOHN PADBERG: It might be worthwhile to make explicit that if we are going to talk about religious experience, there is a context for it. It does not just come out of nowhere. Once that is said, I still think it is worthwhile to deal with some kind of religious experience.

DENISE CARMODY: I think it is worthwhile simply because it is part of students' experience. That is what so many teachers are concerned about, that so many students have no knowledge of their heritage.

This summer, my husband and I were at a summer institute of about one hundred and fifty primarily religious educators, the vast majority Roman Catholic. They do a miniseries in theology at this institute. A speaker there who is a well-known Catholic religious

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educator said in response to my husband, who had been using the Trinity as a paradigm, that she was really bemused that any theologian today would talk about the Trinity since—and this is a direct quote—"that went out with the bustle." This is a Catholic institution, a Catholic religious educator! Now, she later modified that and said she realized she had spoken rather hastily.

What was more disturbing to us was that the reaction of the audience was very much on her side, as opposed to my husband's side. What I came away with was that we are in a very bad way in terms of the theological education that is going out to the laity. Yet I could not deny, and would not want to, that I sensed an incredible, sacrificial notion among those people, the kinds of lives they were living, often exemplary, and all that. There was a lot of the functional that we were talking about earlier, the notion of ritual. They were great on all kinds of sacramental rituals that would be needed. Still, if the Trinity went out with the bustle, and that was the level of the theology, then getting back to texts in a serious way seems to me to be a very important item on the religious agenda.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Could someone prepare a canon of what they think would be the essential texts for a good education in the Western religious traditions? Obviously, there would be argument, but just to list the great books of Christianity and Judaism—to confine it only to those two—of what should be taught in that curriculum, would help.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: In some ways the problem is more basic than that. We do not know what virtues we want to communicate. We do not know what the ideal of personhood is that we wish to communicate. The cultures that are sure about what it means to be a person easily know the relationship between texts. The job may be to explore that problem.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Somebody might defend a point of view on that. We are saying we do not know, but somebody might say, "Well, I think I know, and I will argue to persuade others."

STANLEY CAVELL: Since the issue comes up about the discourse in which we are trying to learn to speak to one another, I would like to know when and where Americans have ever spoken to one another about these things. What are the American texts that you would put in this canon, whether they are actually texts in religious education or

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just provide some discourse within which one seeks for a canon? What is the cultural role of American classics? I claim that you cannot name three books that even a small gathering, this gathering of people, would have in common.

I hope we will commission an essay on William James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*. But what other books might we take as essential?

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Are you speaking for trying to retrieve the religious?

STANLEY CAVELL: No, I am not trying to retrieve it but only to try to convince myself that there is a creative current discourse in American life that engages our questions. If this discourse is not someplace in the culture, it is rather a tall order for us to try to invent it here, around this table, as we find ourselves speaking to one another about these things.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: So we are talking about talking toward that future discourse. If one thinks of past texts, and some of the texts of Henry David Thoreau are extremely religious, one must nevertheless ask whether American students have the readiness to stay with texts like that. Perhaps part of our task as teachers is to find a new canon of American possibilities, a new literary canon of religious instruction. We need not balk at this. Textual hierarchies have always shifted, and the teachers of the texts have always played a vital role in this process.

STANLEY CAVELL: Of course American writers have been obsessed with the question of religion, but the writing that has lasted has on the whole taken the form of poetry or novels. What books of ideas by Americans still speak to us as some basis for our discussion?

DANIEL CALLAHAN: You talk about a text that we can use to talk with each other. It seems to me one function of religious texts is to enable one to talk with oneself. They make some sense of the interior world. And then the problem is how one learns to talk with people who have a different text.

STANLEY CAVELL: When I first realized that *Walden* is an absolutely ground-floor work of philosophical genius, I wanted to rush around to everybody and say, "You know this thing we read in high school? Do you *know* how good that is?" The general response on the part of American intellectuals that I spoke to was "I am sure it is a worthy

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book. I mean to read it." Of course, they did not on the whole go on to read it. There is no real draw of conscience to do so.

Americans do not quite believe that they can produce things like this. That is a piece of the story about American self-doubt. A companion story about American stubbornness is that in every generation there are some, young and old, who know, despite fashion, the value of certain achievements on these shores. Too often, however, they do not know one another. The shock of recognition does not circle around to them. Something I hope for from the pervasiveness of revising now under way in feminism is that as each of our cultural decisions comes up for review, a work like Thoreau's *Walden* will acquire a new life, or a new role in our lives.

FRANK MANUEL: Why must it be a book written by an American?

STANLEY CAVELL: I wanted to look at the obligation we are putting on ourselves to invent a discourse as we sit here. It may be that this is what Americans expect of one another.

ROBERT KIELY: I think about novels or about biographies or autobiographies. One thinks about black fiction—Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man,* for example, or some of James Baldwin or Toni Morrison—or one could go back to Thomas Merton's autobiographical works. But you might say, "Well, those do not last. They have lives of five or ten years. They speak to a generation or so." Maybe that is in the nature of the American discourse.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: There is a very interesting group of Jesuits who call themselves the American Tradition Group.

JOHN PADBERG: It is a group of seven philosophers and theologians, the youngest of whom is about thirty-five, the oldest of whom is about sixty. They also call themselves the John Courtney Murray group. They meet for six weeks every summer to write, each his own material, and have it criticized, commented on, discussed by everybody else in the group. To work together, pray together, and play together. One day every week is simply to go off someplace and have a good time. They have been at Weston in Cambridge for two of those summers. One of the best things that has ever happened to me is just being there with them in the same house.

DENISE CARMODY: Do they come from all different parts of the country?

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JOHN PADBERG: They come from all over the country, and they have been doing this now for five or six years. One of them lives right across the hall from me in St. Louis, so I am much up on the whole thing. They meet usually at a different place, one of the Jesuit places, each summer.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: It is interesting to see the canon that they are developing.

STANLEY CAVELL: I would love to know about that.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: It starts with Jonathan Edwards, goes on to Emerson, Thoreau, William James, Pierce, Royce, Dewey, and Mead, and then on to H. Richard Niebuhr and Bernard Meland, whom they see as a part of that tradition. The group published one collection of essays—*The Reasoning Heart*—in which each of them has an essay on one of these major figures. The editor is Frank Oppenheim, who is a Royce scholar. They will probably have another collection of essays at the beginning of the year.

What intrigues me is that here you have a relatively young generation who are in a sense saying, "All right, we are Catholics. We have been part of this immigrant culture, but there are some affinities between some of our Catholic interests and what we perceive to be an American tradition. We are trying to look at that tradition in terms of how it can inform our Catholicism, and conversely, the ways in which our Catholicism can inform that tradition." It seems to me that is the major drive that lies behind this group. It is a very interesting effort to define an American canon.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Part of what is interesting is that that canon is not a religious canon.

GEORGE LINDBECK: The problem of a common discourse involves making a distinction between talking religiously and talking about religion. The two canons are very different. There is a kind of canonical way of talking about religion in intellectual circles in this country. It is basically sociological. I remember once being involved in a group discussing the status of theological education. It included people from a variety of disciplines, and so what we ended up doing was using a language that borrows from Weber and Durkheim via Geertz and Bellah, with a little William James thrown in. Oh, a sociological and a psychoanalytic language too. Those are languages

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that everybody is somewhat familiar with, and we talked about religion using them. That would be very different from discussing one's own ultimate convictions with somebody else, where the canon would be entirely different.

STANLEY CAVELL: What would be in that canon?

GEORGE LINDBECK: It depends on the particular group. A fair number of the members, both Catholic and Jewish, would have been comfortable with first-level biblical discourse.

JOHN PADBERG: I can tell you what that canon would be, for example, for a seminar in Jesuit spirituality—this group of eleven people that meets five times a year, Friday evening, all day Saturday, and half of Sunday. That canon would certainly contain the Scriptures and the Spiritual Exercises to start with. We are so utterly familiar with them that we do not even advert to the fact that that is the whole canon context within which we talk about our own religious experiences and those of other American Jesuits—interestingly, not just about directly religious experiences.

One of the publications out of that group recently was *American Technology and Permanent Commitment,* on whether American technology has some influence on the ability or inability of people to make permanent commitments, such as to Jesuit religious life. We had to use a variety of languages, among them that of the history of technology, because the man who was directing that discussion happened to be a historian of technology who taught at the University of Detroit and at MIT.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: That is a powerful issue. I am very moved by your description.

JOHN PADBERG: I will get you a copy of that. There is another study, in that same series, that came out recently, called *The Languages We Use: Religious Language and Academic Language.* These languages are very different, and you do not just translate them word for word or phrase for phrase but in a sense—you may not like this term very much—experience for experience. That means it takes a while for people who are in both the academic life and the religious life to understand the misunderstandings that they have.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: It seems to me that some of these issues constitute the master paradigms that we are looking for in this

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consultation. Such matters as different contexts and different languages and such problems as translating back and forth between academic and religious discourse and exploring the relations between experience and textual imagery—all these may serve as ways to discuss issues of religion and education. Of course we have to find the right historical example. But these are, at least as I understand it, the master paradigms. We might choose one or two of them and then explore the issue via several disciplines.

DENISE CARMODY: In 1977 my husband and I were invited to go in the summer for two or three weeks to Collegeville, the ecumenical institute. The project was to bring together theologians and pastoral people for an ongoing discussion. We were not given too much of an agenda, but we committed ourselves to three summers of this. It was all Christian at that point. We had Orthodox and at least some entrée to evangelical Christians. We had men and women. We had blacks. As it turned out, there were a few that were pastors, but almost everyone there was an academician.

What was insisted upon on the first day was that any speaking had to be done in the first person, out of our own experience. We realized that the experience would be deeply colored by our academic lives, but it could not be what some book had said. It had to be what we really believed, felt, hated. It was an amazing thing to watch. I really think it took almost till the third year before we could rid ourselves of hiding behind a theoretical framework language and get at what we actually were experiencing and wanted. The whole title of the effort was "Confessing God Today." When you talk about that translation of languages, it is quite a feat to begin to do that.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Denise, is not that unfair? I am just analyzing my own experience. There is a sort of massive framework that I have lived in for forty-six years, which is abstractly defined as the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus but is essentially the narrative frame of a large religious order—its sense of itself, its place in the world, in the Church. No experience I have makes any sense without reference to that. It is a construct. I know a good bit of its history. I know a lot about the history of some of its personalities. It is not a text in the sense that I can sit down and read the Constitutions. That is no problem. I do not do that very much, because I possess them in a quite vital, if limited, experience. For me to start off always with the

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personal pronoun *I* is the denial of the fact that I am far more comfortable with *we*.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Tim, would you say that the text is there, therefore I am? Or is it a sense of "we" that puts you into a communal context?

TIMOTHY HEALY: It is a text because it is a text lived over four centuries and I share in that living to some extent, just as I share in the formal text. It seems like constraint. I find it at this point far more liberating than constraining. But I cannot make a clear distinction between religious experience that is intimate and personal and religious experience that is my growing consciousness of this larger body of which I am part. I suspect, by the way, that many Catholics would feel that way about the Church. So an American text would seem to me to be a sort of third-order text, which is why I did not respond to your question earlier. I need these older and other texts for the base work.

I can add one absolutely basic text, which is John Henry Newman's book *The Idea of a University* and those essays on things that lie around it. I am not particularly interested in his *Grammar of Assent*. I am very interested in some of his historical writings. Those would be the three texts I would give you, except that two of them are lived texts. They are understood best in my narrative—in other words, in my own history. That part of it is personal. But without the two older ones at this point, I would really quite seriously lack definition. Take those away, and I'm running around wondering who I am.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: I want to reinforce the point that one language that is extremely powerful for religious cultures is the liturgical language. This is a fundamental factor for Judaism and the main carrier of Jewish historical memory. Indeed, liturgical language and the liturgical cycle are deep codes of Jewish religiosity. They constitute the major carrier for relating to the past, for a sense of orientation in the present, and for projections into the future.

We must therefore look for the liturgical rhythms of people who have broken with the ancient patterns. These rituals must be emerging alongside the new mythologies. How does the change in rituals affect the sedimentation of memory or the birth of hope? These deep patterns are

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not things that most people can articulate, but they are the things that people will die for. The lessons on civics and American behavior that kids pick up in the fifth grade may lead them to become marines years later.

We should not assume that these liturgies are religious in traditional terms. Probably not. Civic religion and its liturgical corollaries play an important role. We must try to decode them. We tend to disparage secularity too quickly. It has deep liturgical patterns—even religious ones, I would say. We must try to catch the drift of these patterns in midarc, so to speak, if we are to be effective teachers and interpreters of the modern religious scene.

TIMOTHY HEALY: I can remember the deepening that the liturgical cycle picked up when by enforced isolation in a house in Poughkeepsie alongside the Hudson River, I was able to match the liturgical year to the calendar year, the seasons and times, because I was just simply there in the country for four years. There were not three days' absence in four years. I still remember the enormous reinforcement when for the first time I understood the agricultural calendar, out of which the liturgical year evolved—for example, the matching of Lent to February. It is extraordinary reinforcement. Most people do not have that. Monks do, and for a while young Jesuits are treated like monks, and when we were young Jesuits, we were treated very much like monks—you know, lousy food and dead silence. That has dissipated now, and by the way, none of the modern young Jesuits would ever spend that many years in one place, and if they did it would be in Europe. This is a personal memory of a rediscovery of a liturgical meaning that is lost for many others.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Certain sociological conditions are necessary for that to occur, and I think that's part of the problem of our culture.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: That's right. That's why we want to try to catch the forms in midflight.

DENISE CARMODY: One thing that happened at the Collegeville institute was explicitly ecumenical. We would work together, read together, talk—it seemed to me endlessly—go off and have quiet times and reflect, write, come back, share our writings. But we were not celebrating any liturgical commonality whatsoever, and when a few of us wanted to do that, we met massive resistance from our

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leader, who argued that in his thirty-some years of ecumenical work, the low point of it each time was the liturgical celebration. And it left those of us who were Roman Catholic and Orthodox just bewildered and angered. We went out by ourselves and then came back and thrashed it out together. As our leader explained, his background was quite Calvinistic. The whole question of liturgical celebrations was really repugnant to him. The Word was to be preached, and it was not to be broken.

Finally, what we allowed for was a time of meditation that each of us would take turns leading, and one of the high points was when the Orthodox priest gave the meditation on an icon. What I am getting at—it has stayed with me all these years—is on the one hand, how deeply influential one's own background is. We shouldn't be together if we weren't praying together. We weren't really fully together. But on the other hand, that was a divisive factor in ecumenical work, and then some commonality did come out of the human experience that the Orthodox priest was able to convey to us.

ROBERT KIELY: We haven't really talked about the subject of ecumenicism. It seems an issue or at least an interest among the public that, in my observation, has collapsed in the last ten or fifteen years after what appeared to be high expectations for it. It might be interesting to think about it in terms of mediating texts and languages and the discovery among some Americans that they really can't compromise, that the negotiating-table model doesn't wholly work. Every now and then, when one picks up the paper and reads that the archbishop of Canterbury is meeting with some cardinal to discuss Communion in both species, it seems very silly. Who cares really? If one wants to go to another church and participate in the ritual, one will do it without consulting the archbishop.

So there's the behavioral aspect of it. There is also a drawing back and a resistance to the mishmash of three words from this ritual, five from another, and six from that scripture, stirring it together, and hoping that you will come up with an acceptable brew. I think that a lot is happening among denominations, but it seems to be happening in all kinds of unofficial ways.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Put High Romans for long enough in a university with a lot of High Anglicans, and the amount of concelebrating

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would surprise the Vatican. That's a very easy transit—Anglican, Roman—particularly with the new Anglican liturgies, but we used to do this with some regularity. On the other hand, coming to a seder, I want no acknowledgment that I'm a Roman Catholic. I want the seder as you do it, not as I would think of it. Where there is a profound difference any syncretism is offensive.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: There has been an argument against ecumenicism put forth in an interesting way by certain very Orthodox Jews. On the one hand, they endorse ecumenical encounters on social, ethical, or related concerns. But they reject discourse on religious issues. Why? Because they claim that the first type of sharing involves social solidarity and interpersonal world-building, whereas the second is always subject to suspicion since it involves a distortion of meaning—by virtue of the necessity of translating beliefs into a third, common language. In such settings, a person is concerned that a ground of common discourse be found, so he reshapes his views, as does the speech partner, until the two find a language of communication. The result is that two speakers talk about something that neither really believes. You can see that there is a difficulty here even if the matter can be rebutted. I am myself concerned that ecumenicism should lead to a rethinking of religious and cognitive presuppositions. But even this goal, filled as it is with goodwill, is subject to all kinds of intellectual and emotional traps.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Or sometimes I think, Michael, we each do such social things excessively when we shouldn't. I recall a very moving moment. We had Anwar Sadat here at Georgetown six weeks before he was killed for an honorary degree and a talk, which by the way was refuted by the benediction given by the head of the mosque here. He gave an eight-minute benediction, which I gather was a point-by-point refutation of what Sadat had talked about. It was in Arabic, so those of us on the platform didn't understand. The audience was largely Arabic-speaking, and the Jews there were mostly Israelis, and they understood the Arabic, so the audience got it, but the platform party didn't. Six weeks later we did a memorial service for Sadat, and almost all in the chapel were Arabs. I said that we wished to honor the president—"We mourn for him, and the Mass is how and where we mourn. You are welcome to join." There was no effort to gussy up the ceremony. We simply did it and it worked, as a matter of fact,

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with several compliments from some of the ambassadors afterwards—"We're very glad you did your thing." It struck me as much more realistic than trying to have a ceremony and have someone read the Koran, and then the New Testament, and then some poetry.

What worries me is that a lot of this history does not get to modern students. I have had stories like Bob's. We teach Chaucer and say that of course this is simply the story of Susanna, and the kids say, "Susanna who?" You know, this is like the boy who said, "Why did the Trojans build the Trojan horse?" We shared much in Bible stories as children, so that Jewish history was not as foreign as a lot of Irish kids would have normally found it, precisely because we did have lots of your narratives, which were part of the Hebrew scriptures but translated for us. That doesn't happen anymore either. So the kids don't even have these lovely stories, which are now essentially ethical and which we now read quite out of the Jewish context. We at least had the stories.

JOHN PADBERG: Bible history.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Bible history. You know, the Red Sea and Joseph and the Passover—all of these were familiar enough, so that when I met them as an adult, with Jewish friends, I at least knew some of their narrative, which gave me a little taste of their belief. Modern kids don't have this.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: It seems to me that this is somewhat unique. My understanding is that whole generations of Christians have somewhat bypassed the "good Old Testament."

TIMOTHY HEALY: That generation didn't.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: It wasn't there as something to be known. It wasn't liturgical.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Yes. And this present generation must be like those hundreds of years ago, or people who grew up outside of a Protestant society where the Old Testament was of major importance. Maybe just Americans and Englishmen had this sharing. But it is a very real sharing. I mean, the marking of the door lintel and the ritual of the seder at the first one I went to were curiously familiar.

JOHN PADBERG: We surely didn't do much reading of the Old Testament, but there is hardly a story that I know of out of the whole

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of the Jewish tradition of the Old Testament that in some way or another didn't show up in that Bible history, chapter by chapter.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Are you getting the stories, or are you getting a theology of the stories?

TIMOTHY HEALY AND JOHN PADBERG: No, just the narrative.

DANIEL CALLAHAN: They were colorful stories. Action-packed.

DENISE CARMODY: Interesting, colorful, made for children, just perfect.

ROBERT KIELY: But there were theological notes in Catholic Bibles at that time.

JOHN PADBERG: But we didn't read the Catholic Bibles.

ROBERT KIELY: Well, if you did read one, you got notes with it that said, this means this, and this means that. It took the Hebrew Bible stories and showed them foreshadowing the New Testament.

FRANK MANUEL: I can't participate in some of this, but I can raise the question of the American awe, the Romantic awe, the American who saw his nature religion as the American version of religion. Nobody has mentioned the role of nature religion. I think of it in terms of the confession of the Vicar of Savoy. That seems to me closer to being what the American religion has been and one that was shared by many, of course, because it was mediated through psalms. The Book of Psalms still is the book that I think was the American book, the religious book of the Old Testament that had penetrated, because it was used all the time in this world. When we talk about Scripture, it's selected scriptures that we are talking about. It's principally the psalms.

When I talk about religious experience, it's my selected experience, and that selected experience happens to be based on the idea of the prophet—not a rational phenomenon but some kind of infused, very romantic conception of the possessed prophet, very much influenced by the European-American romantic movement of enthusiasm, of being full of some God, full of some spirit. Now, this kind of phenomenon, coupled with the nature religion, might bear consideration.

It is easy to forget that the deism of a man like Voltaire was not a rationalist deism. This is a most emotive, violent deism. There are

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letters, at least, that describe that. It was anti-Biblical. This was the religion of Washington and Jefferson and Adams, who thought very clearly.

When you talk about what the American religion is, I again want to emphasize the varieties of the experience. The experiences in the eighteenth century are not any of the experiences you are talking about that I hear. Probably the death ceremonials have been for a lot of Americans the only affective and significant religious experiences.

So I come back to the idea of the variety that we have to present. I wonder very much whether the ecumenical mishmash has anything whatsoever to contribute in this overriding phenomenon that is affecting us. The terror is the terror of science. Nature is the nature of the grand outdoors in the primitive American paintings and nature as it entered into *The Last of the Mohicans*—probably those descriptions still resonate.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Are we facing the first generation of kids for whom Rousseau or the derivative Rousseau does not exist?

FRANK MANUEL: But the emotive Rousseau, who sees the sunlight and sees God in the sunlight, the dusk, and the dawn, making religious all of our walking in the woods, to me is a part of your picture of what the American religion is.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: I'd like to invoke the name Jonathan Edwards at this point, because that man had the idea of a nature religion. That's a part of the American religious tradition. Jonathan Edwards' language—the way he could move from a spider to a sense of awe and majesty and the divine ordering and beauty of all things—is part of what you are talking about.

FRANK MANUEL: Yes, which he took from Locke.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Well, partly it's Locke but also John Calvin.

FRANK MANUEL: All right, but I think it was his devouring of Locke lock, stock, and barrel that was important.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Lock, stock, and Newton.

FRANK MANUEL: Yes, Newton. When we begin to dig into this, there are phenomena of this sort that are American in a certain sense, and very few books treat this. We haven't talked about the other side of the coin. I mean, what in the world happens to Christians who are

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brought up on the Gospels? You cannot abolish the gospel with the story of Christ as it was related in the Gospels and the deicide, no matter how many Vatican declarations may come. It will take a vast period of time before that will even touch, I think, vast peoples. In Landsmann's film *Shoah,* the most moving, overwhelming moment for me occurred when outside the little Polish church in the town not far from Auschwitz, he was talking to the parishioners, and they remarked, "Well, they got what they deserved." This is still very much a part of the American religious experience. I think we would be deceiving ourselves if we ignored this.

On the other side of it, let's not kid ourselves. There are secret Jewish books that are not in print but that were received by tradition, particularly the History of Christ, of which I inherited the full oral tradition, which involves the mockery of Christ. Now, maybe that one has died or is beginning to die but not in Israel by a long shot.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: All of this goes back to Hellenistic times.

FRANK MANUEL: That happens to be one of the things I want to dig deeply into. Religions can be made more than tolerable to each other by editing. And the editing is maybe taking place. But I think it has to be done in a conscious manner and not just as here, where we have been selective in our texts. I think the Book of Psalms works beautifully with the American nature religion and a lot of American enthusiasm with this romantic conception of the prophet, who is really an enthusiast.

JOHN PADBERG: May I make an exception or two? I don't know exactly what the American religious experience is. You've been emphasizing varieties. I don't think that Landsmann's film and the moment outside the Polish church is the best evidence of what American religious experience is.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: He was talking about a latent survival of a particular consciousness.

JOHN PADBERG: I realize that, but I want to know what the evidence for this is. These are serious matters, and I don't think that when you are talking about the Polish parishioners and what actually happened there, they are examples easily applicable to America. I mean, maybe America is in for it yet. Who knows? But I hope we

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don't have to solve the problem of the Shoah in order to understand something about the American religious experience.

And the other thing that I take some exception to is the idea that the American version of religion is an experience of nature religion. I think it can be taken this way, but I think that it also may speak much more to the lack of obvious texts and our ignorance of the texts than it does to the fact that American religion is a nature religion. I think it is self-evident that nature has played a different role in the development of American consciousness than in other cultures. And that role is going to affect religious experience. Certainly Walden looks as if it is a nature book. But I don't think that one needs to settle for it as a nature book.

FRANK MANUEL: I'm sorry. I talked like a Turk. I didn't mean for the remarks I was making to be interpreted as the whole of the experience. This was an important part.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: On our first evening, two words were uttered—*ethics* and *aesthetics*. While in our discussion we have returned to some of the ethical issues, some of the moral issues, and while we may want to reconsider some of those, we have done little with aesthetics, the role of aesthetics in education and its relation to religion. Is this a matter that we ought to be concerned with?

FRANK MANUEL: Let me lead off with the general issue of whether in the total body politic parochial education is a good or has some deep disadvantages. I'm thinking particularly of the possibility of the destruction in big urban areas of public education of a secular sort because of the growth of private and parochial education. Would it be better for the various churches and establishments to take care of their own religious education in their own institutions beyond the public school system? I don't mean that everyone should *have* to go to state schools. There are different degrees and ways of doing it.

TIMOTHY HEALY: What's the difference if the various churches take care of their own? Very few churches reach much beyond their own, except for black kids.

FRANK MANUEL: I mean that there is a need for a common education, and then the churches take care of themselves beyond those hours. It's an extra burden. It's a sacrifice.

TIMOTHY HEALY: In other words, not in a school.

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FRANK MANUEL: The public school remains the public school. As I look over the cities that I visit, the jungle is a reality. Now, I'm not saying that this was caused by parochial and private education, but they are important contributing factors. I was, after all, brought up under a system in which we went to a public school. Everyone went to the same public school, and then the Hebrew school was a burden that you put upon yourself after that. What has really happened I don't know, but it bothers me from time to time—there is no common education. Now, is that a good or an evil? A wise man may say that it is both good and evil.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: There might be some ways to link this up with the ethical issues. In the general Boston area, for example, aside from the fact that afternoon Hebrew education has diminished because of a collapse of the supporting synagogue structures, parents often tell me that they now send their children to Jewish day schools because they wish to provide them with the ethical and religious values they will not encounter in the public schools. These parents may themselves not be especially religious and may not even intend to send their children to Jewish day schools beyond the eighth grade. Their principal concern is to provide a firm, unapologetic foundation for cultural values, a foundation that will enable their children to resist the dangers of public education even while they benefit from the complexity of such education. Thus, aside from purely religious and ethnic considerations, parents choose day school education so as to ensure a proper forming of the person—hoping that day school education will transmit to them an appreciation of ethical values, of historical consciousness, and of religious sensibilities.

TIMOTHY HEALY: You have the same pattern in New York and to some extent in Washington. In New York the parochial schools that have remained in black areas draw from black families that are not Catholic. Parents will pay the relatively small fees. The schools are essentially subsidized by wealthier churches.

JOHN PADBERG: In St. Louis among the inner-city schools that are really working are the Catholic parochial schools, and in at least a dozen parishes I know, more than one-third of the annual operating cost of them is being borne by the archdiocese itself, plus a subsidy from the parishes, for a population of better than 80 percent black children, most of whom are not Catholic.

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FRANK MANUEL: What I am saying is that we need to weigh the goods and the evils of this. This is what the situation is getting to be. It was not that way in my youth. I am putting this on the utopian level. Might it not be better for some of the values that we are talking about if that heavy burden were not imposed on the public schools? I think of a specific instance, a woman who has to work in order to pay for her child's parochial school education. She's not very happy about this, but the economic factor, I think, should be minimized.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: I am not certain how it is in the wider world. In the Jewish world the retreat from public schools is not unconnected with the sense that the community and its values are not an unqualified good. In earlier generations one of the first ways to overcome ethnicity and its values was to enter the public school system. Nowadays some are pulling back, retrenching.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: I'd be interested in the factual basis on which one would think about that. My impression is that in the city of Chicago the parochial school system is collapsing rapidly and that in a prior part of American history it was a much stronger force in the education of urban societies.

TIMOTHY HEALY: I have the impression that the collapse starts at the top of the system. The high schools are much more vulnerable than the grammar schools. And I think the inner-city popularity is quite eccentric and applies just to the great cities. If you move into Westchester County, the situation changes.

The other thing, Frank, is that there is a whole set of private schools that have nothing to do with religion.

FRANK MANUEL: I know. They have a little Protestant veneer usually. The tone of my remarks is neither positive nor negative. It is a big question that I think we would be wrong not to face. Am I simply being utopian?

ROBERT KIELY: One side of this that would be interesting to look at is religious secondary schools, to see how those older structures are serving their new populations and different needs. You might also look at various ethnic or religious groups that are recollecting or regrouping themselves outside those structures.

For example, when parochial schools began closing because of the lack of staff and Catholic families like ours found ourselves with

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children and no schools to send them to, hardly a Sunday school to send them to, we gathered with a group of other Catholic parents. There were some intermarriages, so it became a mixed group though predominantly Catholic. We went on for about twelve or fifteen years and gave religious education to our own children. We kept finding other groups like this everywhere we went.

When we talked about why we were doing it, part of our answer to one another was that we wanted our children to have a Catholic chance. They were all going to public schools or private schools where there were almost no Catholic children at all. They felt very, very odd, and we wanted them to know what it was like to have friends who shared some of the same beliefs and values, so part of it was a social matter. We also felt the responsibility to pass on what we believed, and we felt that if there wasn't a structure to do this, we'd better do it ourselves, even if we weren't professionally trained.

FRANK MANUEL: This was in addition to the public schools?

ROBERT KIELY: Yes, we were sending them to regular school.

FRANK MANUEL: How many hours?

ROBERT KIELY: It was every Saturday, half a day. Children came to one of our houses, and usually two sets of parents would take the session because we divided them into the younger group, which was age five to eight, and the older ones. We saw them up to confirmation. There was always a chaplain—usually a Jesuit—involved.

JOHN PADBERG: You were really lucky having the people you had around.

ROBERT KIELY: Yes, but what was interesting was how, as we met other Catholics in different parts of the country, we found people who were forced to do a similar kind of thing. We didn't send our children to parochial schools. Insofar as the parochial schools continued to exist in the Boston area, they were serving another population. They were not educationally what we wanted or what we felt our children needed. At that time, I think we were more orthodox than many Sunday schools that were teaching peace and love with balloons. We wanted our children to know the Lord's Prayer, the Apostles' Creed, the sacraments.

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STEPHEN GRAUBARD: But I think what Frank is really talking about is that there once was an ideal of public education, of what it could do in the way of providing a common culture. Public educational systems, particularly in the cities, have had some very serious setbacks, to put it mildly. The question now, of course, is whether you really can expect to see it put together again so that it serves such purposes.

TIMOTHY HEALY: I would hate to see us slide back into James Bryant Conant. I mean, we don't need ignorance and arrogance combined on a subject like this. The a priori idea is that anything religious is divisive. Conant's ideas may have been just dandy for Harvard in the 1930s, but I think they did a lot of damage and created a lot of heat. They made a good many people angry. I agree that it's an open question, but it's a very, very dangerous question.

Frank, what worries me is that word *utopian*. There's no way you can discuss this issue without talking about the change of population. First, the public schools in this town are about 75 percent black, as are the parochial schools, and that, I think, has had more impact on the public schools than all the religious schools could have had in a couple of centuries. Second, the white population in the United States is largely suburban, and where that issue has gone suburban, it has been solved in favor of the public schools, not really because of lack of Catholic staff but because of quality of the school—better plant, better physical setting, better laboratories—things that a big suburban public school can do that no parochial school can even begin to. It wasn't really so much the failure of staff. That's the usual reason given, and I think it really is the superior quality of the suburban public schools that has solved the problem around the big cities.

But Frank is focusing on the internal part of the great cities, and there are many strands to this, most of which have very little to do with religion.

FRANK MANUEL: It isn't the causes of the present condition that interest me. It's whether each of the major religions—and one shouldn't take the position necessarily that this is a fear of new divisiveness—could be made to consider this question. I know the difficulties in making any kind of statement on an issue of this sort, but I wonder whether we ought to try.

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TIMOTHY HEALY: I've watched the situation in two great cities, and what I can bring is an interested observer's view. I was close to one city because I had a job that brought me into contact with the public schools. I'll tell you one story that was marvelous. When I first got to the City University of New York, I was its first academic vice-chancellor, and I waited upon, with some trepidation, the head of the high schools. That worthy informed me that the university standards were so absurdly high that the high school kids gave up. There was no hope, and there was no reason to work, so they didn't work.

Eight years later, as a sort of exit interview, I went to another gentleman who was head of the high schools, who informed me that since the City University had established open admissions, there were no standards, and the students knew they could get to college, and they had no reason to work, and consequently they didn't work! It struck me that the common note was that whatever was wrong with the high schools was the university's fault.

What worries me is the word *utopian.*

FRANK MANUEL: Why? It can have all kinds of meanings. When I use it, it has ambiguities.

TIMOTHY HEALY: What I am thinking of is a long ethnic anger at Conant, the establishment's purest voice.

FRANK MANUEL: The neutral.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Yes, and the a priori's that fill his set of articles. *Utopian* I define as not considering what is actually happening in the cities—the massive presence in Washington schools of poor black students and a 70 percent black city locked off from the support of its logical banlieu, in our case by state lines. The minute you step into a suburb of Washington, you're in another state, outside the District of Columbia. In New York even more disruptive is the massive invasion of foreign students, and I don't mean just Hispanics, although they are the largest single group. In New York you have a public school system staggering under the impact of thirty or forty languages, several of them ideographic.

It seems to me when you say *utopian,* I say let's discuss this on theory, and that to me, Frank, smacks of Conant. The *utopian* worries me. The question doesn't worry me.

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STANLEY CAVELL: I take Frank's point slightly differently. Maybe I misunderstand it. It's our common American fate that we are staggering under this influx, and I take Frank's point to be that we ought to share this staggering burden and try to convert it as a group, as a social whole, into something productive and not abandon the burden to the already staggering schools in order to preserve the idea that we as a society welcome the influx but as individuals shun it—by, for example, protecting our children in private schools. That seems to me a reasonable thing to worry about.

We were talking about the absence of a common culture. Now we are talking about the right to privacy, not merely as a precious protection against the power of the common, as in Emerson and Mill, say, but as a way to avoid participating in the common.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Do you remember Alex Bickel's despairing article about twelve years ago? He said that soon we were going to need helicopters because the capacity of the white middle class to move away from this problem was almost limitless and the bus was not a sufficient tool because it wasn't fast enough.

STANLEY CAVELL: Have we given up on the idea that there is a common good? You were saying that committing our children to public care in the form of public education is the highest testimony we can give to a faith in the public care for good, and it forces one to work for that good. Then who says that the public schools must remain exactly the way they are, overtaxed and underemployed, so that other people may have the chance and the need to supplement them with after-school institutions? Suppose we had something like national standards of education, so that instead of the requirements we now have, we had ones that demanded a much larger share of each student's life. I don't say that this is realistic, but neither do I think it is realistic or rational to suppose that what public education is now must remain as it is. That is the only feature that is utopian.

FRANK MANUEL: This is the question that I am raising.

STANLEY CAVELL: There is evidence about this, after all. I don't know what the best European public school system is, but France is obviously a contender for this distinction. It certainly produces a very elaborate intellectual culture that manages to have its commando

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forces take over the intellectual interests of other nations. That education is a clear one and it's a national one, and the system, if you're very good at it, has its fairness. It has its care and its reliability. Is that price worth it?

Is an America imaginable, whatever the price, with a national education of that sort? What ground have we for competition with it? Do we compete? Should we? Our simultaneous occupation by, and resistance to, the French onslaught is a function of our positive and negative emulation of the education internal to French thought. Hence, an eventual question for us is the extent to which in turn that education became conducted in German and by Germans and the proportions in which the French have meant to embrace this event and to undermine it.

FRANK MANUEL: It doesn't have to have the evils of the Napoleonic French.

STANLEY CAVELL: I like the idea that we don't have to accept the evils of a good system. But that is too utopian even for me. I am trying to imagine the common good spoken for by a common education. If we do not imagine a common good, then what does it mean to speak of the "core" of a curriculum, especially as one including moral reasoning? Is the idea in play that a course in moral reasoning is to do for the students' relation to morality what a course in "visual literacy," a popular, depressing academic term, is to do for the students' relation to the arts—as if what has not happened in the family or in high school becomes obligatory in college? Or possible?

FRANK MANUEL: By the way, this is directed as much toward the private schools as it is toward the parochial schools.

JOHN PADBERG: If you take the French experience, however much it is a unified national system, there is also a substantial private and religious system, and the single largest political demonstration since the end of the Second World War was when that system was threatened by the French government with extinction. It surprised politicians, both those who were in favor and those who were against it, so that the feelings even in that system run very deep. But would we as a nation settle for the cost of the elitist hierarchy involved in that French educational system?

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TIMOTHY HEALY: Also, for the politics—a national ministry of education and the removal of local control?

I was in England when they passed the first legislation that mandated the comprehensive schools and watched it with some interest and deep ignorance. You know, we are divided by a common language, and we're now on the backswing of it, whether rightly or wrongly I do not know. I read yesterday in the *New York Times* Diane Ravitch's article on what the new school chancellor should do, and she supports the attack of the Thatcher administration against the comprehensive schools. They are too big—three, four thousand students—this is simply an unmanageable group of teenagers. Now the English, with support in the south, and in this issue I don't know whether the north is with the Thatchers or not, are starting to move back away from those comprehensive schools. Obviously, the students are not all going to go to Eton. But what the shape of that new form will be in England I don't know. Like the French, the English have a national system, but they're not as efficient. It doesn't really bite. The examinations aren't as good or as decisive, and certainly for the rich, there are escape hatches.

FRANK MANUEL: On one level, they have created, for me, one of the ugliest societies in Western Europe.

TIMOTHY HEALY: A strict caste society.

FRANK MANUEL: Exactly.

TIMOTHY HEALY: The minute you open your mouth, you are socially pegged.

FRANK MANUEL: It's sad.

ROBERT KIELY: So much for the utopian system! We were living in England when they were closing down small schools to form those monstrous comprehensive schools. We lived in a village with a wonderful school. It seemed to us the perfect relationship among people living in proximity—the neighborhood school, where there is a great deal of parental participation in the education of their children. And one by one, they were closing these schools to create those big two- or three-thousand-pupil facilities.

TIMOTHY HEALY: And the original design was to close the great public schools or at least to expand them into comprehensives, but it

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wasn't that efficient, Frank, because it never really happened. Eton never expanded. They simply couldn't mobilize the forces to do it, unlike the French, by the way, who generally when they adopt a system, follow through.

FRANK MANUEL: They started a long time earlier.

TIMOTHY HEALY: You are right. England is a most bitterly divided society. And it's divided by the intimacy of speech, which is terrible. If you're a foreigner, that's fine. Yanks are easy. We fit—out. But among Englishmen there are gradations and shades of speech that are absolutely fantastic. There's a Royal Navy accent. There's a Royal Army accent—for the professional officer corps. There's a Royal Marine accent. So help me God! And there are poor-man versus rich-man accents.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: The fact is that if you have a certain income or live in certain regions in Britain, your children go to private school in the American sense. It is just as automatic as that. And one of the great sadnesses about Crossland, Williams, and all the rest, is that their hopes for the comprehensives have not been realized, and it's one of the many reasons why Mrs. Thatcher, who has done so much that has been criticized in higher educational circles, has never gotten rapped for this particular thing.

TIMOTHY HEALY: I took a group of Borstal boys—Oxford organized some vacation camps, and I was the chaplain of this reform school for a couple of years—to Sedburg, which is the great public school—private in our sense—in Yorkshire. The Borstal kids were appalled at the living conditions of the Sedburgians. The Borstal boys were Irish, mostly from Liverpool and Glasglow, really rough trade. They looked, and they said "the poor blighters." They really were astonished at the rigor of the cold water, all the rest.

GEORGE LINDBECK: I think it is extraordinarily difficult to see how to keep the religious issue central in this network of questions. We know nothing around this table in terms of research literature, at least I know nothing, so I am forced to be anecdotal.

Our daughter did the equivalent of the sophomore year in high school in a private day school for girls in Cambridge, England. The official place of religion in that school is utterly different from what it is in an American high school. There was an occasional Church of

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England chapel service, and there was formal instruction in religion. Yet the role of religion in that school, judging by her reactions—and she was pretty articulate, a good observer—was as minimal as it is in any public high school in this country, in any suburban high school. Attendance at chapel was about like reciting the oath of allegiance. And it had no effect on the way things were taught.

In the American high school we avoid the subject of religion. In England, when religion came up, it was treated dismissively. It would come up more frequently, but the tone was dismissive. So you have two countries and two different systems—one private, one public—where, looked at in institutional terms, the role of religion should have been extremely different, but in fact it was, as far as my daughter could see, much the same. Indeed, religion perhaps had a rather harder time in England, in an officially religious school, than it did in an American public high school. Those kinds of subtleties are interesting for our purposes.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: How do you represent them? Well, ceremonies, I suppose, is one way. I recently received a degree from an American university where every third person arrived at commencement with a champagne bottle, and may I say the corks began going off during the first prayers. "God the Father. . . " "Pop!" And so it went. The most extraordinary sight was the undergraduates. Once they were in front of you, to receive their degrees, you noticed most of them were in bathing trunks under their robes, and while it didn't bother particularly with the men, with the women, the state of undress was really extraordinary. What is one to make of that? Every aspect of the ritual, the things that happened during prayers, the general buzz that went on perpetually, must have been disconcerting, and not only to the faculty. What is one to say when one contrasts that with what happens at similar ceremonies in England, particularly in schools where one finds sixteen-year-olds receiving their prizes and curtsying before the headmistress? Consider the role ritual, and indeed the role prayer, plays in such a service, and compare it with what happens over here.

TIMOTHY HEALY: You know, caps and gowns in the formal academic convocation are a form of civic liturgy. Our experience with it at Georgetown has been horrendous. The young will simply not sit still for it. They do exactly what Steve described. They mock

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it, make fun of it, disrupt it. I mean nobody is standing up with placards or anything, but this year champagne was going off during a speech by a distinguished American, in this case a conductor of some substance from Boston. The deans were so angry at the performance that I think we've had our last general graduation.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: Really?

TIMOTHY HEALY: Yes. The deans are going to break the undergraduate schools up, mix them with their parents, and perhaps not even put them in cap and gown, because something about the cap and gown on undergraduates makes them want to make fun of this, and yet they want a graduation. Urging old-fashioned logic, I have no objection to a champagne party, and if you want a graduation, let's have the graduation and then have the champagne party. Rather stubbornly, the undergraduates want both together.

JOHN PADBERG: I bet you'll get a holy row if you abolish the cap and gown.

TIMOTHY HEALY: I have a funny feeling, as a matter of fact right now, that I am in the mood for a holy row. My last vision was of upper-middle-class louts acting out their tastelessness. We're going to have to stop it somehow. I don't quite know how. It seems to me dehumanizing to search seniors on the way into graduation, and while we could walk off the platform, the mood of some of the actual drunks might get some elderly folk pelted with the bottles if we started to walk off. It's very interesting because it is a rejected ritual. It has absolutely no meaning. They are going to get their degrees without it. It isn't as though we had the old Oxford thing where you pluck a proctor's sleeve and call, "Hey, I object to his getting a degree!" There's none of that.

JOHN PADBERG: But interestingly, in some of the other schools around the country, which are less fortunately endowed with kids reasonably well off than Georgetown is, much more lower-middle-class, none of that problem exists yet. This is too solemn a ceremony for those kids who are getting the degree.

FRANK MANUEL: Brandeis has the same problem.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: This year the sound of uncorked bottles counterpointed the music of "Pomp and Circumstance." The person

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who gave the opening benediction was particularly unnerved and actually started to scream at the students. He couldn't get through the prayer and interrupted it to berate the students. Walter Cronkite, who gave the commencement speech, handled the matter marvelously. The students again started to uncork bottles in his direction. But he simply smiled and said, "Well, it's a hot day, and I'm thirsty, so let the champagne fly at me so that I can have a drink." And they stopped.

ROBERT KIELY: Whether we are talking about secondary education or higher education, one of the themes that's run through a lot of what we've been asking is whether the signs of religion rendered in religious ritual or language are vital. There is the perfunctory grace said at meals or the commencement prayer. Well, we can laugh at it or go along with it because it is empty of significance except as a reminder of the past. And yet we also see, especially in American society, how volatile and sensitive a subject religion can be, in the intellectual sphere and in general. So often we have said our educational system seems to work best when people stand away from real religion and leave an empty space, even the empty space for the meaningless ritual, rather than talk about what the real thing means to us.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: It is interesting that at the commencement I was just talking about, the antisocial disruption of public morality was part of a broader ritual demonstration against apartheid. The common thread, obviously, was a rejection of the public face of religion in the face of moral hypocrisy. The pompous benediction was being mocked while a very powerful moral sentiment was being expressed. So you had these counterrituals going on simultaneously.

JOHN PADBERG: Something that might well be a subject is sacred liturgy and religious liturgy as education. I was struck very much, Tim, by that issue of *Georgetown Magazine,* "The Mass at Georgetown"—an absolutely beautiful piece of work. What it said about liturgy was both perceptive and moving—about the Mass and the impact, not just of that but of other religious ritual and liturgy, on the students and the faculty, in ways that nobody would at first have thought were religious.

TIMOTHY HEALY: We have had no problem with the great religious liturgy. Where we have had real problems is with civic liturgy. I am

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absolutely stumped—the civic liturgy ought to appeal to the totality of students, whereas the great religious liturgy here addresses only 60 percent of them. The Jewish liturgies have no problem. There are eight hundred kids at a seder during the high holy days in the big auditorium here. We had to move it there because it got so big we could not hold it anyplace else. A lot of them are not Jewish, but a tremendous number are. That has absolutely no problem. There is no drinking, no carrying on, no disruption. And the only authority figure there is one rabbi. It is unpoliced. It is unstructured. Yet you run a university graduation for fourteen hundred kids on the front lawn, and it becomes a real police problem.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Somebody who has inherited the mantle of Victor Turner needs to do an analysis of ritual process among the youth on these different levels. These are in a sense cultural dramas.

TIMOTHY HEALY: The faculty, of course, shows up in cap and gown, and sits there appalled. Most of them realize that when you get fourteen hundred students together, there is very little you can do by any sort of police action. Years ago, I was at a Notre Dame graduation, and somebody popped off a champagne bottle, and President Ted Hesburgh turned around and glared with a stare that seemed to work. I could have stood up there with a shotgun, and I would have had no effect on ours whatsoever. I think it has gone so far now that we really have to change the structure. That is my conclusion.

ROBERT KIELY: One of the things that Ted Sizer mentioned is watching secondary school students pull together in some ritual fashion when a classmate dies. I have seen that at Harvard in a very touching fashion more than once in Adams House.

One case was a student, a healthy member of the swimming team, who was walking down Mount Auburn Street and dropped dead. His father was Jewish. His mother was Catholic. They flew in from California. The funeral was in Los Angeles, but his friends put together a memorial service for him in Adams House. What was so extraordinary about it, I thought, was that it had a kind of spontaneity and traditional formality to it. It was very reverent, and it was an interesting mixture of Jewish texts, psalms and other Hebrew Bible readings, and some Christian prayers. And there were testimonies—people standing up and talking about the boy in an extremely

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reverent and prayerful way. And there were original poems and prayers. There have to have been five hundred students there. It was very powerful and had a real formality to it.

I think what impressed me was the dignity that the students managed to pull together for this out of grief and affection. This may not be your random crowd of Americans, but we have been talking about texts. They borrowed and invented. Their own language was very powerful. They were able to say and read what was called for in that situation.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: This whole theme of civic ritual and religious ritual could be very interesting.

FRANK MANUEL: If somebody knew how to interpret what rituals everybody participates in, in some form or another. Death is there, marriage is almost always there, and confirmation seems to be taking on more and more significance.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Much more than it used to have.

FRANK MANUEL: For example, in the bar mitzvah, which traditionally was not a vital part of Eastern European Jewish ritual, on the day boys turned thirteen, they were called up to the Torah, but nobody else thought of it as a significant event. I would say that it has become a central ritual in Judaism.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Except in Orthodox Judaism. In these communities, because the nature of ritual life remains so continuous, this event remains a public sign that the young person has achieved majority. On the other hand, for communities where religious ritual has diminished, such events have very prominent symbolic significance—a significance that rabbis always mention in their charge to the bar mitzvah boy.

TIMOTHY HEALY: When there is not much faith, you get "four-wheeled Catholics." They come to the church in the limousine for the baptism, in the limousine for the wedding, and in a hearse for the funeral, and that is it.

JOHN PADBERG: If you want to see another example of that, there have been less daily ritual and less obvious external signs of belonging to a religious order, within the Jesuits, for example. When you get to the taking of religious vows or to ordination, the rituals are much

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more elaborate than in the early years of Tim or myself as Jesuits. I used to maintain that the diaconate ordinations in Cambridge in recent years would make the coronation of Charlemagne pale into insignificance.

TIMOTHY HEALY: This is true, very true. Nobody came to our first vows. In fact, parents were not allowed in the cloistered chapel, and the most we did for them was after the mass at which we all took our vows—there was another mass that was public for the parents and then a rather lousy breakfast. Now it is in the midafternoon, it is open to the whole public, it is jammed with people, and it has a rather elegant buffet supper. Within forty years that shift occurred in a religious order, a rather curious place for that kind of shift to happen.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: But your other comment, less *daily* ritual—it isn't just that compulsory chapel is out. It is much more the whole question of where it still exists as voluntary chapel.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Mike hit it quite directly. I imagine that the Benedictines do this without any fuss at all, simply because they have the elaborate daily ritual of the Divine Office. I suspect the vows, the profession of the young Benedictines, is something squeezed in between two offices with a mass around it, and parents can come, but my hunch is that there is not much of a fuss, whereas Jesuits are nonliturgical types anyway, and so they whoop it up.

ROBERT KIELY: Stephen, this is a change in subject. It would seem to me to be a mistake not to have something significant representing the role or activity of women in religion in this country, because it has always been important. Look at enrollments in divinity schools and more and more women assuming functions in ministry and counseling. A lot of our talk has been about secondary education. The people who staff those schools, parochial and public, and have for a long time, are women. It would be a great mistake not to take note of the importance of that.

JOHN PADBERG: Something there has happened in Roman Catholicism that is worth noting. If you were to do something on the education of religious professionals, and if you included women within that group of religious professionals, as I think you must, then at least within Roman Catholicism, you would find that they are getting a different kind of education now than ever before. Often

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enough it is in Catholic "collaborative model" schools, places that include a variety of male religious orders whose members are preparing for the priesthood and laymen, laywomen, and women religious. That combination never existed before. This is now happening in about half the places where men are being prepared for the priesthood. The other half are deliberately turning their backs on that, going back to a closed seminary system. For the priesthood at least, this is going to present two neatly divided, wholly different streams twenty years down the line, with people differently educated yet preparing for the same religious profession.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Much more is going to be complicated by the shift. When I was a kid, most Catholic women from comfortable families went to small Catholic women's colleges. The ne plus ultra was Manhattanville, Newton, and the Mesdames of the Sacred Heart—that marvelous old title. The lay Catholic women who are in Catholic institutions now are facing a much broader education, and men and women in most of the big Catholic colleges are very close to fifty-fifty. They tell me this year's entering law class is 48 percent women.

There are as many women theology majors as male theology majors. It tends to run right through the institution. It is fascinating that there do not seem to be women's subjects anymore, although the hard sciences are still disproportionately men's. The women are not all in English. There are probably far more of them in government. They are certainly in philosophy and theology in quite equal numbers to the men. Now, that educated laity is going to move into a church 50 percent of which believes, as you know, that the time has come to end the discrimination involved in an all-male clergy. We are stuffing dynamite into the body of the Church, and when the fuse gets put to it, there is going to be one huge explosion.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Certainly all of these dynamics are also found in contemporary Judaism. In Orthodox settings, for example, women are increasingly included in certain study sessions from which they had formerly been excluded. In non-Orthodox settings, women are enrolled in the seminaries. This development is having revolutionary effects.

FRANK MANUEL: In some seminaries.

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MICHAEL FISHBANE: It is all a matter of time before this feature expands. For the present, the very fact that in some circles women can make independent decisions or that they are not defined by male categories is a matter of great importance and needs to be reflected on.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Mike, within the tradition of the colleges and the universities the same thing was true. Women were in English and the fine arts, remember? Science was for men.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: The effect on the social structure still cannot be estimated. Take, for example, the simple fact that with women becoming rabbis, achieving men in their fifties and sixties are being instructed in spiritual, ethical, or religious issues by younger women. Even in liberal contexts, there is often resistance to this, and thus the tendency is to employ such women as assistant rabbis for another generation, until the people get used to the phenomenon.

There are other ways that the inclusion of women will have a great impact. The whole issue of choice and personal responsibility for one's religious behavior is one such way. Men who grow up with the fixed rituals of Judaism often tend to take these things as given structures. Women who come to them afresh, often doing some things for the first time, represent the notion of voluntarism, the desire to appropriate religious ritual in personal terms. The role of women as leaders of study groups or prayer services is new in certain Jewish circles.

The significance of all this is, to my mind, very great. These are some of the numerous subtle changes that will change our society and our religious life, not to mention the new religious education that will be built on them.

GEORGE LINDBECK: I would like to make one comment and then ask Denise a question. The comment is that there appears to be a structural parallel between the women's question and the educational question that we were talking about before. In both cases, you have a massive public social problem or crisis—change, a whole series of changes that has a religious dimension. It is extremely important to the religious communities, and they obviously play a role in the way in which that change takes place, but it is hard to isolate the specifically religious factor for our purposes.

The question I was going to ask is what the difference would be in the way in which this question is treated on the Protestant side and the Catholic or Jewish side.

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DENISE CARMODY: The main difference is ordination. What I know from the women who are in the Protestant clergy, already ordained, is confirmed by the sort of thing that you mentioned. They are almost always assistants, operating in a social dimension of the parish. A lot of it is economic. They cannot get the appointments—the old-fashioned, traditional resistance survives. Not so much resistance, the Protestant women tell me. Once they have gotten into a parish, into a church, the people generally accept them. But when the hiring is being done, and you get into boards of elders and the like, a man generally wins.

In Catholicism there are many women now prepared for ordination, as fully prepared as men. What do you do with the kind of frustration that builds up when it is clear they cannot be ordained? Some leave, go to Episcopal or other dominations, but a critical mass is building there that is going to be quite explosive. Most of them are not going to go away. They really feel that they do have the religious call. While some join alternate religious groups, and while there are groups of nuns who actually say Mass, this is an underground that doesn't have much impact on public consciousness.

Another dimension I see is that Catholic circles in large areas of the Midwest are, in effect, under the administration of women, nuns or laywomen. There are simply no priests. And that has been going on now for a couple of years, and it is just going to continue. My conviction is that Rome will probably hold out until they are flying one man around the world, saying Mass from above or something. But this cannot be, so the key issue is ordination.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Rome has one extra card up its sleeve. That is a married clergy. I think it will play that card first, but it will not solve the problem. And, in ten or fifteen years after that, I think they will take the step they ought to have taken first. I would love to say when I read Catholic statements, and I read many, that an early reversal is likely, that a celibate female clergy will be acceptable, but I do not think that this will happen. I think they will give up celibacy first. That is my hunch, at any rate.

DENISE CARMODY: I think that is true.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Why?

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TIMOTHY HEALY: Because it is a halfway house. I am one kind of thing, and a priest with a wife is another kind of thing, but both of us are male. I don't think this half step will work. I see it as a palliative, a major dodge that can be used.

ROBERT KIELY: It is done by the Orthodox.

TIMOTHY HEALY: And, by the way, it was done in the Roman church until the thirteenth century. Celibacy has existed for fewer centuries in the Roman Catholic Church than the married clergy. One of the delightful documents from the Council of Nicaea is to read of the concubines the bishops brought with them, along with their wives and domestic establishments. Many had handmaidens after the manner of Isaac and Jacob.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: George Lindbeck a while ago noted that when we talk about education, we have a hard time getting to religion and that when we talk about religion, we have a hard time getting to education. I take it one of the things that you are now talking about is the effect of education on religion, in terms of religious institutions. I am trying to find a way to tie our various themes together.

DENISE CARMODY: It is important to note that we do have a change in the number of courses offered on feminist theology, feminist spirituality, women and religion. For instance, when I was at Penn State in the mid-1970s, I wanted to offer a course on women and religion. I was told very explicitly as a member of a large department—twelve or thirteen—that feminist matters were simply a fad. You could not do that, so a number of us did it outside the structure. But now, I think that no state school that offers courses in religion would object to a women-and-religion course or a feminist theology course, so there has been a big shift even in ten years.

JOHN PADBERG: Maybe the theme of what we have just been talking about can be rendered as the theological education of women and its impact on religious structures. One of the more interesting things that has happened within Roman Catholicism, where women have begun to have an influence that would have been unthinkable thirty years ago, is women trained as spiritual directors becoming the spiritual directors of priests on an ongoing basis or for the annual retreats of the clergy. That would have been absolutely unthinkable thirty years ago, but it is a common enough phenomenon now. It was approached by certain priests with great trepidation at the beginning.

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STEPHEN GRAUBARD: John, could you in just a sentence or two tell me what the theological education of women in the Catholic world in America is today? Where is it occurring?

JOHN PADBERG: First of all, in the theology departments of Catholic colleges and universities on the undergraduate level and then on the graduate level, with masters and doctorates. But maybe more for the long-term explosive results, it is occurring within a certain number of the professional theological schools, such as at the Catholic Theological Union in Chicago—with about three hundred students, a good proportion of whom are women—at Weston in Cambridge, at Berkeley, at the Washington Theological Union. Those four places perhaps more than any others, but there are other schools as well. The preparation for the priesthood cycle has seminarians in it, but within the same courses you will have laymen, women religious, and laywomen, and in some instances they will be getting the same academic preparation as the people preparing for the priesthood. They will be studying together, working together, praying together, arguing together.

The real problem for the future is that this is happening for almost every religious order of men in the United States. Their students are now in that kind of collaborative-model seminary or school. But almost every man preparing for the diocesan priesthood is in a freestanding seminary, which for some years, cautiously and tentatively in some instances, began to take women also as students and have now been pushed, and I think are going to be pushed much more vigorously, to close in on themselves again, with only priest teachers, priest subjects, priest students.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: John, the whole issue that you just commented on has a deep impact in the Jewish world. In cases where you have mixed education, what has been the impact on curriculum?

JOHN PADBERG: My own impression—well, my experience of ten years at Weston and then working with these other places—is that there are other things that have forced curricular change, that the presence of women has not meant a great change there.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: How about methodologies? Is there a ground swell of different methodologies that allow things to come through the cracks now, a certain revising of the historical material?

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JOHN PADBERG: Content, yes. Methodology, I would say no, but a certain rereading of text and a rediscovery of content out of history and a repositioning or a rethinking of systematic theology, yes.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Has that also affected the faculties, so that the research projects are changing?

JOHN PADBERG: Some are. What makes a big difference is if you have on the faculty or in the administration some women who are as competent—you wouldn't want to hire them if they weren't—as the men on the faculty or administration and who, without threatening the males, push gently and persistently and change the place. If they are too abrupt, they are going to threaten them—it is unfortunate, but it is true. I have seen it in my experience, and I could tell you that the presidents of other places and the deans would surely agree with me. We talk about this a lot.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Meanwhile, in the colleges we are preparing a laity that will accept the change.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Exactly.

DENISE CARMODY: Yes.

TIMOTHY HEALY: There will be pressure from both ends of the spectrum, from women who do not choose to be ordained, would not think of it but would say that their a priori exclusion is nonsense, and from men who have been brought up to make exactly the same statement. I think the educated laity could make the change tomorrow without a vast shock. In the total body of the Church, once you get beyond the college-educated, I think it would still cause fright and surprise. I suspect that both will disappear in another ten or fifteen years.

JOHN PADBERG: For the United States.

TIMOTHY HEALY: For the United States. I'm not talking about others.

ROBERT KIELY: It may be not only the presence of women in these theology schools that will affect the curriculum but the presence of laywomen and laymen and people from different religious orders together representing a mixture that has an educational impact on curriculum. The mix creates a more discursive, more critical, more

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analytical, more research-oriented atmosphere, whereas if you look at all-male, freestanding seminaries, that is not what you are going to find. You will find a higher level of the old Baltimore Catechism.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: It would be interesting to try to mark that, at least in its major historical dimensions. I imagine there is some familiarity between those great breaks in history when different groups came together for new synthesis and what is happening today, when there is a new meeting between individuals who haven't talked to each other previously.

JOHN PADBERG: It is extraordinary, watching that happen.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: It is a remarkable historical moment that we are living through.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Another interesting factor is the extent to which people teaching in Catholic seminaries got their doctoral degrees from what were historically Protestant schools—Harvard, Yale, Chicago, and elsewhere. The education of the professor, whether in the seminary or in the department of religious studies, was at Harvard or the like.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: All this bears on the important question of who is teaching religion, for we now have secular people teaching religious people about their religion. This is but one of several kinds of significant inversions in our educational and religious culture.

JOHN PADBERG: One of the griefs regularly alleged against those collaborative-model institutions by some within the Catholic hierarchy was that they had too many people with degrees other than from Roman ecclesiastical universities.

TIMOTHY HEALY: It used to be that if you were a Jesuit and did not have a degree from Rome, you could not teach in a Jesuit seminary. World War II blew the bottom out of that, because you had five or six years of young faculty that could not get to Rome.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: A few years ago, there was a professor of moral theology in each of the Jesuit theologates in North America who had gotten his degree from Yale or Chicago.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: In some ways, this is the opposite side of the issue we were discussing before. Who is teaching religion? Religion

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now gets taught through literature or through secular ways of teaching Bible. There are all kinds of developments affecting who is teaching the subject matter and who is cultivating sensibility.

GEORGE LINDBECK: May I point out that the time has come to take up once again the subject that was dismissed rather abruptly before—ecumenicism. Jim's example is an ecumenical phenomenon. It would have been impossible without the Second Vatican Council. The whole shape of American religion has been transformed by ecumenicism in all sorts of ways.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Could you talk more about this ecumenical thrust? When you started, my first reaction was to say no, that doesn't strike me as ecumenical—it strikes me as a kind of neutralization of religious confession in favor of method.

FRANK MANUEL: What do you mean when you use *method*? Could you explain it?

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Yes. My point is that there seems to be a distinction between ecumenical openness, or the sharing of confessional positions, and the neutralization of personal commitments in favor of historical inquiry and understanding. This latter requires the use of strategies of scholarly investigation, control, and analysis—or "method," if we speak in shorthand.

When reading such historical research, it is irrelevant to me what that person's private confession is. Or, I should say, the researcher's private attitudes do not matter to me personally. Now, I do not mean that the perspectives of the researcher do not matter. Of course they do, and I may be variously enlightened, delighted, or infuriated by them. But whatever the case, whatever my judgment on the method or strategy of analysis, I expect no living dialogue. As against the phenomenological constraints upon the scholar, ecumenicism requires me to be consciously aware that such and such a person confesses this or that religious belief. As opposed to suspending that belief, I expect that it will be openly and honestly presented to me. Now, I am not so naive as to think that there is value-free scholarship or value-free education in any absolute sense. But I do think a basic distinction should be drawn between regarding a person as a formulator of information and regarding him or her as an advocate, a voice, for a particular position.

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JAMES GUSTAFSON: I would like to try to respond to that. While there is a certain amount of that value-free approach, more is going on. The evidence is not only in the materials to which these people are exposed in their graduate studies, which goes beyond their own tradition obviously, but also in the kinds of writing that is coming out. I would illustrate that with the group that John Padberg has talked about. These Jesuits are open to Emerson, interested in American tradition. It is clearly affecting the way in which they are thinking as theologians, and I am sure it is affecting what they are teaching in the seminaries and colleges. It is not merely methodological, although I think clearly there is something in what you are saying. Would you agree with me, George?

GEORGE LINDBECK: Well, it seems to me that one needs to make a distinction, in addition to the one that you made, between openness and method. The developments that we are talking about on the scholarly level could not have happened without the changes of method. That is clear. The clearest example would be biblical studies. When one adopts historical-critical methods or at least is open to them, then Jews, Catholics, and Protestants read the biblical materials similarly and learn from each other.

The further distinction that needs to be introduced can perhaps be formulated in terms of the difference between interdenominationalism and ecumenicism, understood as the conscious encounter of the traditions. Interdenominationalism, the way I am using the term, often involves a loss of identity. One feels less and less distinctive. One has more and more cultural features in common. Boundaries begin breaking down.

The pan-Protestant developments of the nineteenth century are the classic case of interdenominationalism. The mainline Protestant denominations became more and more similar but nevertheless did not become a unified community. They retained their separate organizational structures yet became less and less distinct from each other. They were marginally differentiated from each other, the way breakfast foods are each competing for the same market and simply offering a marginally different product. There is an awful lot of that going on. I think most of what we call ecumenicism is of this general sort.

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If I may mention an anecdote, I was down in Atlanta three or four years ago visiting a very large Catholic parish, a new parish. It was the socially prestigious church in its suburban area, but in the southern context the people around were treating this Catholic church the way they would a Protestant church. The rector told me that the bishop had warned him that he ought to follow the rule that the head of every parochial organization should be a Catholic. He checked the twenty-odd parochial organizations and discovered that most of them had non-Catholic presidents. He abandoned any effort to give Communion only to Catholics. He told me about a young woman whom he had spoken to just the previous week. She had asked if she could join. She had been around for two years, was organizationally active and highly practicing. He just assumed she was Catholic. He said, "Of course you can get a transfer of membership. No problem at all." She said, "But you don't understand, Father. I am a Lutheran." Well, being an ecumenically inclined Catholic, he recommended that she try the neighboring Lutheran churches. She said, "I've tried all eight of them, and this parish is more like the one I came from on Long Island."

That is different from the genuinely ecumenical attempt to "edit texts." The different traditions need to edit texts in coming into contact with each other. They need to reach new forms of understanding but without losing identity. In the case of Christians, the hope is for unity, not homogenization like competing breakfast-food companies. This unity is one that does not destroy but maintains traditional distinctiveness and integrity. That is what the ecumenicism of the sort that I have been involved in most of my life is concerned with.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Religious education and the formation of boundaries.

GEORGE LINDBECK: That is right. I am very much concerned about maintaining boundaries and identity, but this needs to be done in new ways. With the disappearance of Christendom and the growth of pluralism and secularism, all the Christian traditions find themselves in a radically different situation. A reorganization of their forms of life and a reconceptualization of their relationships to each other and to Judaism, not to mention nonbiblical religions, becomes necessary.

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TIMOTHY HEALY: To take the recent history of the Jesuits, I was a "puppy" Jesuit when the first Jesuits came back to Fordham with degrees from Harvard, MIT, Yale, and Cal Tech. They were not welcome, were sharply resented, went through a very difficult period of reestablishing themselves within a tradition that said the Jesuit course of studies is enough for anything. Now, twenty-five years later, it is absolutely taken for granted that if you do a doctorate, you do it at the best place to do that kind of doctorate in. If that place is officially Anglican, like Oxford, so be it. If it's officially nothing, like Cal Tech, so be it. Religious affiliation has nothing whatsoever to do with the preparation of a young Jesuit academic. You go to the best place you can get into, and the society foots the bill for that, or some foundation does.

JOHN PADBERG: That was true of the East Coast much more than the Midwest. I was a puppy Jesuit about the same time. At St. Louis University alone, there were Jesuits who had doctorates from Cambridge and Oxford in England, Johns Hopkins, Harvard, and Berkeley, but the East Coast was far more conservative.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Far more conservative indeed. What mattered in that process was an openness to the university as a community in the United States. Before that the order's training in philosophy and theology was done at Woodstock, a rural farm in Maryland. In fact [pointing to the wall], there's the guy who founded it. He rode out until his mule got tired, stopped in the middle of a repulsive swamp, and said, "Here it is." The seminary was locked away. All the faculty were Jesuit. All the students were Jesuit. It was as hermetically sealed as you can get.

All of a sudden, twenty years later, quite mysteriously to the seminary profs, the rest of the corporate body of the Jesuits was willing to put the institution at Harvard or at Columbia. It was bid for by Yale. There was a body willing to accept association with the university and to leave completely aside the notion of whether it was Catholic, which made that shift possible. The most resistant forces in many cases came from within that seminary, not outside it. But that's a process that took long, at least in the East. The Middle West has always been ahead in Catholic things. John is right. They were far more open there than the Eastern establishment was.

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But we started from a position that I think you would find it difficult to imagine. You had the four years of theology and three years of philosophy, and that's all you needed. If you suggested that you should go take a Ph.D. in philosophy from Stanley at Harvard, the answer to that wasn't even rational. It was just, "Why? What could he possibly teach you?"

GEORGE LINDBECK: The phenomenon you're talking about now is a matter of provincial groups joining a high culture, making adjustments, and learning to communicate with each other on that level. As a Lutheran, I can say the same things have happened to Lutherans, for they also are for the most part of nineteenth-century immigrant origins. We are comfortable now in places where in my father's day Lutherans were not comfortable. We are present in universities that we were not present in before.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: You took over the Yale Divinity School.

GEORGE LINDBECK: The new dean of Harvard Divinity School is a Lutheran. That was unthinkable fifty years ago. Lutheran and Catholic representatives of their respective traditions can now talk to each other more easily through being members of the same high culture, but that is different from another phenomenon—learning to speak a new language to each other that is derived from our own traditions. We're learning how to speak to each other in our own languages.

Just let me try to make this concrete. Moshe Greenberg, who has been at Yale as visiting professor this past year, and Bard Childs, our Old Testament man, have similar concerns about the reading of Scripture. They both want to take account of historical-critical methodology but also to read Scripture as the holy book of the religious community, so that the ties to theology and devotional life are closer than both of them think it has normally been in historical-critical approaches. They have been spending three hours a week talking to each other about the reading of Hebrew Scripture. In the way they describe it, they read the Hebrew Bible in distinctively Jewish and Christian ways but learn from each other in the process. The Christian way of reading Scripture—I can't speak for the Jewish—changes in the process of this kind of conversation while still remaining distinctively Christian.

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STEPHEN GRAUBARD: And vice versa?

GEORGE LINDBECK: I think Moshe Greenberg would say to some extent vice versa, but I can't speak for a Jew.

TIMOTHY HEALY: I thought Mike was giving us too much credit, accepting as a long and established tradition what is in fact really shockingly new. I am saying that the secular part of the move was propaedeutic, first, to creating the scholars who could talk on this level, and second, to giving them an atmosphere and an intellectual background in which this kind of talk makes sense. Our initial presence to each other, George, is not necessarily hostile. I'd been there as a graduate student and attended your courses, and one thing I know about you is that you are not evil. Thirty to forty years ago, auditing one of your courses would have gotten me an absolute brickbat from a Jesuit provincial—"Why on earth are you hanging around Lutheran theology?" That would have been the accepted mood within the order, and the change has been radical, but it took several decades for that to happen. I was just trying to get it in that time frame.

DENISE CARMODY: There is still the reality that you spoke of before, and that is that the diocesan clergy is not being educated in this way, which means down the road there is an even greater potential clash because the diocesan clergy, the local priests in the parish and not the order priests, are the ones who are preaching the sermons, administering the sacraments, and sitting on the marriage tribunals.

TIMOTHY HEALY: And running the dioceses.

DENISE CARMODY: And running the dioceses. And therefore, their impact on the Catholic community is still very, very important.

ROBERT KIELY: Since I was the one who said that ecumenicism had seemed neglected recently, George's point is very helpful. Either we mean a different word, or we want to say that there's been a rethinking and a redefinition for some of us of what ecumenicism is or what it might accomplish. There have been contacts and processes of learning and cross-fertilization. What seems to me, as a lay observer from the Catholic perspective, to have, if not collapsed, at least slowed down is precisely what you referred to as the interdenominational trading sessions among official delegations. What you

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are saying seems to me important, which is that powerful interchanges are going on at the scholarly level. They are not breaking down boundaries so much as changing the way people see their own traditions and their own doctrines.

Also, a comment about George's anecdote about the Lutheran woman in Atlanta. At the participant liturgical and parishional level, quite apart from the official hierarchical delegations, people of various churches are interacting in strange and new and important ways. We are feeling more at ease in one another's houses but still keeping a sense of the furnishings of our own homes. In any case, I appreciate what he said, and I do think that whatever name one wants to give to it, there's a vital dynamic interchange going on, but it doesn't seem to me like what was called ecumenicism in the popular sense twenty, twenty-five years ago.

GEORGE LINDBECK: Intellectual developments that have great educational significance may occur without any public attention to them. By the way, Jim could give many illustrations of the general point I am trying to make. He wrote a book on Catholic moral theology that is a study of the interaction between the Catholic and Protestant traditions. It is used all over the world, both Catholic and Protestant, and has some Jewish readers.

TIMOTHY HEALY: George, to go back to your Atlanta story, it has been a decade since university priests bothered about trying to identify someone coming to Communion. I am quite sure that at every major liturgy here there are dozens of Protestant kids, and perhaps even Jewish kids, who want to share in this and do share in it, and there are no questions asked from the altar. I'm not saying that we publicize this. It's just a fact. Certainly, buckets of Protestant kids go to Communion with great regularity, feeling that this is part of the Mass and that they too should share in it. I can't think of a priest here who says Mass for students and who would question that participation.

JOHN PADBERG: Feeling comfortable in each other's houses—I have to again talk up. As I look around this table, almost everybody here lives, works in, and probably is from the East, except for the three of us right here in this corner. I lived thirteen years on the East Coast, but I am from the Midwest. There there is so much more of that feeling comfortable and so much more of the doing of new

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things, along with those parts of the Church in the United States that have finally gotten to the point, which eventually the East Coast is going to get to, of not having enough clergy. There is still enough diocesan clergy on the East Coast to staff the parishes, not only one for each, but two, three, four, in very large parishes, and they are—it's almost too strong to say—priest-ridden. That's what it is compared to someplace in the Midwest or the Far West, where so much more experimentation, not in the name of experimentation, but in the name of necessity, is going on. Unless you take that into account, you'll think that the Church is far more priest-driven for most of this country than it really is.

DENISE CARMODY: The priest comes once a month, once every two months—to large areas, not just to little ones.

GEORGE LINDBECK: And so you get this irony—there are more and more situations where women are exercising more real authority on the Catholic side than they are on the Protestant side, even though they cannot be ordained while the Protestants can.

DENISE CARMODY: You get terrible things, ludicrous almost, where the priest will consecrate all the hosts, and they're stored, like frozen Jesus, until it's time to distribute them. Or you get very poignant things, where a nun or a laywoman has been attending a family through a long illness, but when it comes to the funeral mass a priest from St. Louis has to come in, doesn't know the family, and the grieving people are angered that the one who nursed this mother and visited the children and comforted the husband can't say a word at the actual interment.

GEORGE LINDBECK: There is a crossover between the ecumenical and the women's dimensions. I want to illustrate this. The one place that I know of in which women Catholic theologians speak as official spokespersons of the Church is in ecumenical dialogues. For example, Elizabeth Johnson, who is a member of the Lutheran-Catholic dialogue in this country, speaks in that setting—appointed by the bishops' committee with the same authority Father Dulles has, who is also a member of that group.

STANLEY CAVELL: Each of us keeps coming back to the relation between education and religion. I think I should say a word for the

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godless. Ecumenicism is the conversation between religions. But the conversation between the secular and the sacred mustn't be lost here.

Where your faith gets threatened by education in rationality and where your faith in this education gets threatened by faith—these things are still fateful. You have at some point to cede your autonomy to a teacher and take what is said on faith. How do we understand this act? How do we feel we justify and warrant it? The role of science in Western culture has hardly been mentioned. But is it only we, people committed to the study of the human, who are tortured by these matters and maintain the spiritual difficulty? Is it that scientists, as such, know what they want from education, without conflict? What is a scientist "as such"?

A crisis of faith is sometimes brought on by a passage within a certain kind of secular education. Not every day, but surely once in every term, a moment comes in a class that I now even expect to come in which I feel pressed to ask, What is a university that I should be saying these things to students? Should I be ordained or anyway something more than certified to say them? Or should we be in a different place for me to speak so, even to worry so? Over and over I have had to come back to the fact that there is no other place for me.

It falls to me to assume curricular responsibility for Heidegger and late Wittgenstein in the philosophy department at Harvard—a chaotic department, a creative department. I mean, I'm likely to be the person the students will demand to teach Heidegger because I'm both interested and I yield to their demands to do it.

Now, there are times in which you feel the weight of the claim, on the part of both Wittgenstein and Heidegger, not to be talking about ethics, not to be talking about religion—I mean, feel the necessity of having to make the claim of denial, mostly implicitly—that is, to recognize that what they are doing may be taken, and mistaken, at any moment, at every moment, as an ethical or a religious enterprise.

It comes over you that their work is nothing without some ethical or spiritual call that they set in motion and resist. In the moment in which you are drawn by that, you ought to feel that you may be on false ground, which is not to say that you are in danger of raising a false issue. What is the theology of my position now? I feel I want to ask myself. I don't ask, What's the philosophy of my position? because the philosophy that I'm involved in has, as far as I have taken it, no philosophy of the teacher, or not a sufficient one. I ask for the

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theology of the teacher, not, I should say, for the sociology, because I am asking, What authorizes me to speak? I want to say, and want not to say, that whatever else, Heidegger's *What Is Called Thinking?* is perhaps a postreligious text, and so perhaps is Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*.

Now, one can say such a thing in the most debased way and leave students absolutely empty-handed. It isn't that I want this saying to be doctrine—it hardly amounts to a claim. Indeed, my fear—in part, of ungrounded doctrine—as I came to face my esotericism in these matters was a motive in my starting to publish in fair amounts. The thought struck me that if I was going to teach as and what I do, at least I should keep no secrets. I must tell the tales out of school. For the record, the tales I was just telling, for example about why I began publishing in fair amounts, are not the ones on the whole that I am likely to tell *in* school.

That the conflict between reason and faith is not over is testified to by professors of humanities who sometimes wish they had, and could declare, the radical obligation of faith and by professors of divinity who wish they had, and could speak for, the radical obligation to reason.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: My comment has some relevance, perhaps, to what Stanley was saying. I am interested in another phenomenon that one finds in some learned societies. The American Philosophical Association is one of them. A group of Christian philosophers meets during the APA meeting and now has its own journal—*Faith and Philosophy*. Some members are very distinguished philosophers. I was invited to attend the Christian philosophers' session when the APA met in Chicago, and I heard more conservative religious language that night from the evangelical philosophers than I'd heard for twenty-five or thirty years in any other learned society meeting. What does the phenomenon of Christian philosophers meeting with the APA mean about the sharp division between faith and reason?

Last weekend I participated in a session of what used to be the Catholic Sociological Society. It's now the Society for the Study of the Sociology of Religion. They are not merely sociologists of religion—they had a liturgy on Sunday morning. Members of so-called secular learned societies are finding quite self-consciously religious orientations to their work. This may be something really very distinctive

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about our present epoch. What you are talking about, as you've indicated, is a kind of confessional phenomenon. I can't think of any other period in Western history when believing professional philosophers tended theologically to be very conservative, much more conservative than many theologians. Philosophers who were religious in the past have generally been liberal.

STANLEY CAVELL: Yes. That has to do also with the case of the Orthodox mathematician within philosophy.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Or to give another example, I heard a philosopher lecture on the possibility of verification of Orthodox theological statements, which was a *tour de force* philosophical defense of the Nicene Creed. This is another example of what George is saying. Theologically I am much more liberal than George is, but it's interesting to understand precisely what George is saying. It's like your mathematician in certain ways.

GEORGE LINDBECK: I find myself wanting to relate something that was told to me by a Polish Franciscan. We've gotten together at international conferences on a regular basis, once every year for ten years. When John Paul II became pope, I was naturally very curious about what he had to say about the pope's theological orientation. Like any good loyal Pole, my friend is enthusiastic about John Paul but said that theologically there's a problem. His training is philosophical, not theological. It's in phenomenology. The result is he has no feel for the historical dimension of the faith. The implication is he is theologically inflexible.

TIMOTHY HEALY: It seems somewhere we ought to face the fact that a sincerely held religious belief, depending upon the subject matter that a teacher teaches, is absolutely bound to influence that teacher. And when you deal in the world of imagination, in the humanities and the hard sciences, I think we should look at that. It certainly influences the approach to a discipline. It influences the patterns of human relations within a university community, particularly the faculty community. Religious belief says something to the believer about the future of students, at least something about the virtue of hope, and it may indeed, because of its imaginative cast, determine the line of scholarship. In other words, just taking the

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believer, Christian or Jew, dealing with subjects where the imagination is called into play—thus history, literature, the languages and their literatures, and I should think also science—does the believer have a different apparatus in his mind and imagination than the nonbeliever? I'm not saying the hostile nonbeliever. I'm just saying the man or woman who would say, "I will have no religious talk."

No one wants to address what difference belief makes in the process of teaching and learning. Both processes are secular. One is very afraid of imposing belief, of preaching in the classroom, of trying in any way to cheat. On the other hand, let us consider these structuralists' critiques, which to me are imaginatively repulsive, and for which my lack of sympathy must be obvious every time I say the word, let alone if I try to follow an argument about an individual text. It seems to me that an imaginative grasp of what is and is not numinous makes a difference in teaching, certainly in the humanities, and I suspect well beyond them. I'm not talking in any confessional sense at all, but I am talking about a sense of religious belief.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Are you talking about religion only as a kind of spiritual sensitivity? Is your view of your task in the university that you are called upon to teach certain kinds of information and help the student become sensitive to its religious dimensions? Where we are custodians of the transcendent as it is found in texts, it is important, I think, to stress that we are not trying to open students to a specific confession but rather to open the student to new awareness, to the presence of mystery. If this is so, let us recognize its vital bearing on our theme of religion and education, for such a university teacher is a new kind of *magister*.

I don't think that this has to be apologized for. What does have to be apologized for, however, is the transfer to university education of types of teachers found in denominational settings. This latter is an abuse of our role as teachers and taking an illegitimate privilege with our students' imaginations. One must stay within the boundaries of the text and its concerns, not bring in new or extraneous values. Such teaching is vulgar, to my mind. Perhaps we should be a type of *magister ludi*—teachers enhancing the playfulness and development of the imagination.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: Also, there is counter evidence to what Tim is saying. Some people have a certain capacity for empathy without any

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self-conscious religious orientation. They are moralists or expounders of religious texts. Their work reverberates with authenticity to the religious reader. I think one of the great writings in the history of American theology is Perry Miller's chapter on Augustinian piety in the first volume of *The New England Mind.* I never met or knew the man, but Miller obviously had capacities for empathy that were quite different from any kind of observable stance, at least that I've ever heard of, in terms of his religious outlook. Thus, there are other factors than belief in this. I think there are the capacity for empathy and the intellectual qualities of imagination. I'd like to think that I can put myself into an atheistic text as well as an atheist can when I'm expounding texts and arguments in the classroom.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: I would even go so far as to say that it is a value imperative for me to teach subjects in depth. I consider one of my primary responsibilities as a teacher to represent habits of the mind that the student would ordinarily not come into contact with and to do so without any recourse to the cheap generalizations or neat resolutions of the vulgar. I consider that a moral imperative for myself as a teacher. The university should be one place in our culture where subtlety and contradictions need not be apologized for. This is part of our sacred vocation, to extend and play on Max Weber's famous essays.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Fairness and professionalism, I think, are central. I'm taking those as given. I'm taking Stanley's comment that he's not cheating—and by the way, I think the great protective is to make it a public act and put these perceptions where your peers can get at them, not just your students, which is the discipline of all of us who have joined the academy. But it seems to me that if we are talking about religion and education, there are differences between the believer and the nonbeliever in a range of the material that we cover that are significant.

I think back to a conversation Bob and I had last night about AIDS. It seems to me that this university has an ancient Catholic imperative to be seriously involved in this. And we are both horrified by a story somebody told us of a university that was offered a large sum of money for involvement and decided no, it didn't wish to be involved because of the excruciating social and legal problems it raised. It seems to me that this institution, Georgetown, or I, as a Jesuit, have

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absolutely no moral leeway in this. If I am leading this university, I should lead it to that involvement.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Tim, I would like you to expand a bit, for it raises intriguing aspects of the question of religion in higher education. Do you see your role as a religious man who is also the president of a university to bring the moral weight of the Catholic tradition to bear on certain questions? Is this a task you have set for yourself?

TIMOTHY HEALY: Largely, the job of leading a place is lending spiritual support. It is not intellectual, because you are not competent to do that except in a little tiny piece of it, and by the way, the longer you stay in the leadership role, the less competent you are in that piece. The erosion of any kind of scholarly grasp is really frightening. Seventeen years of this, and I am a cipher in anything except little tiny bits of John Donne. But there is a difference, I think, because I am a religious man, and the university knew this when it appointed me. I think there is a difference in approach to larger community problems that way, an approach to certain group realities within the university. It can go all the way down to the classroom. I cannot think that your possession of a Jewish tradition does not influence you.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: You are absolutely right. My tradition influences everything I do. And I believe that I have a responsibility to inculcate values. The task and moral burden is to do that responsibly.

ROBERT KIELY: In some ways my instinct is to say yes, of course it makes a difference for a teacher or a scholar whether one is religious. What kind of difference is harder to say. Let's say in my teaching or writing that I were to express or declare certain beliefs. Then I would feel uncomfortable about not being able to admit also that I have very great doubts. Does it mean that if I'm a religious person, I have solved all those questions of acceptance and faith? For a lot of nonreligious people, that is a misunderstanding of what it means to be religious, as though certain questions have been closed off forever. I don't want to say that. That certainly is not part of my interior sense of what I mean by being religious. So, on one hand, one wants to declare, at least if one gives public assent to an established religion, "This is what I give my assent to insofar as I am capable of it." It doesn't mean that there is not a constant process of questioning and doubt and that the abyss or the blank does not exist for the religious person as it does for anyone else.

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I wonder sometimes also—and this, except to a very few of my students, I would never dare say, because I think they would never ever understand it—sometimes I think that, at least for a Christian, what it means to be religious as a scholar and a teacher is to say in some ultimate sense that these things—the words, the images we are working with—don't matter. Aquinas, after his lifetime of doing philosophy, said his writing was all straw. That could be misconstrued if not understood in a certain kind of religious context, but there is a part of me that always believes that—that it matters and doesn't matter.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: One of the imperatives of the university is to raise these matters to self-consciousness.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: I think what you have raised, Tim, is one of the most delicate, and one of the most provocative, questions.

TIMOTHY HEALY: One of the most puzzling to me.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: But you didn't mean simply a person of a particular religion. You meant a person who holds sincerely held religious beliefs. Are those religious beliefs not inevitably going to affect his teaching and his scholarship? I think one of the reticences within American universities today has to do with this kind of issue. It would be a source of great discomfort to many departments to find that a deeply religious man—which is more than a comment on the fact that he takes Communion on Sunday—was about to enter a field where it is thought that his religious opinion could influence his teaching. I think it would cause an enormous stir.

TIMOTHY HEALY: There is one further complication, which destroys the distinction between the public and the private, which I take comfort in and in which Bob obviously does too, and that is in dealing with undergraduate students because they will not acknowledge that distinction. The student wants to know where you stand, Stanley, what you really read in the late Wittgenstein. He brings to this the destroyer of the whole public forum, which is his or her affection for you, to which you respond. All of a sudden, whereas in the classroom the professor is in his public forum and quite safe, head-on-head in a tutorial or walking after class on a college pathway, this other human relationship is laid on you, which you will

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accept or you wouldn't stay in the trade, and it destroys the public-private distinction.

And then in the climate of respect and learning, but also of affection and commitment, a pressure is put on you in which you can no longer hide under the easy distinction between public and private. When Bob says, "I would not say this to most of my students," I know there are some to whom you *would* say it, Bob, and here is where it seems to me we are on a kind of ground that is very dicey and very loaded. It seems to me that if I were a graduate student, I would get at you head-to-toe, and you would have to let me because I would do so on the basis of friendship and that comes with the trade. This is not a question of saying we met and we got to know each other. With faculty members, that may be true. When I'm a student, I am laying my vulnerability on the line and asking you to respond to it. You will respond. And suddenly we are in a totally different world about what your beliefs are and how they condition your thinking. I am still free. I am not saying that I am a groupie. But I want to know, and I have a right as your graduate student to ask you. And I think you have an obligation to tell me. Once you step into that world, the distinction breaks down.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: One can exaggerate this as a problem for religion. There are lots of other believers in universities who have ultimate objects of confidence and loyalty that inform or don't inform how they teach things just as much as religious people do. While it is quite appropriate to raise it as a special problem with reference to religious teachers, dogmatism at some deep level and certain kinds of deep faith at some generic human level are fairly evenly distributed, I find, across university departments. So I think one could ask the same question about people who have no religious identity—to examine themselves in the same terms we would have to examine ourselves in, those of us who have some religious conviction.

STANLEY CAVELL: I'd like to come in here. There are lots of ways of failing to be a good teacher. Incompetence is a famous one. But when you are talking about the dimensions of failing to articulate where you stand, where that matters, you need not reach as far as ultimate concern. There is an analogous failure with respect to one's own subject. I have particularly in mind a cynicism toward one's subject, cynicism toward one's profession, one's university, one's colleagues,

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and of course toward one's students. I don't know of a good academic or philosophical interpretation of the corrosiveness of such a condition.

I say that I need a theology of my own role and want a philosophy of my role. I am thinking about it, about the theology of the bad preacher or of the bad priest, for example. I guess it is no secret that not all teachers are perfect. Given my interests, I feel this matters more, or perhaps is more noticeable, outside the sciences. Theology can find that since the effectiveness of the preacher depends on the saying and accepting of the Word, the inner state of the preacher is not at issue. Or it can find that since effectiveness comes from the institution of the Church, the inner state of the priest is again passed by. But how close are the analogies for the teacher? To what extent can we find the Word to have its effect, and equally from all texts—philosophical, poetic, narrative—no matter what, or despite, its pedagogical framing? And what role does an institution of learning play in effecting learning? Does it work primarily in its discipline, say grading and certification? Or through its representation of a worthy past and its expectation of worthy successors?

GEORGE LINDBECK: I find myself confused about the number of issues circulating. There seems to be a connection, but I wonder what the connection is. What of the cynicism problem that you were talking about? Some teachers at divinity schools—two particular persons come to mind—got into difficulties with their students because their students reacted against what they took to be a cynical way of presenting religious material. It was a grave problem for these teachers, but they would have had the same problems had they been dealing with any other subject that is humanistic because it was their personal style. It didn't have anything to do with their teaching religion. Nor was it a problem of religious orientation. If you had asked them, one would have said, "I'm an agnostic," and the other would have said, "I am a believing Christian," but they both had the same problem of presenting material cynically.

Perry Miller was mentioned. He is an excellent counter example. Miller was the sort of teacher of American religious history that any divinity school I respect would love to have even though he was an agnostic. Miller would be much preferable to the cynical-sounding believer I mentioned. The ability to read and expound a text in a way

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that is sensitive is relatively independent of the question of personal faith.

MICHAEL FISHBANE: Stanley, while you were talking, I was wondering whether you had suddenly redefined the religion-education equation, so that now religion means teaching through integrity and cynicism becomes an antireligious act.

STANLEY CAVELL: I meant to be simply expanding on Jim's words of warning to us neither to exaggerate nor to confine the specifically religious dimension that influences teachers. I was trying to give an instance of ways in which I thought that something you might think was a religious dimension—I assume you can provide a religious interpretation of cynicism or skepticism, which is another way of talking about some of these things—can be corrosive, poisonous, in one's teaching life. I am not pushing it as a religious question. I am saying it depends on what your view of religion is. You can say that since it is a spiritual matter, of course it is a religious question. Or you can say that the problem with spiritual questions in a modern age is that they strike us as psychological—individual, empirical—and that the psychology at our disposal is so imperfect that it does not know how to articulate a spiritual question.

TIMOTHY HEALY: George, one of the places I start from is the airline that welcomes you to Washington with "We hope you have a pleasant stay in the nation's capital or wherever your final destination may be." My final destination is not of their concern.

STANLEY CAVELL: Ours is a subject with a literature. I mentioned before that I think a couple of major texts need to be reassessed. James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* is one. Newman's *Idea of a University* is another. Another is Kierkegaard's *Philosophical Fragments*. That is explicitly a place where the difference between the teacher and the preacher is talked about. It is comparatively clear, and it may be that somebody has got something fresh to say about that for our issue.

TIMOTHY HEALY: Before we break, can one full-time administrator make a plea? There is nothing to read beyond three or four texts that is of any help at all in these matters. The *Chronicle of Higher Education* ran an article on what college presidents are reading, and they are all how-to books, how to exercise authority. God help us! I

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don't know if I have any authority left. But on this level, for an ex-academic trying to make sense of the university, there is extraordinarily little published that is worth reading, and you keep going back to a few old, established texts. By now, I probably have John Henry Newman memorized.

There is very little way in which one can feed oneself outside quite extrinsic ways. I wonder what the *Chronicle* would have made out of my reading that mysterious book *The Death of Virgil,* by Hermann Broch, this summer. A fascinating book, but the prose is absolutely defeating. It makes Faulkner look like a brisk writer. Sentences go on for twelve or fourteen pages. There is a fantastic administrative audience for reflection, and I feel like screaming that the faculty, at least the literate end of it, is not really much help on understanding this institution to which most of us have given our lives.

Thanks for the Kierkegaard. That is one I don't know. I will pick that one up, but I would love to have some of the present company talk about this mysterious thing, the university, which is very, very puzzling. You get absolutely no mercy. You are pushed back to the basic questions. The day you walk into the office, somebody says, "Where do you want it to go?" And my only answer is, "Where indeed?" And I can quote *Alice in Wonderland* and duck and hide under the desk, but feeding the head is extraordinarily difficult.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: Stanley, I do think it is a challenge. What one or two books would you add?

STANLEY CAVELL: Perhaps Kant's *Struggle of the Faculties,* lately under discussion in France. I might mention that I have sometimes suggested in what I have written about Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* that it is a work of instruction, that it conceives of philosophy as education. Perhaps someone could be encouraged to take that suggestion further. I would say something comparable about Heidegger's *What Is Called Thinking?*

FRANK MANUEL: I think Rousseau's *Emile.*

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: I would certainly add Max Weber, both *Science as a Vocation* and *Politics as a Vocation.*

JAMES GUSTAFSON: You remember that the background of the Weber is a very Lutheran understanding of *Beruf.*

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: Of calling, of the inner voice, yes.

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GEORGE LINDBECK: Stanley, when you were talking about your problem of the authority by which you say these things, you sounded just like Luther. He did not believe in individualistic reading of Scripture. He was reading it for the community. He wasn't a bishop, so he fell back on the fact that he had a doctorate, an academic degree that authorized him to deal with these things.

STANLEY CAVELL: Well, this is at the heart of the French onslaught and a principal reason that I think the philosophical disdain for it as well as a literary swallowing of it whole have been uncreative responses to it. There have been increasingly in the past two or three years individual creative responses, surprising developments more from the side of English studies than from philosophy. Precisely what that is about—in this it is certainly not alone—is the authority of, let us say, reading. Of course, you can say that what the French say is that there is no authority, so anything goes. Well, I suppose some of one's fellow human beings—some for and some against the French work—think that way about their lives. But the anxiety of the question by what authority one approaches and reads texts, texts that have in them forces that draw you into them and forces that repel and deflect you, is a response to a crisis in that authority. The French onslaught is a response to that crisis. No response to their work will be significant that does not contain its own reading of that crisis.

FRANK MANUEL: The Pharisees did ask this question of Jesus. By whose authority? The answer was very specific—the Scripture.

GEORGE LINDBECK: He gave two answers. One of them was a refusal to answer.

FRANK MANUEL: So it becomes circular.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: In the last minutes, we have been getting back again to this matter of the text. We talked about the interpretation of the text and then this whole question of the canon. What is in the canon? What is not in the canon? How does the canon change?

ROBERT KIELY: We have talked very little about science, and maybe that is just as well because it could be a whole other subject—science and religion. But perhaps if we had a scientist here, at least a certain kind of scientist, that person might well say that for the physicist or the chemist or the physician, there is a canon, there are texts of their kind that everyone must know. I mean that you must build on certain

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language systems, and even certain notions of documentation, that everyone must know. You can't proceed to the next step without them.

It has often struck me that the behavior of students in certain of the sciences, particularly premedical sciences, though perhaps the term *belief* in regard to what it is that they are working at may seem like an odd word, looks to me like the behavior of what I might have imagined of the Jesuits or members of a religious order in the very earliest periods of its formation. These people work terribly hard, spend hours in the laboratory, are extremely disciplined, seem absolutely committed to a choice that they have made quite early, earlier than humanists usually make their choices about their vocations. That is to say, there is a vocational element in their behavior as students, which they may or may not associate with belief. In fact, they may think that *belief* is too weak a term for what it is that they are doing. They are working in an area of certainty and value and importance that has almost an absolute quality for them, that for many would have nothing to do with religion. Yet some of the attitudes are strikingly analogous.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: I think we are missing a scientist in this group, and to have had one here would certainly have changed the discussion.

JAMES GUSTAFSON: We haven't talked about something that Wendy O'Flaherty has been concerned about, and that is non-Western religions—the impact they have on Western religions and how instruction in non-Western religions can influence liberal arts education. We missed Wendy very badly in that regard.

STEPHEN GRAUBARD: She is anxious to be involved, and I will try to represent to her what we have done. I am immensely grateful to you, Tim, for making all of this possible. It really did begin with a talk between us.

TIMOTHY HEALY: I would like to say thank you in return, above all for a kind of discourse that is so rare. I hate to see you all go.

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John B. Cobb, Jr.

Education and Religious Pluralism

CAN THERE BE EDUCATION THAT has no religious basis? That question grows increasingly urgent. Of course there can be training in reading, writing, and arithmetic as well as in technical skills for business and industry. But in the past, education has meant something more than that. It has meant the cultivation of understanding of the self, of society, of the world. It has meant the appropriation of wisdom from the past and learning how to use it in the present. It has meant refining taste, learning to discriminate what is excellent, developing historical consciousness. It has even meant character formation. Can any of this take place with no religious basis?

The United States is engaged in an experiment to find out. Thus far, the results are not encouraging. As the religious basis is abandoned, the aims of education narrow and success even in this narrower area declines. One of the functions of religion in human history has been to widen horizons of concern and interest and to provide measures of importance. With the loss of the religious basis of education, the world beyond the personal experience and recognized practical needs of students recedes from attention. Better and worse become hard to distinguish from private gain and loss.

Are there alternatives? We cannot return to a society in which public education primarily reflects the values and self-understanding of one of the religious traditions operative in society and ignores or belittles the others. It is equally impossible to identify what is common to all religions or life orientations, including secular ones, and to base an education on that.

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I can see only three alternatives to the present decay. One would be to abandon shared public education in favor of pluralistic education. Every community of meaning would be free to develop its own schools and transmit its own values. The state could still insist that training in a set of skills needed to function acceptably in society be included in all curricula.

A second alternative would be to abandon even this much commonality and indeed required schooling in general. Its replacement with a voucher system would allow the several traditions to establish their own schools and other types of educational institutions to develop so as to teach skills or meet felt needs with little regard to underlying values.

In the past, public education has functioned in the assimilation of persons of diverse religious and cultural backgrounds into the American melting pot. Both of the alternatives I have mentioned would leave this function aside. They would lead to a society made up of separate groups, each strengthened in its own identity. National identity would weaken and with it the hard-won spirit of mutual tolerance. Whether the gains would outweigh these losses is difficult to say.

The third alternative may be utopian. It would be to seek a shared educational experience for most young people, an experience based on a synthesis of religious values rather than on a common value or no value at all. Representatives of various communities of meaning would engage in extensive dialogue to learn from one another and from the educators with whom they would be in conversation. These communities might discover that although their central concerns differ, they are not mutually exclusive. It might be possible to devise an education that would transmit the values of multiple communities of meaning in ways that could satisfy each while educating a new generation that would genuinely profit from all.

The hope underlying this proposal is that what is most important in each of the religious and quasi-religious traditions, while differing from what is most important in the others, would not contradict or exclude the others. Education could be based on the joint contributions of a plurality of traditions. Each, of course, would need to be carefully formulated so as not to exclude the others.

At the elementary school level this approach has been tried. Rather than forbid the celebration of Christian holy days in the school, it has

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been possible to continue these celebrations and to add those of Jews, Muslims, and Buddhists. This approach need not simply objectify the faith of each community. The celebrations can be participatory up to a point. Developing guidelines for such participation is difficult but not impossible.

Certainly there are risks and difficulties in celebrating any religious holy days at all in pluralistic communities; and certainly this step by itself would have only minor effects on the educational system. What is needed goes much further and deeper. Some beginning of the required reflection is occurring in interreligious dialogue, but for the most part the seas on which I propose to launch are still uncharted. We cannot know in advance whether across these seas there will be another shore, but when the alternatives are so bleak, there are reasons to experiment along these lines.

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

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Daniel Callahan

Tension Between Religion and Philosophy

FOR THE PAST THREE DECADES I have struggled in both my personal and my professional life to sort out a pair of fundamental tensions. The first of these became clear to me in the late 1950s, when I was a graduate student in philosophy at Harvard. In those days the department was fully under the sway of analytic philosophy; linguistic and conceptual analysis of an elegant sort, rigorously pursued, was the norm. There was only so much of that I could take, and for relief I spent a good deal of my time at the Harvard Divinity School. There one could find the larger questions of life and morality being pursued but little rigor and rarely much other than rhetorical elegance.

The divinity school, in short, had all the interesting questions; the philosophy department had the powerful methods. But there was no way to bring them together, and few even wanted to try. I don't sense a great change since those days in either field; and for me that has had a persistently disturbing quality: how are we to ask the important questions in a careful way? I still migrate back and forth between philosophers and theologians. They have not, from what I can see, solved that problem, and they talk with each other only fitfully.

But just what is the problem? That question brings me to the second of my two unresolved tensions. I ceased being a religious believer nearly twenty years ago but have always missed the kind of depth it made possible, the kind of probing it pushes one to. What vanished for me was any sense of religious awe or religious experience; it all became personally dead, and the alleged rational reasons for religious belief soon disappeared as well (e.g., proofs for the

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existence of God). Yet it is difficult, I think, to lead a full and satisfactory personal life—and a fully rich philosophical life—without some sense of the religious issues and possibilities.

What is the problem, then? Just this, that without some feel for religion, some sense of awe and transcendence (or, if you will, awe and immanence), the questions posed by religion lack a full mooring; and an elegant methodology will not provide it. And yet an elegant methodology that runs from those religious questions has limited value only. It is good for intellectual needlepoint but not for knitting those fuller and more ample garments that we need more than ever in our lives and society.

I wish that higher education could help to make some sense of these two tensions in my life. I wish that theology and philosophy could talk well enough in the university to pursue them. I wish that more philosophers had the nerve to break their professional mold so as to ask harder and deeper questions and were less skeptical about the possibility of making progress on them. I wish that more theologians were more demanding of their beliefs and less credulous of their methods. I wish, that is, that both religion and philosophy would once again try to work together, if only for a time. Independently, neither is likely to be a powerful influence in education. In partnership, they might be.

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George Lindbeck

The Search for Habitable Texts

IT MAY BE USEFUL to expand on the importance of texts for religion, which I kept emphasizing in my contributions to the discussion. In the background of my remarks is the surge of interest in the last fifteen years or so in the literary-critical (as contrasted but not opposed to the historical-critical) study of sacred writings, especially the Bible. Literary critics, inspired by an earlier work of Erich Auerbach (*Mimesis*, 1950), have taken the lead. Close reading of the biblical text with all conceivable techniques, including deconstructionist methods, has rapidly increased in departments of literature.

The result, as the editors Robert Alter and Frank Kermode put it in *The Literary Guide to the Bible* (1987), is that "the general reader can now be offered a new view of the Bible as a work of which it is entirely credible that it should have shaped the minds and lives of intelligent men and women for two millenia and more" (p. 2).

Converging with this literary approach has been a new attention among students of religion to premodern exegesis. The overlap is considerable between Jewish literary and midrashic analysis on the one hand and Christian narrative, typological, and allegorical reading on the other. Powerful interpretation and religious power come to seem virtually coterminous. A fundamental shift in the conceptualization of the nature of religion is taking place in some circles. It is the wider intellectual context of this shift I would like to try to characterize.

It is related to the loss of Enlightenment confidence in reason and progress. More and more, the worlds within which human beings live

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are thought of as socially, linguistically, and even textually constructed. Sociology, anthropology, history, philosophy, and literary studies have all contributed to this development. We are aware as never before of the degree to which human beings and their perceptions of reality are socially and culturally determined. Nothing is exempt from this conditioning, not even the natural sciences. Within our own lifetime, historians of science such as T. S. Kuhn and philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Willard Quine, and Robert Rorty (to mention examples only from the Anglophone sphere) have undermined the nineteenth-century distinction between *Natur-u.-Geisteswissenschaften*. Physics and poetry are not differentiated ontologically or epistemologically: it is not that they refer to distinct types of reality or arise from distinct ways of knowing that makes them different. Rather, they are seen as products of social practices that, though diverse in structure and purpose, have overlapping features.

This explains why in the discussion I said, and why one hears rigorous scholars say, as if it were a commonplace, that the epistemological grounding of quarks and Homeric gods is basically the same. It is rhetorical force rooted in communal practice that gives them their cognitive status, and when rhetoric and practice change, so does that status. Homeric gods were real and quarks nonexistent for the ancient Greeks. Their status is reversed for us, and we have no definitively formulatable, context-free criteria for determining who is right and who is wrong (although we may have such unformulated implicit criteria).

In its Anglo-American forms, this recognition of radical historicity is not necessarily associated with skepticism, relativism, or irrationalism. The truth available to human beings in this life is justified belief, and the fact that the canons of justification vary does not make the search for truth and the use of the best available canons (which differ from age to age and from subject matter to subject matter) any less imperative.

The recent literary emphasis on textuality becomes understandable against this background. Texts, understood as fixed communicative patterns embedded in rites, myths, and other oral and representational traditions, are already basic in preliterate societies. They function in different contexts, for different purposes, and with

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different meanings and thereby provide frameworks in which utterances (speech acts) are socially significant and effective. This power is enhanced when they take written form, for they can then have a comprehensiveness, a complexity, and a stability that is unattainable in other media (not even in modern electronic and cinematographic ones). In short, texts project worlds in which entire cultures live.

Furthermore, without such texts, it is difficult and perhaps impossible for large-scale communities of discourse to develop. Sinic civilization, as it spread from China into Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, depended on the Confucian corpus; the various types of Buddism, on interlocking Buddhist canons; and Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, needless to say, on their respective sacred scriptures. Without a central core of special and familiar texts, social cohesion becomes more difficult to sustain and depends more on bureaucratic management, the manipulation of public opinion, and ultimately perhaps totalitarian force. Reason in the form of science or philosophy is too restricted in scope (it neglects imagination, for example) and too contradictory and changing in its pictures of the cosmic setting of human life to provide a satisfactory substitute. What is needed is texts projecting imaginatively and practically habitable worlds.

A habitable text need not have a primarily narrative structure (with the exception of the Bible, none of the canons earlier mentioned do), but it must in some fashion be construable as a guide to thought and action in the encounter with changing circumstances. It must supply followable directions for coherent patterns of life in new situations. If it does so, it can be considered rational to dwell within it: no other foundations are necessary or, in today's climate of opinion, possible.

Much contemporary intellectual life can be understood as a search for such texts. Marxists and Freudians, for example, now rarely seek to ground their favorite authors' writings scientifically or philosophically. They simply ask that they be followable, that they be construable in such a way as to provide guidance for society and for individuals. Thus it is that Enlightenment systems, which once claimed rational foundations, have now turned into foundationless hermeneutical enterprises.

Classical biblical hermeneutics was born in a similar foundationless era when followable texts were in short supply. The Jews had a great advantage: not only did the monotheistic character of their sacred book give it universal scope and unity, and not only did the

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long history and diversity of the writings it contained give it extraordinarily wide applicability in varying circumstances, but it had directive force and community-building power far superior to the philosophical systems that were its only real rivals. Once it was made applicable to non-Jews by the Christian movement, Scripture proved widely appealing. It was a preeminently habitable text in a world needing habitations, and the nations flocked to it.

Ours is again an age when old foundations and legitimating structures have crumbled. Even the defenders of reason think it unreasonable to ask anything more of a philosophy of life, or a religion, or the texts that give richness, comprehensiveness, and stability to philosophies and religions than that they be followable. There are fewer and fewer intellectual objections to the legitimacy or possibility of treating a classic, whether religious or nonreligious, as a perspicuous guide to life and thought. The only question is whether one is interested and can make it work.

No one is arguing in quite the way I have just sketched, but such considerations help explain, I suspect, the fascination over the past two decades with textual traditions as central forces in religion and culture.

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Robert Kiely

Religion in (and out of) the University Curriculum

One of the subjects that was on my mind during the conference but that I did not find the right moment to introduce is the split in attitude toward religion in our institutions of higher learning and in the American population as a whole. If the academy was once a major source of religious and moral instruction in this country, it is now, at the university level, a repository of institutionalized agnosticism and, some might say, of moral relativism.

We did touch on some of the historical reasons for the separation of religious instruction from the public and private educational enterprise in a democracy. And I think all of us agreed that tolerance, civic peace, and cultural diversity were values worth maintaining in our educational system. But there are some troubling consequences of this separation that we never quite got around to. One is the alienation of the academy from the general culture, the training and formation of a materialistic, skeptical elite out of touch with the society that it presumes to manage, represent, and inform. It is true that scholars and their schools have always been in some fashion set apart and that a certain degree of detachment is necessary for the pursuit of learning. Yet the claims and functions of the academy in a democracy are never wholly separate from the economic, political, and social structure of the nation. Though certain aspects of mass culture—merchandising, media, the role of technology—have become standard subjects in the curriculum, the serious exploration of

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popular religion—not cults but the most common forms of expression of all religions—is still rare.

I am certainly not ready to argue that a particular religious point of view should prevail in our classrooms except in certain denominational schools, yet I do think that in the inevitable process of dismantling sectarian domination of the system, the whole idea of religion suffered in our institutions of higher learning. One impression that is commonly given to American undergraduates when they first arrive on a university campus is that truly educated and smart people cannot continue to be believers. Of course, there are chaplaincies and comparative religion courses and, in some universities, excellent divinity schools, but the primary message is that religion is private, peripheral, and intellectually suspect. For thousands of students, this message must seem like part of an Alice-in-Wonderland reversal, since in the world in which they have grown up religion is public and central. They may also wonder why in universities, in which everything is supposed to be open to question, the religious questions seem to have been settled and silenced whereas in other parts of the society they continue to be debated.

I recall sitting next to a well-known professor of economics at a faculty dinner around the time of the Jonestown mass suicides. He observed that like Jim Jones, Jesus had probably been a depraved egomaniac bent on leading his followers to an early grave. Discussion of the subject turned out to be impossible because the professor had no knowledge of the Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, or any of the noncanonical early Christian writings. What most surprised me is that he did not seem to consider such knowledge necessary for formulating his theory. It hardly needs to be said that had I ventured an economic theory based on so little information and understanding, I would have been seen to be breaking a fundamental rule of academic decorum in addition to making a fool of myself. Yet I think dismissals of religion within some branches of the academy are similarly ill-informed and arrogant. They are based not on analysis and patient reflection but on ignorance and prejudice.

As Marxists, feminists, Freudians, and others have reminded us, no approach to history or literature is ever free of a system of values. The loosening of denominational control over higher education was inevitable and healthy, but the exclusion of religion as a serious subject of study in a typical undergraduate curriculum is another

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thing. True, majors in comparative religion and courses in the Bible, the Koran, the Bhagavad Gita, and other religious texts are available in some schools. And more and more of these courses are likely to be taught by professors not bent on conversion but openly sympathetic to religious experience. Yet as long as religion remains a subject about which the well-educated feel it is acceptable to have strong opinions and little knowledge, an extremely odd message will be sent to students. On all other subjects, they are taught that it is essential to know something before one speaks. On this subject alone is it permissible, perhaps even desirable in some circles, to speak without allowing oneself to be tainted by information, never mind wisdom.

Often during our conference discussion most of us felt that we could examine religion or education but that it was somehow difficult to keep both of them before us at the same time. Part of the difficulty surely stemmed from the fact that while theology, church history, Scripture, and so on can be taught, religion resides in and evades the well-ordered text and spoken word. Another part of our difficulty was that for a variety of social, historical, and intellectual reasons, religion and education began parting company late in the nineteenth century. Religion has not gone away, as some predicted it would, but it has changed. Some of the most highly trained natural scientists and humanists in our universities are still thinking of religion in nineteenth-century terms, or more commonly, they hold nineteenth-century opinions of religion but do not think about religion itself at all.

Religion and education is a tough subject to analyze. Students come to universities without a common body of knowledge. Faculties complain about this deficiency, and some try to respond to it. But there are still large pockets of happy know-nothingism with regard to the study of religion. The message from some quarters is: "The less you know, the more you can say. (P.S. This message is not applicable to law, medicine, or business.)"

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Timothy S. Healy, S. J.

The Contrary Model

ONE REFLECTION I wanted to think through a little more before speaking of it was Robert Kiely's remark that a university founded on a religious tradition is, almost fatally, in tension with many of the intellectual currents in secular education, perhaps even in opposition to them. There really is nothing strange or frightening about that in a Catholic university, and I thought at the time that the comment, if properly applied, could explain many of the inner tensions with which such universities have to deal.

I say there's nothing frightening about such an opposition because that is, after all, the way Catholic universities began. They were founded in the 1800s to mount an assault by training those suffering prejudicial exclusion from the job market, particularly from the professions. The world has changed since the mid-nineteenth century but only somewhat. In some quarters, as is evident in intellectual discourse, anti-Catholicism is still the anti-Semitism of the intellectuals. A broader and knottier problem is the widespread substitution of the university itself for the religious tradition out of which it grew. The phenomenon is not strange to believers, especially to Catholics. It was very easy for denizens of great medieval abbeys or for the builders of cathedrals to find in the fabric of these works substitutes both for the Church and for the faith that begot it. To grasp the modern parallel, one has only to eavesdrop on the adulatory worship of the University of Chicago in which Professor Bloom so devoutly indulges.

Perhaps the sharpest point of opposition, and the one most likely to generate a creative tension, is our growing sense within Catholic

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universities that in our stubborn hold on tradition we have something of great value, indeed something much needed, to add to the nation's intellectual dialogue. Our memory harks back to a history still vital in the life of the republic. Even a cursory acquaintance with that tradition shows that it demands theological as well as historical learning, valid disciplines in themselves, along with a habit of mind that can look beyond decades into centuries and fight off the claims of both relevance and immediacy. Our religious experience of human nature under grace easily finds Jerome and Chrysostom, Pascal and Newman helpful contemporaries to John Courtney Murray and Karl Rahner.

A second thrust that will bring disharmony into American university discourse is the increasingly harsh criticism Roman Catholicism makes, here and elsewhere, against the worship of power and the arrogance of industrial civilization. All of us wring our hands over the materialism that seems to dominate so many of our students' ideals and agendas, but it is the religious angle of vision that mercilessly finds in our own young so many pale copies of ourselves. Humanism minus theology can lead to generation after generation haunted by Ibsen's ghosts.

The growing alienation between all the mainline churches and even democratic national governments also takes its most acute form in Roman Catholicism. For all that the curia in Rome belabors what it sees as Marxist thought in "liberation theology," the gap between the Catholic moral teaching and entrepreneurial capitalism continues to widen. The comfortable American disjunction between Marxism and free enterprise is increasingly viewed by Catholics in both North and South America as less than total and, quite simply, irrelevant for most of the peoples on the earth. The urge to build a world beyond mere nations is disturbing even to benevolent empires.

Finally, those of us who live and work in universities that have kept alive a serious religious tradition can give our colleagues in secular education a stern but rewarding reminder. Neither this republic nor any university, neither democracy itself nor even great learning can be a sufficient or a satisfying end for the promise and the power of our students. In this understanding, our tradition has a long reach, which goes all the way back to the Book of Deuteronomy. When the young seek our help in orienting heart, soul, and might, the Lord God is still the one and only God.

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Steven M. Tipton

The Church as a School for Virtue

THE EXTRAORDINARY DISCUSSION of religion and education in this issue of *Dædalus* implies questions about the educative nature of religion and the religionlike nature of modern education, which I want to sketch in relation to the American polity seen as a moral community.

America's constitutional provision against the establishment of a state church serves its even more fundamental provision for the free exercise of religion. In contrast to the freedom from religion or its protection as a personal option for those so inclined, this ideal of free exercise embraces the moral purpose of the church* as an institution of learning and teaching about the whole of social life. It is a "school for virtue."[1] Its virtues are civic as well as religious. Its students are citizens as well as believers. In tandem with the family, the church teaches virtue by practice and example, by word and worship, and by question-and-answer catechesis.

As schools for virtue, churches have no business lobbying the state on behalf of their members' interests. Nor should they seek to mobilize and manage public opinion to their side of any social issue. But the church as the community of all God's creatures spans the boundaries of particular churches, synagogues, temples, and ashrams. It bridges the borders of nations. In this sense the church has an inherent responsibility to the whole of human society to seek its common good and take an exemplary part in the moral argument of public life.

*I have chosen to lowercase the term *church* throughout my article to be consistent with my references to the institution as a social-ethical ideal.

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By the usual numerical measures, the United States today is the most religious society in the modern industrial world. Ninety-five percent of us say yes when asked if we believe in God. Nine out of ten express a "religious preference." Two out of three belong to a local church or synagogue, and four out of ten participate in weekly services. At the same time, other numbers have recently grown all too familiar to many in the "mainline" Protestant churches, along with liberal Catholics and Jews. These congregations have lost 10 percent of their members and aged rapidly over the last two decades. The leading cause of these losses is young, well-educated adults becoming unchurched. In contrast, the conservative Evangelical and Fundamentalist churches have held onto their children and continued to grow.

Yet mainline Protestants such as Methodists and Presbyterians make up 33 percent of American church members, twice the 15 percent who are white conservative Protestants such as Southern Baptists and nearly triple the 9 percent who are unchurched. Moreover, as a result of upward social mobility and cultural assimilation in the last generation, growing numbers of Catholics, now 26 percent of the population, have come to resemble mainline Protestants in their social, political, and religious views—and in their lower level of church participation and doctrinal orthodoxy.

The erosion of mainline religion's strength has been more a matter of ethos than of numbers. Although it remains a strong majority group, the mainline has a growing consciousness of itself as a beleaguered cultural minority, caught between the widening freeways of the secular city and the rising bastions of the religious right. The churches that have been most troubled since the mid-1960s are those that have upheld the synthesis of religious and political liberalism that has long defined the moral middle ground of American culture. In this period of cultural conflict marked by resurgent Evangelicalism and spreading religious individualism, these churches of the center now find themselves off-balance, beset by modern mystics and sectarians.

Once the unchurched were as a group relatively uneducated, socially marginal, and culturally alienated. Today they tend to be well educated, urban, employed in managerial and professional work, in step with a cosmopolitan life-style, and motivated by an expressive

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ethic of personal fulfillment. They look more like religiously nonchalant yuppies, if you will, than the strident Madalyn Murray O'Hair or the fervent village atheist.

Moreover, when we use active and regular participation in a local church as the yardstick, the unchurched population expands to some four out of ten American adults with similar social profiles. They are overwhelmingly religious believers, but they "choose to express their religiousness apart from churches and synagogues," as pollsters put it. A much larger and socially diverse group of Americans seems to share some such perspective, even if they act on it differently. Thus, four out of five persons polled by Gallup in 1978 agreed that "an individual should arrive at his or her own religious beliefs independent of any church or synagogue" and that "a person can be a good Christian or Jew without attending a church or synagogue."

Now, there is more than one way to interpret these statements and this larger picture of increasing religious voluntarism and movement in religious affiliation, and there is more than one moral to draw from them.[2] Let me propose that these social trends do not mean that institutional religious attachments are breaking down today. Rather, they are coming to depend more on intrinsically binding ties between the moral outlook and the way of life persons actually hold to on the one hand and the moral vision and community their churches embody on the other. Fewer Americans now need to go to church to find marriage partners, business contacts, or social respectability. The erosion of traditional denominational loyalties and social inducements to sustain them, especially for the educated middle class, places a new premium on the moral coherence and sacramental soul of the churches. It does so at a cultural moment when many mainline denominations find themselves confused about who they are theologically and what they should be doing in catechetical and practical character formation among themselves and in civic conversation about the meaning of faith lived out in a good society.

If we consider the church as a school for virtue in this light, it becomes clear, as James Gustafson notes, that practical ignorance of religious traditions and texts is a problem that extends well beyond explicitly educational institutions to religious communities and the families of their members. Colleges and high schools may offer remedial catechesis, but its effects will be checked both by belatedness and by the inability of formal schooling to teach religion by worship

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and way of life (and not only by word) across the full range of exemplary social practices and relationships that shape character. In all but the most monastic or sectlike schools, there will be some of the abstracting of students from the narrative content of the tradition and its community that troubles Timothy Healy. Further, the subsumption of belated catechesis into the college student's development of a "personal philosophy of life," as George Lindbeck puts it, reflects individualistic cultural shifts too broad for educational reforms alone to roll back.

Such shifts are particularly striking in the case of American Catholicism, the discussion indicates, given its pre–Vatican II benchmarks. These include the Scholastic doctrinalism of the Baltimore Catechism and the defensive closure of exclusively Catholic parochial schools that "protected the faith" of immigrant church members while advancing their social and occupational prospects. These shifts also contrast with Evangelical and Fundamentalist churches, which for all their stress on individual salvation, piety, and responsibility, foster orthodox belief, binding moral authority, and compelling character formation within some of the strongest voluntary communities in America. Fundamentalists, as George Marsden shows, read inerrant Scripture with the same unbroken faith in inductive rationalism that Enlightenment philosophers brought to Baconian scientific treatises.[3] This early modern faith justifies rejecting the historicist and culturalist premises of later forms of social science, which invite moral relativism and epistemological agnosticism among present-day liberals.

Faced with such contrasts, the cultural functionalists Gustafson sees in the universities supporting religious studies as a conservative counterforce to *anomie* have their denominational counterparts. They no less vigorously urge recovery of dogmatic beliefs and ethical absolutes to strengthen communal religious loyalties, and thereby reverse membership declines in the mainline churches.

Conversely, if we probe the religionlike aspects of modern education, we find it transmitting moral visions and practical virtues fitted to the civic and administrative institutions of a modern liberal democracy. Central among these tenets are ideals of individual rights and liberties, procedural justice, and social contracts. These enter what George Lindbeck refers to as "thin" theories of the good. They imply both moral and religious tolerance. They leave questions of

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further moral ends, binding duties, and cardinal virtues to be decided as matters of personal choice, interpersonal agreement, and value consensus within families, friendships, and religious communities seen as lying outside the public realm.

Peter Berger has argued that while America today is ostensibly a denominational society without a state church, a cosmopolitan and corporate "knowledge class" has gained for secularity something of the status of a new orthodoxy, institutionalized in churchlike forms within the state itself, especially its administrative organs.[4] These include its social welfare and education departments, the public elementary and secondary schools, and the universities.

Berger calls for compromise and civility on both sides. The secular community too must accept its status as one denomination among many instead of a state-sponsored form of cultural orthodoxy. On the religious side, the Fundamentalist right should abandon its theocratic ambition of conquering the entire society for Christ, and the liberation theologians on the left their dream of an all-embracing religious and moral community under the banner of "the new Christendom." In America such dreams are infeasible or downright dangerous, although milder forms of sectlike religious communities can shelter individuals and fit functionally into the economic and political requirements of modern mass societies.

Even as he praises the freedom of the denominational marketplace, Berger harks back to de Tocqueville and Durkheim to stress that such religious pluralism is healthy only as long as it nurtures a moral consensus broad and strong enough to integrate and order the society as a whole. But he says little about how religion is to help sustain this consensus.

In contrast, *Habits of the Heart* seeks an ecclesiological alternative to the sheltering or aggressive sect at one extreme and the denomination as a loose association of like-minded mystics at the other.[5] The answer lies not in any effort to recover some bygone establishment of American cultural Protestantism, we, its authors, argue, let alone a medieval or a Tridentine model of the Church Triumphant. It lies in a practical renewal of the church ideal within the denominational forms of American religion.

Modern mysticism is ethically idealistic yet vague in practice, one with all humanity yet socially unbound by communal discipline or love. It is culturally eclectic yet unbothered by enduring moral

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contradictions among our traditions and institutional arrangements. As opposed to the mystic's pursuit of inner experience rather than social loyalty and commitment and the sect's impulse to withdraw from the world or to conquer it, the church seeks to engage the world as it is, wrestle with its moral contradictions, and transform its institutions and ideals.

The church too has its characteristic weaknesses. It is tempted by authoritarianism on the one hand and by too-easy compromise with worldly powers on the other. A truly public church, then, must be willing at critical points to draw on the ethical rigor of the sect and resist co-optation by wealth or power. It must refuse to compromise with the larger society and must instead stand as a witness community over against it. But only the church as a type of religious community and social ideal can overcome the sect's strongest tendency today—that is, to withdraw from the world and let it go its own geopolitical or market-driven way, however unjust or uncaring, in return for the state's religious tolerance and legal support on a few centrally symbolic issues. Only the church can free us from having to be unblemished saints or reprobate sinners, from having to conquer the world or abandon it, from having to decode a theological and moral Esperanto or surrender to subjectivity and instrumentalism.

In advancing this strengthened ideal of the church to rebalance the sectlike and mystical aspects of modern denominations, we need to reject a simple moral-consensus model of culture. Instead we must learn to recognize the moral ordering evident in the plurality of our traditions—biblical, classical, and modern—and the conflicts among them over how we ought to live and arrange our institutions.

* * *

Moral pluralism is not the cause of the problems we face in making sense of how we should conduct our lives and our public affairs. And moral absolutism is not the cure for our problems. The core of the problems lies, on the contrary, in the cultural overgeneralization of individualism to represent a sort of moral Esperanto. How to redress the moral imbalance this creates is the key question we face, for the effect of this overgeneralization in an institutionally differentiated society is to garble and cut off a cultural conversation that embraces other modes of moral discourse and more traditional perspectives on

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life's meaning. The overgeneralization of individualism's utilitarian and expressive languages is institutionally grounded in our experience of the instrumentally organized, procedurally regulated bureaucracies of a corporate economy and administrative state, coupled with the expressive fulfillments of middle-class leisure and romance. But these institutions do not comprise the whole of our lives or our social order.[6]

Every moral tradition seeks to encompass selfhood, society, nature, and ultimate reality in its own terms. The universalizing nature of each moral tradition enables us to conceive of how to live the whole of our lives in accord with the whole of reality, not just one slice of life in accord with one institutional sphere of the social world. The biblical tradition, for example, enables us to envision how to love and obey God, not just in worship but in business, politics, and family life as well, so that these activities too become worship in their fundamental meaning. The classical republican tradition enables us to extend a principled concern for the common good and reasoned dialogue regarding it to the whole of life seen as a forum, not just the academy and the townhall. In contrast, the utilitarian tradition extends its bottom line from the market to every interpersonal exchange revealed as a matter of wants and uses with calculable costs and payoffs. We see ourselves producing and consuming political and cultural goods, accumulating and investing social and symbolic capital. The romantic, meanwhile, urges us to "give our all for love," and the aesthete or dandy stylishly shows us how to live the whole of life as a work of art.

On the one hand, we all grapple with the universalizing character of our moral traditions and with our drive for integrity of character and culture. On the other hand, we grapple with our varied experience of social institutions and the way contrasting moral perspectives ring more or less true to a given social sphere of our experience. Thus, calculating costs and benefits along a bottom line most effectively interprets our experience of the market and justifies our behavior in it. Due process, individual rights, and contractual commitments make the most sense of bureaucratic life. Self-expression and intuitively shared tastes most easily embrace the meanings of romantic love and leisure. Principled reason and truthful dialogue most clearly define the disciplines of education, professional work, science, and the lawful ordering of public life.

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In every moral language we begin with certain assumptions and reach certain conclusions about ultimate reality, society, the natural order, and interpersonal relationships. But each moral perspective is peculiarly oriented to one dimension of reality as primary—the biblical to divine ultimacy, the republican to the civic integrity of society, the utilitarian to nature and the economy, and the expressive to interpersonal emotions and perceptions. Recognizing these differences in the ways each moral tradition actually accomplishes the interrelation of self, society, nature, and ultimate reality leads us away from asking once and for all which moral perspective will best orient all of us to the whole of reality. It leads us toward asking again and again about particular problems and their social settings: What is the interrelation of traditional moral perspectives within and across the institutions of a differentiated society like ours that will best orient all of us to the whole of reality?

It is in this sense that the overgeneralization of individualism into a moral Esperanto makes us so tongue-tied in civic disagreement and so color-blind to tradition in arguing through it. By overexpanding a vision of public life as a marketplace for competing interests and an administrative center for distributing utilities, and by overnarrowing it as a covenantal community and a forum for debating our common needs, virtues, and ends, we are failing to do justice to one another and to care for one another as we should. This statement holds true no matter how hard we try to guarantee the rights of individuals, satisfy their interests, and respond to their feelings. Without fuller recourse to the biblical and republican traditions, we cannot even adequately understand what it means to be just and caring, nor can we sustain these virtues as attributes of communities. Yet neither can we do without the moral languages of rights, interests, and feelings. We must not try to replace Lockean rights or cost-benefit calculations with republican reason in all of life, nor even within politics. We must seek to balance these forms of knowledge more truly. We must not try to replace an overgeneralized individualism with an artificially imposed form of biblical authority or republican debate. Just the opposite. We must seek to correct the biased belief that individual interests, feelings, and rights in their utilitarian and expressive sense can tell the whole truth about the meaning of a good society.

What holds us together as a people is not some comprehensive cultural agreement conceived as a value consensus. Rather, it is the

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coherence of our moral disagreement and argument within an ongoing cultural conversation that embraces multiple moral languages, practices, and their social settings. Across every line of social difference we have enough in common to understand one another when we disagree and to argue about our life together. We can understand one another because all of us share a culture woven of contrasting moral traditions, which themselves embody continuities of conflict over how we ought to live together. All of us lead lives that span the different social institutions and practices to which traditions ring true.

Once we recognize the diversity of what we have in common, we can focus our educational aim. We can better learn to sustain dialogue within and among moral traditions. We can learn more patiently and powerfully to wrestle with their interpretation and application so as to make moral sense of the present and its problems.

* * *

Our public need for the substance and integrity of traditionally religious and civic forms of moral insight entails a commitment to the interdependent forms of community that inspire such insight and the ways of life that enact it. This public need pertains to our concern for guiding the modern American welfare state itself, not simply for resolving the problems it faces. In sharp contrast to the half century of civic and religious debate that surrounded its rise, the welfare state has since 1960 undergone great expansion and then reversal with little real moral argument about its growth and limits or, more important, about its overarching purpose, order, and justice.

Political consideration of its recent growth has chiefly concerned the legitimacy of claims to social provision by numerous "clients" according to the dynamics of group-interest pluralism. Its recent reversal has taken place on much the same ground, with the state's mainly middle-class clients welcoming "tax relief" in the face of eroded real income and bolstered military spending.

It is ironic, as Theda Skocpol notes, to see farmers sustained since the New Deal by public works and price supports who now "oppose government spending, welfare, and bureaucracy and merely want interest subsidies for farmers."[7] They are joined by blue-collar union

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members and middle-class suburbanites long helped by public programs that range from the Wagner Act to home mortgage subsidies. "The unionists want particular jobs in particular industries saved through federal bailouts, but oppose 'welfare handouts,' and the middleclass suburbanites want college loans preserved but oppose 'bureaucratic quotas' enforcing affirmative action for blacks." Now that "federal spending does not appear to guarantee a healthy economy and a steadily growing pie of benefits and opportunities from which every interest group can have more with no hard public choices," Skocpol concludes, we must face the need for effective political coalitions to span class, race, and urban-rural interests and set up "authoritative governmental centers" to engage in national economic planning.

But under conditions in which asserted rights often conflict and aggregated interests always unbalance the public budget's bottom line, we must also face the need to deepen our moral argument into our reasons and arrangements for common provision. We can agree with Michael Walzer's affirmation that "the welfare state . . . expresses a certain civil spirit, a sense of mutuality, a commitment to justice. Without that sense, no society can survive for long as a decent place to live—not for the needy, and not for anyone else. . . . Communal provision is required for the whole range of social goods that make up what we think of as our way of life. Not my way of life or yours, but ours, the life we couldn't have if we didn't plan for it and pay for it together."[8]

We cannot plan and pay for the social goods that make up *our* way of life, however, unless we learn from and argue with one another about the morality of the diverse ways of life we share. The meanings of *mutuality, civil spirit,* and *justice* are not uniformly evident to all of us even within a single institutional sphere. This is not just because our interests conflict and our perceptions vary with our social locations. It is also because we interpret these ideas within different moral traditions, which we read in ways that vary with our cultural location. Liberal democratic ideals make up neither a stable synthesis of these underlying traditions nor a neat alternative to their conflicts of meaning. We live in a constitutional democracy that is also a biblical republic, itself a creature of cultural contrarieties that no Enlightenment deism can erase or modern mysticism ignore. We will not be willing to plan and pay for our essential social goods unless we

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can elicit from one another and criticize the "thick" moral goods and exemplary stories from contrasting traditions that enable us to envision our society as a moral community. As long as it remains a morally neutral association of communities with their own values and life-styles, each of us will be moved to take a public part in the social order only when it is *our* rights that are being threatened or *our* ox that is being gored.

What are the institutional conditions needed to cultivate genuinely civic discourse and the sort of persons who can practice it? Such moral conversation requires a circle of persons small enough and possessed of enough shared time and learning to permit them equal participation in turning a topic round and round.[9] If it is to extend beyond small elites, thoughtful and decisive civic conversation in a mass society requires economic production, bureaucratic efficiency, and distribution of benefits that are sufficient enough to free the time and attention of women and men of every race and economic class for shared reflection. Beyond the limits of public service as a form of professional altruism or administrative expertise, the moral intelligibility and compelling invitation of civic life rely on the interdependence of such conversational practices across a range of institutions of learning that enable us to live out their lessons in community. This range includes schools as well as families and churches.

Because shared public languages and arguments about how to live together, not identical interests or shared values, are what unite us as a people, we need an educative and civic conception of community instead of the homogeneously organic idea of community that now prevails.[10] Rather than strive simply to celebrate our common convictions and to broker our opposing interests, we need communal as well as political institutions to encourage debate about our moral differences and our confusions about how to live together. We need to encourage such debate instead of foreclosing it for the sake of collective self-interest in a portion of the nation's economic pie or the comfortable fellow feeling of the neighborhood or congregation. In other words, we need to revive an educative ideal of politics based on truthful argument instead of administrative procedure or legislative interest brokering. We need to revive a more covenantal and catechetical conception of religion, committed to conciliar dialogue yet rooted in the sacramental soul of shared worship and resistant to mystical subsumption into philosophical liberalism.

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Instead of overprivatized pastoral care for the many and underpublicized political activism for the few in the denominational equivalent of a cultural free market, the church as a school for virtue, like a good school itself, offers the polity a model for civic life more like a forum than a marketplace or an administrative bureaucracy. The church can take part in both the shared argument and the peaceful cooperation of public life in forms that transcend trying to manage subjective consensus among mystical individuals or preaching theocratic truth to reprobate unbelievers from atop sect walls.

Insofar as the church knows itself to be truly catholic (with a small *c*), it knows that it cannot fully serve the needy without drawing everyone else into the task of cocreating a good society. Insofar as it is catechetical and sacramental, it knows that it cannot draw people to this task through some simple identity of interests or consensus of values. It can draw them only through convictions inspired by a shared sacramental life and then offered up to critical public dialogue. For all the inspiration and consolation of its community, the church offers the larger society no prospect of an orthodox heaven on earth or a cheerful congregational fellowship writ large. It offers the sometimes uplifting, sometimes tragically troubling, often uncomfortable practices of a moral community where we cannot escape or exclude the strangers we are to engage in argument as well as love.

ENDNOTES

[1]Here and later I draw freely on Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven Tipton, *Habits of the Heart* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), especially chap. 9; cf. Stanley Hauerwas, "The Church and Liberal Democracy," in *A Community of Character* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1981), 72–86.

[2]Wade Clark Roof and William McKinney, *American Mainline Religion* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987).

[3]George Marsden, "Preachers of Paradox," in *Religion and America*, ed. Mary Douglas and Steven Tipton (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 163.

[4]Peter Berger, "From the Crisis of Religion to the Crisis of Secularity," in Douglas and Tipton, *Religion and America*, 14–24.

[5]Robert Bellah et al., *Habits of the Heart* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 243–48.

[6]See Steven Tipton, "Moral Languages and the Good Society," *Soundings* 69 (Spring-Summer 1986):167–71.

[7]Theda Skocpol, "The Legacies of New Deal Liberalism," unpublished manuscript, 1982, 20–21.

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[8]Quoted in Skocpol, 21–22; see also Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 64–91.

[9]Ralph B. Potter, "Qualms of a Believer," *Soundings* 69 (Spring-Summer 1986):124.

[10]See Christopher Lasch, "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism," *Soundings* 69 (Spring-Summer 1986):60–76.

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

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Isadore Twersky

Random Thoughts

In reading the transcript of the planning conference in Washington, which I could not attend, my initial feeling that the conceptual area under discussion needed to be expanded was reinforced; the point was made early and forcefully in the meeting. Even if an analysis of religion and education were to remain the pivot and goal of the *Dædalus* issue, it would be necessary to push back the frontiers of the discussion. Religion in its most comprehensive sense—religious experience, religious symbolism, religious behavior, religious aspiration, and religious epistemology—needs to be examined.

In the course of such an examination, the semantics of the working title would be clarified. Does it make sense to speak of 'religion' in the singular as a meaningful abstraction, as a clear and cohesive entity? Does religion speak with one voice on basic ethical-social issues? Is the message of religion predictable and unequivocal? Or do we in fact deal with a heterogeneity of religious attitudes reflecting the diversity of social, political, economic, and, of course, philosophical, positions?

The liberal-conservative demarcation seems to be very formative and repercussive, and hence the religious rhetoric is pliable and flaccid. Varieties of religious experience and religious thought need to be delineated. That religion has been a divisive force in history is a commonplace; "uncivil religion," to use the phrase of Robert Bellah and Frederick Greenspahn in their exploration of "interreligious hostility in America," is emblematic of a good part of the history of religion. This involves politics, institutions, holy and unholy alliances and is not my concern here.

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I was thinking, in the first instance, of whether we are able to discern a basic metaphysical or ethical bond uniting *all* religions: Does religion, because of its value system, demand certain attitudes? Is the dignity of life, for example, an anthropocentric or a theocentric principle? In other words, is it relative or absolute?

The revival—the renaissance or recrudescence—of religion is a phenomenon that demands meticulous analysis; this is particularly so in light of the false, historical-sociological predictions concerning the atrophy of religion and the ascendancy of secularism. In the course of studying the contemporary religious resurgence, we must step back and review the Enlightenment ideology—its presumptive attractions and strengths as well as its defects and disadvantages. If Schleiermacher aimed to reconstruct theology in the wake of the Enlightenment, today we need to reconsider the Enlightenment in view of recent religious developments. They include liberal theology as well as a variety of neoorthodox and existential ideologies. The return to religion may to some extent be rooted in and related to the inadequacies or oversimplifications of earlier thought.

One corollary of this development would be that we should seek to engage not only people who are formally in the field of religious studies but religiously committed people who are reflective and articulate and who would be able to describe in general nonconfessional terms the nature of their commitment, the meaning and impact of their religious experience, the views they have of secularism or other antireligious ideologies. Sensitive, perceptive, introspective scientists and humanists not formally in the field of religious studies but able to use its categories and constructs would presumably make significant contributions to the discussion. Scholars, particularly university teachers, do not regularly have the opportunity to spell out their personal commitments, nor do they consider it appropriate in purely academic settings.

A word about Judaism. It is well known that Judaism did not have good press, popular or scholarly, in Western civilization; its religious phenomenology was neither understood nor appreciated. Its halakocentricity—that is, the central role of a carefully constructed, finely chiseled normative system (the halakah)—was puzzling and provocative and was usually treated pejoratively; suffice it to mention the Kantian and Hegelian perceptions and presentations of Judaism. This

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problem remains; the tenacity of halakah and the fact that it is generally misunderstood need to be noted.

Let me add that I myself am very much interested in the dialectical relationship between 'religion in essence' and 'religion in manifestation' that lies at the very core of Judaism and its religious-intellectual saga. The halakah is best seen as a tense, vibrant, dialectical system identifiable by its beautiful blend of romanticism and classicism, its insistence upon normativeness in action and inwardness in feeling and thought. While students of religion may find in Judaism an opportunity to see how legal details and prescribed modes of behavior reflect an ethical infrastructure and a theological suprastructure, practitioners of halakah may regularly ask to what extent they combine objective, prescribed performance with subjective, experiential awareness.

What needs special attention today (Frank Manuel alludes to it) is the commitment, enthusiasm, and dedication shown by so many Jews to the study of Torah, the written and the oral Law. This is a remarkable phenomenon: while the purpose of study in Judaism is practice, we have here a kind of intellectualism as an all-consuming form of religious service. No apologetics, no self-consciousness, no discomfiture. The deepest religious experience is to *study* and understand the Torah; education, the process of learning, is religion.

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

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Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty

The Case for the History of Religions

I HAVE READ with great interest the transcript of the Georgetown conference, and I am very happy to have this opportunity to say in print what I might have said then aloud. It seems to me that the discussion focused almost entirely on the role of the teaching of our own religions, with nary a word about the religions of others, an unfortunate oversight that I would like at least to point out, if not to rectify.

To begin with, precisely which students and which teachers are we worried about? The problems differ for the teacher in a university or a seminary or a high school. They differ again for the people who define themselves as "the culture"—generally, but not entirely, white male Christians who have designed and benefited from the European and American systems of formal education over the past few centuries. And the problems differ also for the many groups who have never been part of that culture but who have religious traditions of their own that they have never lost or who are inspired to create other, alternative traditions.

Perhaps for our purposes, it would be better to divide our subjects into several groups of Americans who find themselves at various stages of religious commitment. Using Bultmann's term *demythologization* to denote disaffection not merely with myths but with religion in general, we could say that there are the undemythologized, the demythologized, the remythologized, and the thoroughly unmythologized.

From the start we may be able to exclude from our discussion the thoroughly unmythologized, the people who have never had, and

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never will have, any inclination to take religion seriously; we may of course study them, but it is unlikely that we will be able to teach them.

The undemythologized, at the other extreme, are the people who are still religious in the old-fashioned way, the devout churchgoers, the people who have never lost what has been called their first naivete. There have always been many people of this sort, of course, and indeed there are now many new ones, only some of them Fundamentalists. Many are not at all naive about their naivete either. They are religiously sophisticated and literate, aware of the flaws in the traditions to which they are committed and of the available alternative traditions but still happy to worship within their own traditions. These people are the ones with whom teachers in seminaries and related institutions primarily deal, though of course university and high school teachers also have such students.

The demythologized are the people who have lost their first naivete. These are the secular (or radical) humanists, a group that includes many professional scholars of religion. These are the people for whom, as Nietzsche said (or because Nietzsche said it), God is dead; these are the post-Enlightenment rationalists. This group, though smaller than the first, may still be in many ways the dominant voice in our culture. They are the ones with whom secular universities ideally and theoretically deal—though in fact their classrooms are filled with people of all sorts of religious commitment.

The remythologized are the people who have begun to react against secular humanism but who are still unable to return to their first naivete. They have eaten their way through Marx and Freud and are still hungry, sometimes for a second naivete. These, I think, pose the most interesting challenges both to religion and to education.

The ambivalence of the remythologized is matched by the uneasy ambivalence of many scholars who teach religion in the universities. One issue that was touched on at the conference but never really treated is the question of the legitimacy of an educator with a strong personal faith commitment teaching in a secular educational institution—public or private—given that small matter of the U.S. Constitution making the church otiose in comparison with the state. This problem, about which I have written elsewhere, is somewhat

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muted, if not entirely avoided, if one teaches about other peoples' religions.*

My primary concern is not about the teachers but about the students, who are increasingly ignorant of their own religious traditions yet still susceptible to religious impulses, often ill founded and misdirected. One way to find out what is embedded in the pseudo mythologies that engage the demythologized and the remythologized nowadays is to study these narratives in the context of traditional mythology, to see just where they do and, more significantly, do not serve a religious function.

The work of Mircea Eliade, if nothing else, long ago established that mythology still survives, bloody but unbowed, in American culture. It may be seen in films, in children's books, and in all sorts of unexpected places. But for most of the demythologized and perhaps also for the remythologized, the surviving mythologies of American culture no longer perform the function of traditional mythology, though they may share many of its themes and even its forms. The surviving mythologies do not shape our lives with traditional meaning. They neither comfort us, as traditional myths can, nor shock us, as inspired retellings of traditional myths can.

Soap operas and myths may sometimes appear to be about the same archetypal human problems; but soap operas do not ask the same questions about these problems that myths ask, nor do they ask other important questions in the same words. Science fiction, too, often contains kitsch mythology. The myth of the incarnate god is reduced to the comic-book tale of Superman disguised as Clark Kent or Wonder Woman disguised as Diana Prince; the evil look-alike or shadow double becomes a clone created by extraterrestrial invaders and body snatchers. The shaman's voyage to the gods has become a Star Trek, and the battle between gods and demons a Star Wars.† Aliens can be gods; Mr. Spock is the most famous example, but the paradigm began much earlier in what might be called the Shazam

*See my presidential address for the American Academy of Religion, "The Uses and Misuses of Other Peoples' Myths," published in the *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 54 (2) (Summer 1986): 219–39; and my forthcoming book, *Other Peoples' Myths* (New York: Macmillan, 1988).

†Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, "Inside and Outside the Mouth of God: The Boundary between Myth and Reality," *Dædalus* 109 (2) (Spring 1980): 93–126.

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syndrome. In one science fiction film, *Chariot of the Gods,* the heroes of the classical Greek myths appear as aliens.

Science fiction usually lacks the rich texture of meanings of traditional mythology, however; students respond immediately to the quality of the bizarre in science fiction, but they must be taught to respond to the less immediately accessible meanings hidden behind the wilder bizarreness of great religious fiction. Though some science fiction does deal with great cosmic and ethical questions, and even resorts to a transcendent element at times, it usually lacks the substance that traditional mythology draws from its tradition. In soap operas and science fiction there are instances of what Eliade termed the degradation of symbols.

What is the appeal of such false mythologies? They attempt to fill the gap left by traditional religious education. The rejection of the religious communities into which they have been born, their given ritual communities, has left the majority of secularized Americans with nothing but an emasculated mythology of atheism and solipsism, a degraded mythology that is found not in churches but in films and children's books. Even, however, where myth is bereft of ritual and has become a mere story—a religion deprived of a congregation—it has once again begun to draw to itself a kind of secular ritual community through the growth of cults, such as those that developed around "Star Trek" and the books of J. R. R. Tolkien.

The possibly mythical function of science fiction is supported by a ritual community of sorts—the computer covens that have sprung up all over America, users' groups that form a communications *communitas* with modems and discuss such metaphysical questions as the nature of human intelligence and the possibility of life on other planets. Their terminology is often theological too. My favorite item is Resurrection Software, a disk used to retrieve lost files (souls), which may have been lost because the operator failed to perform operation "Save." Although such groups have no commitment to the myths of "Star Trek" or Tolkien and no group that will hold them responsible to live in a certain way because of these myths, their members do live much of their lives through such paradigms.

One reason students often become groupies for their parareligious myths is perhaps a reaction against the terror of religious solipsism, the danger of lapsing into what Robert Bellah in *Habits of the Heart* calls Sheilaism, after the religion that Sheila Larson invented for

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herself. But some people avoid Sheilaism and, by taking up the myths of an already existing religion, save themselves the trouble of reinventing the religious wheel. Now, to take up foreign myths together with their already existing religious rituals is to convert; this does happen, but it raises a host of problems that go beyond the subject at hand, the subject of religion and education.

More often, the student merely picks up the foreign text and uses it privately. It might be argued that these books, used out of their true context to attain what Stanley Cavell calls a certain parareligious experience, do not avoid the problem of solipsism. But this need not be the case. The real danger of solipsism arises when the religious experience is entirely unmediated, even by a text. In reading the *Bhagavad Gita* or the *Tao Te Ching,* the student who has at least some inkling that the book has been loved by hundreds of believers for hundreds of years feels himself or herself to be in the company not only of the authors of these texts and of the ghosts of all the Hindus and Taoists who have read them but also of all the California hippies who have read them—an odd community but a community nonetheless.

And by going outside America to search for religious meanings, the student may also avoid the very real danger of the bigotry that is so often nourished in the pious but textually uneducated minds of the undemythologized and the remythologized. Pluralism is certainly one answer to this problem. If you get into the import-export business with myths, you need a large inventory to account for all the merchandise that is bound to be lost in transit, but eventually you do sell something. Relativism does expose us to serious dangers, as Allan Bloom points out in *The Closing of the American Mind.* These dangers harm us, though, only if we are determined to hang on to a single truth given to us by our own culture or admit that this truth might be replaced by another single truth from another culture. It is not necessary to choose one single variant from many myths from many different cultures; it is far better to seek many variants. There are ways in which students can healthily assimilate the great religious ideas of other cultures.

Though the otherness of other peoples' religions does provide serious obstacles to our understanding of them, it also enables us to do a kind of end run around some of the obstacles that stand in the way of our understanding of our own religions. Foreign texts sneak

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past our guard to tell us the things that we will not listen to from our own texts; foreign texts present to us meanings that may exist in our own culture but that we may ignore or undervalue or resist when we encounter them in their familiar form, prophets in their own country.

Once we have learned what is "other" about other peoples' religious texts, we are equipped to turn our lights back upon ourselves, to photograph the cameraman. If we attempt a sympathetic understanding of the Hindu treatment of the Untouchables, for instance, we may have to face up to our assumptions about many outsiders in our own supposedly democratic society (the insane, the poor, the elderly, criminals, people with AIDS or cancer, gay people, black people, women). It is certainly hard enough to attempt thinking like a Hindu while continuing to think like ourselves; but once we even begin to try, we may find ourselves occasionally thinking as we believe a Hindu would about our own society. However removed we may be from anything like a direct encounter with reality, this can only be a humanizing experience.

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